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The premise of the thesis is that attention to the processes that produce the green state opens 
up avenues for analysing African states from the perspective of the green state. This study 
engages the theory of the green state within the African context to understand the complex 
processes that enabled the greening of the state in Botswana.  I draw on the example of wildlife 
conservation policies and practices in post-independence Botswana to argue that the greening 
of the state entails processes by which the state interacts with non-state actors to enact 
environmental reforms over a long period of time. Such interaction maybe initiated by the state 
or by non-state actors who are determined to pursue an environmental agenda or to implement 
environmental strategies through organs of the state. To account for the processes that enable 
the greening of Botswana, the study employed an interpretive approach that is dependent on 
qualitative data. The study primarily draws from archival research and key informant 
interviews with academics, environmental consultants, representatives of civil society, relevant 
government departments and ministries, the private sector in Botswana’s tourism, and an 
interview with former President Ian Khama. To understand the greening processes, the thesis 
analysed the qualitative data between 1966 and 2018. These historical periods cover the 
presidency of Seretse Khama (1966 – 1980), Ketumile Masire (1980 – 1998), Festus Mogae 
(1998 – 2008) and Ian Khama (2008 – 2018). 
  
The four key findings of the study are that, first, the collaboration between authorities in 
Botswana and international agencies and actors enabled the greening of Botswana. These 
agencies and actors, financed environmental-related programmes, facilitated the development 
of green institutions, and influenced the country’s conservation policies. Second, the study 
demonstrates that political leadership is instrumental in the greening of Botswana. The four 
presidencies paid attention to environmental protection though there were variations in each 
presidency. The presidency of Ian Khama stands out as an important period in greening of the 
state as he strengthened the greening process by realigning the wildlife economy with political 
power. Third, the study found that the greening process necessitates the internal restructuring 
of the state through the establishment of green institutions, which serve to realign state 
activities with the green agenda. Fourth and lastly, the study reveals that the greening of the 






These relations played out through the marginalization of the local people in the ecotourism 







The State and environmental governance  
(A)ny green transformation of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-
dependent (Robyn Eckersley, 2004, p. 5). 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the changing role of the state in the provision of public goods and services as 
well as in environmental protection have been a subject of extensive debates in the fields of 
political science, economics, international relations (IR) and political ecology. The debates 
centres around the erosion or diffusion of state power and authority in the delivery of public 
goods and services as a result of the increased participation of non-state actors in policy making 
and implementation (Rosenau, 1992; Kooiman, 2003; Rhodes, 2007; Hysing, 2009; Reed and 
Bruyneel, 2010; Bäckstrand et al., 2017). This literature highlights that the state has been 
hollowed out through the processes of decentralisation and neo-liberalization whereby state 
power and authority is transferred vertically to international policy levels and horizontally to 
local actors, civil society and private sector in natural resource management. This hollowing 
out implies a shift from government to governance, and it takes place in varying degrees within 
nation states (Rhodes, 2007; Jessop, 2009; Moon et al., 2017; Bennett and Satterfield, 2018). 
This shift has opened avenues for the increased role of non-governmental organisations, civil 
society, private actors, community-based management and market-based policy instruments in 
environmental management (McCarthy, 2005; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Castree, 2008). Put 
simply, the concept of governance promotes shared decision making in which policies and 
interventions aimed at solving environmental challenges are negotiated by a broad coalition of 
non-state actors. Since non-state actors play an increasingly authoritative role in decision-
making, shaping policy outcomes and implementation, analysts argue that the state has 
retreated from environmental governance. 
There are at least two main factors that accounts for the erosion of state power within the 
literature of environmental governance. First, environmental problems are often characterised 
as complex or wicked. Environmental issues such as the loss of biodiversity, climate change, 
air pollution, water shortages, food insecurity are multi-layered. This means that resource 
management takes place in a context of rapid environmental change, uncertainty and increasing 
complexity (Armitage et al., 2009; Preiser et al., 2018; Reyers et al., 2018; Rodela and 






adequately address the complexity of environmental problems. This perspective is “based upon 
the recognition that no single actor possesses the capabilities to address the multiple facets, 
interdependencies and scales of environmental problems that may appear at first blush to be 
quite simple” (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006, p. 311). In this regard, the state is seen as lacking 
the capacity to deal with complex environmental issues. Hence there is a shift in the role of the 
state as a central authority figure to one of facilitator or co-partner working in collaboration 
with other social actors in decentralised and market-based governance processes (Kooiman, 
2003; Hysing, 2009; Ngeta, 2015; Armitage et al., 2017). Scholars have thus enhanced our 
understanding of the conditions of success and failures associated with collective action to 
manage natural resources under a combination of various forms of knowledge and socio-
economic contexts (Ostrom, 1990; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Sowman and Wynberg, 2015). 
Examples of environmental models that call for the participation of non-state actors in 
environmental governance include community-based conservation, especially community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) (Alexander et al., 2016; Twyman, 2017; Milupi 
et al., 2017). Others have put forward market-based solutions in which the community and the 
state have relatively little roles to play in effective ecological management (Vatn, 2015; Cooke 
and Lane, 2020).  
 
Second, globalisation is seen as a driving force in the waning of state power and authority 
(Rosenau, 2017). The advent of globalisation witnessed an increase in international actors, 
international treaties and networks that pressure the state to recognise powers from above and 
below; making it difficult for the state to govern through traditional top-down, command and 
control forms of sovereign rule (Sassen 2007, 2008). The growth of institutions such as the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), United Nations agencies, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and the proliferation of international environmental law, epistemic 
communities, together with the rise of local movements and instruments like Local Agenda 21, 
environmental NGOs and movements, citizens groups, private companies involved in 
corporate social and environmental responsibility, and the importance of local governments in 
designing and implementing environmental regulation have resulted in the waning of the 
central role of the state. Keck and Sikkink (1998) considers these networks to be political 
entrepreneurs, who play various roles including information sharing, capacity building and 
implementation and rule setting (Andonova et al, 2009). Networks are key to globalisation. For 






global economy, in what he refers to as the global shift. These global transformations entail the 
rapid proliferation of cross-border trade and investments by transnational corporations and 
financial institutions, the penetration of global cultures and the reluctant power shift from 
nation states to global governance. Dicken (2015, p. 438) argues that the effects of 
globalization “are felt not at the global or the national level but at the local scale: the 
communities within which real people struggle to live out their daily lives. It is at this scale 
that physical investment in economic activities are actually put in place, restructured and closed 
down”. In the context of Botswana, which is the focus of this thesis, globalization resulted in 
key resources such as diamonds and wildlife being under the control of multinational 
companies and largely benefiting the traditional Tswana elites. The wealth generated by the 
globalization of these resources has not translated into the improvement of quality of life of 
ordinary citizens (Ulriksen, 2017).  
 
Despite the hollowing out of the state, scholars have challenged the alleged move from 
‘government to governance’ by highlighting the continued interference of the state in market-
based environmental management (Jordan et al., 2005; Howlett et al., 2009; Giessen et al., 
2016). Studies in political ecology have pointed to the significance of the state and civil 
regulations in neoliberal reforms, which produce a form of hybrid neoliberalisation (Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002; Roth and Dresseler, 2012). A growing body of governmentality studies 
has also engaged with the simultaneous operation of disciplinary forms of intervention 
alongside the prevalent neoliberal ones, producing a form of state-led neoliberal restructuring 
(Bluwstein, 2017; Fletcher, 2017). Given these counter claims on the role of the state, recent 
work in green political theory and environmental politics calls for the re-insertion of the state 
as the central unit of analysis in environmental protection (Barry and Eckersely, 2005; Duit et 
al., 2016). In this thesis, I appreciate this call but locate it within the theoretical frame of the 
green state in order to understand what bringing back the state means for the greening of the 
state in the African context. The frame is also helpful for analysing the implications for re-
inserting the state in the governance of the environment.  
 
1.2 ‘Re-insertion of the state’ in environmental governance 
Contrary to the arguments that the state lacks the capacity to deal with environmental 
challenges, scholars of environmental politics and green political theorists argue that the state 






challenges and social injustice (Eckersely, 2004; Barry and Eckersley, 2005; Meadowcroft, 
2005, 2012; Duit et al., 2016). What this implies is that the state remains a primary site for 
environmental management and it is critical for resolving human-environment tensions. In 
addition, the state is a powerful actor that mediates political, economic and social interactions.  
Rather than completely dismiss the role of the state, green political theorists call for the 
transformation of the state so that it can pursue greener goals and better practices (Eckersely, 
2004, 2016). Against this backdrop, the role of the state in addressing global and domestic 
environmental issues is being investigated afresh.  
There is a view that the state has and will always be the first point of reference when 
environmental problems arise within its territory. This is so because the state, as a political 
organisation, has a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory 
(Robinson, 2013). Drawing on the Weberian conception of the state, this view presupposes that 
for an organisation to be a state, it must be autonomous and also have the means to 
extraordinarily dominate within its territory. Therefore, the state is an enabler of operations 
and has the legitimate and coercive power to deal with ecological challenges within its territory. 
The state’s “relative monopoly on administrative resources, technical expertise, bureaucratic 
intelligence and institutional influence” (Whitehead et al., 2007, p. 415) gives it unique 
capacity to manage the human-environment interface better than any other actor. 
In light of the above perspective, the state as a primary institution has the legitimate power to 
come up with laws, regulations, plans and to develop green institutions that could enhance 
environmental sustainability within its territory. State regulation remains a domain of 
environmental protection. Through the legal framework and institutions, the state has the 
capacity to compel various actors operating within its territory to abide to laws and measures 
that the state has put in place. In this way, the state is able to monitor and guide the behaviour 
and activities of various actors operating within its territory and enforce solutions favourable 
to environmental sustainability (Mansbridge, 2014). This means that the state is able to mediate 
state-society-nature relations. Death (2016, p. 63) argues that states have a central role in 
producing, circulating and implementing political practices “that evoke green, environmental, 
or ecological discourses”.  Whether the state fails or succeeds, the fact is that states cannot be 






Taking into account that environmental issues such as climate change are not only confined to 
the borders of the country, states are key figures in ameliorating global environmental 
challenges. States may seem to be overshadowed by international non-governmental 
organsations such as the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), United Nations agencies in 
international fora. However, states have the power to decide whether they want to sign 
international agreements, collaborate with these organisations and align their domestic policies 
with international policies. Domestically, national governments often implement various 
environmental strategies to influence the behaviour of its citizens, environmental 
organisations, multinational corporations and the private sector operating within their territory. 
These strategies include: the introduction of mandatory environmental education in schools; 
they can employ administrative measures such as taxation, fines and other policy instruments 
as well as provide an arena to resolve environmental conflicts (Duit, 2014, 2016; Duit et al., 
2016). Depending on the kind of policy the state has put in place, they can improve the quality 
of the environment or can also destroy it. Eckersley (2004, p. 6) notes that “it is difficult to 
imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed without the active 
support of states”.  
 
The role of the state as a facilitator of environmental sustainability rather than a contributor to 
environmental degradation is encapsulated in concepts like the ‘green state’ (Eckersley, 2004), 
‘ecological state’ (Meadowcroft, 2005, 2012), ‘eco-state’ (Duit, 2014) and ‘environmental 
state’ (Duit et al, 2016). Despite nuances, these concepts not only focus on sovereign state 
policies and institutions but are also relevant for regional regimes and multilateral agreements 
that help states to ameliorate environmental harm and facilitate a sustainable green future for 
its citizens and the world. For the purpose of this study, I adopt the concept of the green state 
since it is a generic concept that can be used to mean different things (Hildingsson et al., 2019).  
Hildingsson et al. (2019, p. 911) note that the concept of the green state has emerged as a 
“normative or analytical construct; counterfactual ideal of ecological responsiveness to strive 
for or an evolving institutionalisation of ecological responsiveness that can be empirically 
assessed”. Green states are states in which “the governance of environmental issues has become 
central state imperative and is closely linked to core imperatives of survival, maintenance of 
domestic order, generation of finance, capital accumulation and political legitimacy” (Death, 






There are several factors that push states to internalise environmental reforms. First, 
environmental movements play a key role in pushing states to pursue greener practices 
particularly in industrialised Western democracies. Environmental movements provide an 
arena in which citizens collectively pursue their common interests. Hence, they are regarded 
as key actors in the transformation of the state. These movements usually operate 
independently without the interference of the market and the state (Dryzek et al., 2003). They 
pressurise governments to internalise environmental reforms through non-institutional 
strategies ranging from environmental education campaigns, lobbying, boycotts and litigation 
to more expressive and direct actions such as strikes and protests (Saunders, 2013; Charles, 
2019). Such strategies often have a bearing on the enactment of environmental policy (Jenkins 
et al., 2007; Saunders, 2013). It is for this reason that Dryzek et al. (2003, 2005) argue that a 
green state is likely to emerge in countries where there is an active oppositional sphere (see 
more discussion on Chapter Two).  
 
Second, environmental reforms are likely to happen when environmental issues jeopardize 
national and global security. For example, wildlife poaching, climate change, food insecurity 
have since been given priority by states. According to Barnett (2019), climate change can 
undermine legitimacy, individual and collective economic livelihoods, impair human health 
through reduced availability of freshwater and food and exposes  people to new diseases and 
migration, undermine state wealth and military capability as well as intensify inequalities 
between people. This poses considerable challenges for sustainability and cause increased 
contention and/or conflict internally as well as between nations thereby disturbing peace and 
harmony. This often calls for enhanced action by states. Ramutsindela and Buscher (2019) note 
that the rising wildlife crime has brought African states face to face with international 
interventions such as anti-poaching measures with the aim of protecting wildlife.  
 
Third, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) often assist states to review and 
integrate international or regional measures into domestic policies targeted at mitigating global 
environmental challenges. Environmental issues have no respect for international boundaries 
hence MEAs form an important international legal protocol through which states can address 
global environmental challenges. More often, states are members of various international 
multilateral agreements and treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 






International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) and many others. 
These MEAs often develop common rules, targets and indicators with the expectation that 
member states will feel an obligation to abide by the provision and cooperate in safeguarding 
the environment. States usually integrate such targets in domestic policy, which in turn enables 
the greening of the state. Weiss (2009 cited by Death, 2016a) notes that by 1990 there were 
about 900 international legal instruments either directed primarily towards or containing 
important environmental programmes. These factors suggest that there are various ways 
through which environmental reforms can be achieved by a state.   
 
This study draws on the literature on the green state to understand the state’s engagement with 
environmental questions and how the environment has become embedded within state politics 
and policies. This literature is relevant for the study reported in this thesis because it opens 
debates on how we might conceive the green state through the lens of the processes that 
produce this type of the state. The green state literature also allows us to trace parallel 
developments of, as well as the intersections between conservation and state formation over 
time. Furthermore, the concept of the green state allows us to analyse African states not as an 
isolated case but as part of broader discussions on the green state and on the relationship 
between the state and the environment. Expressed differently, environmental activities in 
Africa should be studied within the theories of the green state.  This study takes these theories 
as a point of departure to understand the complex processes that enable the production of the 
green state using Botswana’s wildlife conservation policy and practice as an example.  
 
1.3 Statement of the research problem 
The extant analyses of the green state, especially the normative and empirical assessments, are 
skewed towards more economically developed democracies in the Global North. The analyses 
of the emergence of the green state in these countries consider the greening of the state in terms 
of environmental outcomes and do not pay adequate attention to the processes that produce the 
green state. From this point of view states in Africa have been left out of the discussion on the 
green state though these countries have engaged with environmental reforms aimed at 
protecting the environment. There are at least two perspectives on the exclusion of African 
states from the green state debates (Death, 2016a). Firstly, African states are often viewed as – 






weak state capacity, African states usually do badly in most indexes of environmental 
performance and governance. Secondly, environmentalism is considered a post-materialist 
concern (Death, 2016a) and that African states are faced with pressing challenging issues such 
as economic development, health, employment, which means environmental protection is not 
always a priority.  
Although the green state discussion focuses on many aspects of state policies and institutions 
such as climate change, urban and energy policy, consumption and transport, the debates have 
not featured any sustained discussion on wildlife conservation and policy. Unlike in Europe 
and North America, wildlife conservation has significantly contributed to state formation in 
colonial and post-colonial Africa. In Africa, for instance, protected areas preceded independent 
statehood and are associated with practices of state building, border enforcement and the 
penetration of the state in rural areas (Lunstrum, 2013; Death, 2016a; Woods, 2019). 
Furthermore, the expansion of protected areas in Africa is illustrative of an increased 
recognition by African states of the need to conserve biodiversity and to move towards a more 
sustainable management and use of biodiversity and ecosystem services. This recognition is 
also demonstrated through the adoption of a wide range of international agreements concerning 
biodiversity conservation of which African states are signatories. Such agreements, for 
instance, the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 calls for the establishment and effective 
management of protected areas (UNEP, 2014). Against this backdrop, I proceed from the 
premise that the green state is not the preserve of countries in the Global North. African states 
do engage with environmental agendas that in turn impact on the outlook of the state and 
therefore qualify to be viewed from the green state perspective. Their engagement with global 
and regional environmental agendas has transformed and continues to (re)make the states in 
various ways and has thus opened possibilities for the greening of African states.  
The question then becomes what accounts for state greening in African states? In this thesis, 
state greening is understood in terms of processes through which the state pursues the green 
agenda. That process entails the interaction of the state with non-governmental organizations, 
civil society, and international agencies to achieve certain environmental outcomes. Such 
interaction may be initiated by the state or by actors who are determined to pursue an 
environmental agenda or to implement environmental strategies through state institutions. The 






practice, this means the state pursue environmental goals through various means, including the 
development and implementation of environmental policies that resonate with national needs 
as well as global aspirations.  
 
In this thesis, I investigate how the process of state greening unfolds and how it is crucial for 
expanding analyses of the green state beyond the Global North. Using a historical analysis, I 
focus on the processes of state greening in post-colonial Botswana between 1966 and 2018 
through the lens of the wildlife sector. The period covers the presidency of Seretse Khama, 
Ketumile Masire, Festus Mogae and Ian Khama, allows us to trace shifts in wildlife 
conservation policies and practices but is also crucial for understanding complex processes that 
enabled the greening of the state in Botswana. The wildlife sector is important for the analysis 
of state greening because it is a site on which many actors are visible and their roles in the 
greening process are made visible. The wildlife economy is anchored on environmental 
policies that fuse together domestic and international interests. Furthermore, the wildlife sector 
in Botswana advances a business model that simultaneously encourages profit making and 
environmental protection through its high-cost low volume tourism model, which is dependent 
on green branding (see Chapter Six). This kind of business model is mostly practiced in tourism 
concessions in places such as the Okavango Delta in the northern part of Botswana.    
 
1.4 Aim and objectives of the study 
 
The study engages the theory of the green state within the African context to investigate the 
complex processes that enable state greening in Botswana. It does so by tracing the 
development of wildlife conservation policy and practices over time. Three objectives were 
formulated to achieve the aim of the study. The first objective is to examine the role of political 
leadership in steering wildlife conservation policy, practices and institutions in Botswana 
between 1966 to 2018. The second objective analyses the development of institutions during 
the greening process while the third objective examines state-society relations in the wildlife 
sector within the context of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) 
programme.  
 
The central question that guides the study is: 







In order to answer the main question, the following questions were formulated: 
1. How has the political leadership shaped the character of the state and has this influenced 
the greening process in the wildlife sector between 1966 and 2018? 
2. How, and under what conditions were institutions developed, sustained, broken or 
transformed in wildlife management during the greening process? 
3. How does the state interact with citizens in the wildlife sector within the context of 
CBNRM as one aspect of the greening of Botswana?  
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
 
The concept of the green state has gained momentum in recent years. Eckersely (2004) 
advanced the debate on the emergence of the green state through her seminal work, ‘The Green 
State’. Since then scholars have revisited some of the core questions and assumptions around 
greening with the discussions mostly revolving around advanced industrialised democracies 
and welfare states. Discussions have focused on the link between the environmental state and 
the welfare state (Gough, 2017; Christoff, 2017); studied the critical political economy agenda 
(Paterson, 2016); extended comparative research agendas (Dryzek et al., 2005; Duit, 2014, 
2016; Duit et al, 2016), and brought to the fore the politics of sustainability transition 
(Bäckstrand and Kronsell, 2015). Others have widened the geographic scope to include African 
states (Death, 2016; Chandrashekeran et al., 2017). Broadening this scope requires that 
attention should be paid to how the process of greening unfolds over time. This is precisely 
what my research aimed to do. My goal is to contribute to the ongoing debates on the process 
of greening by focusing on wildlife conservation policy and practices over time. This way, we 
can better understand how states engage with environmental reforms. 
 
1.6 Botswana and wildlife conservation 
Botswana is a semi-arid landlocked country located in Southern Africa bordering South Africa, 
Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Botswana, a product of British colonial rule gained 
independence in 1966. The country did not have a promising future at independence with the 
majority of citizens living in poverty as the country was underdeveloped. However, the 
situation changed with the discovery of diamonds that brought about a major economic 
transformation in the country. The remarkable post-colonial success is ascribed to the 






leadership. For this reason, Botswana has earned the label of the ‘African miracle state’ 
(Samatar, 1999), and has adopted a developmental economic approach (Taylor, 2005; Leith, 
2005; Hillboom, 2011; Botlhale, 2018). The country has used its revenue from natural 
resources particularly diamonds to bring about broad developments such as infrastructure, 
health care provision, free primary and secondary schooling and the creation of jobs.  In its 
effort to reduce poverty, the government of Botswana introduced welfare programmes to 
poorer sections of the populations. These include a drought relief programme, remote area 
dwellers, the Accelerated Rural Development Programme, Ipelegeng Programme and financial 
assistance policy. These efforts signify government commitment to assisting the marginalized 
in society. Furthermore, Botswana is viewed as a good example of governance in Africa. Over 
the years the country has consistently been ranked by Transparency International (TI) as the 
least corrupt in Africa in its Corruption Perception Index. In addition, the Ibrahim index of 
African governance has also over the years ranked Botswana in the top five of the well 
governed states in Africa. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance is regarded as the world's 
most comprehensive ranking of African governance.   
Notwithstanding the above indices, a handful of scholars argue that the country is no model for 
democracy in Africa (Taylor, 2003; Good, 2008; Good and Taylor, 2008; Mogalakwe and 
Nyamnjoh, 2017). It has been argued that Botswana is characterized by illiberal 
authoritarianism and presidentialism characterized by elitist top-down structures and rising 
inequalities (Taylor, 2003; Good and Taylor, 2008). Hence the country has become a 
‘minimalist democracy’ (Good and Taylor, 2008). Two images are discernible from the 
literature: ‘an African miracle state’ and ‘authoritarian ethnocentric state’. The former projects 
economic prosperity and serves as evidence of good governance in usage of natural resources. 
The latter indicates that power is concentrated in the hands of a small fraction of elites from 
one dominant ruling class, the Tswana. Despite these diametrically opposed images, there is a 
strong narrative of Botswana as a success story.  
 
The process of greening the state in Botswana has developed through environmental policies 
anchored on the protection of environmental assets, namely wildlife. Wildlife conservation 
policies are instrumental in greening the state in Botswana and have since played a critical role 
in driving the green economy of the country. It is deeply embedded in state politics and national 






megafauna. This megafauna feature prominently in the country’s international conservation 
profile. In its endeavour to diversify the economy away from diamonds, the Botswana 
government has embraced wildlife-based tourism. Although the industry was non-existent at 
independence, it has grown substantially over the years to become the second largest economic 
sector in Botswana contributing about 9.5% to the gross domestic product (GDP), after mining 
(GoB, 2017). Botswana pursues a greener model of tourism, which is in the form of high-cost 
low volume (HCLV). This model was developed in, and is concentrated in the northern 
conservation zone, which includes the globally unique fragile ecosystem of the Okavango 
Delta (see Figure 1.1). This greener model aims to minimize the ecological footprint in 
Botswana’s conservation areas by attracting fewer high paying tourists who originate from 
countries in the Global North. This greener model takes place in Botswana’s conservation 
areas, which comprises of protected areas and wildlife management areas (WMAs) covering 
an area of 39% of Botswana’s territory, with much of the protected areas located in northern 
Botswana.  
 
Since independence, Botswana has had a long-standing concern with the protection and 
management of its wildlife, which accounts for the country’s evolution towards a green state. 
In recent years, the country witnessed a dramatic shift in the use and access to wildlife 
resources, and this is directly linked to the state. The decision by the government of Botswana 
to suspend hunting in 2014 provides a glimpse into how the state goes about controlling and 
governing its people, territory and resources, and how citizens respond. The hunting ban in 
Botswana was enacted through a presidential directive aimed at transforming environmental 
governance (cf. Chapter Five). The changes undertaken by the government of Botswana is 
illustrative of the coercive power the state has over valuable natural resources and how it drives 







Figure 1.1: Map showing the location of the Okavango Delta in Northern Botswana, the 
Ngamiland district (Source: Okavango Research Institute GIS lab, 2019) 
 
1.7 Thesis structure and overview of the chapters 
 
This introductory chapter laid the foundation of the study by posing the research questions and 
providing the justification of the study. The rest of the thesis comprises of six chapters as 
follows. Chapter Two examines the broader concept of the green state, which underpins the 
theoretical foundation of this thesis. In this chapter I recount the green state as both a normative 
and empirical concept, and how it is presented by the green state theorists. The literature on 
the green state helps us to understand what the greening of the state entails in various contexts. 
The chapter refers to the exclusion of developing countries from the analyses of the green state 
arguing for attention to African states because they have been engaging in green discourses 






militarisation, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and transfontier 
conservation areas (TFCAs) are an attempt to enforce and experiment with the greening of the 
state. Through these processes the state has been able to penetrate remote areas where wildlife 
conservation takes place, to include local communities in the green agenda, and to enlist 
international financial institutions and environmental NGOs into its conservation projects. 
Furthermore, the chapter highlights that unlike the green state in the Global North, which is 
post-materialist, the greening of the state in Africa is top-down as the state exercises excessive 
control over people, land and the environment. The abuse of power by the state and the 
consequent environmental injustice is very much part of greening of the state in Africa (Death, 
2016a).   
 
Chapter Three explains the methodology and the techniques of data collection that have been 
used to understand the unfolding process of greening Botswana as a state over time. The thesis 
provides the justification for the adoption of a qualitative approach used in the study and gives 
an account of how archival data, observation and key informant interviews, including interview 
with former president Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen) Seretse Khama Ian Khama were conducted 
to answer the research questions. Furthermore, it details how data was analysed and presented 
in the thesis. Chapters Four, Five and Six provide the empirical evidence for the unfolding 
process of greening the Botswana state.  
 
Chapter Four explores changes in wildlife conservation policy and institutional transformation 
between 1966 and 2008. This period covers the presidency of Seretse Khama, Ketumile Masire 
and Festus Mogae. The chapter does not dwell on the biography of the former presidents but 
rather places them within the context of the evolution of wildlife conservation policy and 
institutional transformation. It explains how the green agenda was set and the various actors 
that were involved in greening the state under each presidency. The premise of the chapter is 
that ideological orientations of the presidents are reflected on, and also guided the greening of 
the state as witnessed under each presidency.  
 
Chapter Five argues that the greening of the state in Botswana was consolidated between 2008 
– 2018, the period that covers the presidency of Lt. Gen Ian Khama. It pays attention to how 
Ian Khama defined state authority over wildlife thereby deepening the greening of Botswana. 






ascribed to his background in the military, where the chain of command is the norm. It is largely 
the army that influenced his style of leadership, which translated into the militarization of the 
state as well as wildlife protection. The chapter demonstrates that the militarization of wildlife 
in Botswana under Ian Khama was part of the general trend of protecting wildlife in Africa. 
Furthermore, militarization aided the centralization of power in wildlife conservation through 
the national environment fund (NEF), the hunting ban and the tourism land bank. 
 
Chapter Six analyses the consequences of the greening process on local people in the Okavango 
Delta within the context of the CBNRM programme, and how that process shapes or defines 
state-citizen relations using the case study of Khwai community in the Delta. The chapter 
demonstrates that state-citizen relations at the local level reflects the wider global and national 
changes in wildlife governance. It further shows that the greening process in Khwai concession 
is characterized by fluid and negative state-citizen relations. The attendant shifting of authority 
away from local communities to the central government through the presidential tourism land 
bank has created new tense relations between the state and the Khwai community.  
 
Chapter Seven re-emphasizes the argument of the thesis, summarizes insights from the thesis, 
reflects on the research questions, and highlights the contribution of the study. The chapter 
argues that part of the process of greening is constituted by the environment becoming central 
to government policies and actions with tangible results. The chapter shows that considering 
greening in terms of state practice or processes enables research on the green state to pay 
attention to state-led environmental initiatives in countries in the Global South, including 
Botswana. Successive governments in Botswana have demonstrated sustained efforts towards 
managing the environment, especially wildlife although there were variations in the style of 
governance by the four presidents. The study concludes that the greening process in Botswana 
has been driven by two factors. Firstly, the convergence of state and non-state actors operating 
in Botswana between 1966 and 2018 pushed the environment into the centre stage of 
government planning and policy. Secondly, political leadership was crucial for Botswana’s 
engagement with green discourses and practices. It shows that political leadership can 













This chapter discusses the concept of the green state which is key to understanding the role of 
the state in addressing environmental challenges. The premise of the chapter is that the state is 
a central conceptual anchor for achieving environmental sustainability goals (Eckersely, 2004; 
Barry and Eckersely, 2005; Duit, 2014). The concept of the green state illuminate’s processes 
through which green discourses and practices are invoked by nation-states. This chapter and 
the thesis as whole argue that the greening of the state is a process that takes place over time 
and that it entails the interaction between the state and non-state actors that operate through the 
state to achieve certain environmental outcomes. This interaction leads to institutional changes 
and the development of environmental policies aimed at achieving environmental protection 
through the backing of the state. In order to understand how this process unfolds, there is a 
need to reflect on the concept of the green state. 
 
The discussions on the green state are divided on whether African states can or should be 
included into the category of green states. Leading theorists of the green state argue that a state 
should be post-materialist and also measure favourably in environmental outcomes to qualify 
as a green state (Eckersely, 2004; Barry and Eckersely, 2005). Based on this criterion, African 
states would not qualify as green states. Death (2016) has provocatively challenged the 
assumptions that the green state should have the same attributes that define greenness in 
economically developed democracies. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I recount the ideas of the green 
state, both as a normative ideal and empirical assessment.  The second section discusses the 
green state in relation to the African state and its approaches to environmental challenges.  This 
serves as a background to the argument I advance in the third section of this chapter, namely 
that African states should be considered in analyses of the green state because they have 
engaged and led various environmental reforms as evident in protected areas, green 
militarisation, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and transfontier 
conservation areas (TFCAs); all of which contribute to the greening of the state. The last 






2.2 Theories of the green state 
In this section I revisit the concept of the green state as discussed in literature on green political 
theory, environmental policy and comparative politics. I do so by focusing on conceptions of 
the green state as well as the conditions that enable the state to transition towards a green state. 
The debates on the green state are inspired by the theory of ecological modernisation (Mol and 
Spaargaren, 2000) and comparative analysis of the implementation of sustainable development 
(Meadowcroft, 2005). Drawing from ecological modernisation, green state theorists have 
developed typologies of green states ranging from weak to strong ecological modernisation. 
This literature has paid adequate attention to countries in the Global North and tends to over-
emphasize the greening of the state in relation to ecologically beneficial outcomes. 
Accordingly, scholars explained why certain states perform better than others in pursuing green 
practices. Some of the elements of state greening include: entrenching polluter pay and 
precautionary principles, commitment to environmental agreements, performance of 
environmental institutions relative to state capacity, environmental policies such as carbon 
emissions taxes, ecological footprint, enactment of environmental education programmes, 
concern with the concept of sustainable development, and the modernisation of the state 
through ecological means.  
The green state literature is derived from two approaches namely, the normative and the 
empirical. The normative approach holds that ecological sustainability and biocentric values 
need to be embedded in the economic, social and political objectives of the state (Eckersley, 
2004; Christoff, 2005; Hysing, 2015). Whereas the empirical approach scrutinizes the 
performance of state policies and institutions relative to measurable ecological outcomes. I 
discuss each of these approaches in detail below. 
2.2.1 Normative approach 
 
The discussion on the ideal type of a green state has been steered by Robyn Eckersley. 
According to Eckersley (2004, p. 2) an ideal green state is a “democratic state whose regulatory 
ideals and democratic procedures are informed by ecological democracy rather than liberal 
democracy”. In her view, the green state is post-liberal in so far as it emerges from immanent 
(ecological) critique (ibid). Eckersley identifies three challenges that prevent the modern liberal 
state to move towards green statehood, that is, international anarchy, global capitalism and the 






enables environmental justice in that “all those potentially affected by risk should have some 
meaningful opportunity to participate or otherwise be represented in the making of the politics 
or decisions that generate risks’’ (Eckersley, 2004, p. 111). Eckersely asserts that when a state 
achieves a greener status it will be able to deliver on environmental justice. 
 
To foster ecological responsibility and environmental justice, a democratic state would 
incorporate substantive and procedural green values into the formal political and legal decision 
making of the state. For instance, entrenching green norms such as the right to environmental 
information, the right to be informed of risk generating proposals, the right to participate in 
environmental impact assessments (EIA), the right to environmental remedies when harm is 
suffered, third party litigation rights in the constitution of the democratic state. By so doing, 
environmental considerations become engrained in the core functions of the state as the 
constitution is the foundation of its political society. In this vein, political decisions would not 
only be limited to humans (current and future generations) but would also consider non-human 
species. Furthermore, entrenching environmental provisions in the constitution would enable 
legitimate state intervention in ostensibly private matters (Barry, 2001; Eckersley, 2004, 2020).  
 
In terms of multi-lateral agreements, the green state would have to move away with the 
principle of territorial exclusivity (Eckersley, 2004, 2016). This means states must take 
responsibility of protecting non-citizens on ecological matters where they will be affected by 
decisions made by the state. Considering this, the green state becomes a fluid entity constantly 
changing depending on the determination of risk exposure. The ideal green state of Eckersley 
is post-liberal, transnational, cosmopolitan, risk averse, discursive participatory and 
representative democratic ecological state (Eckersley, 2004, 2016). She also emphasises the 
importance of ecological citizens who continuously (re)shape and monitor the state to ensure 
that it promotes ecological sustainability and social justice.  
 
Peter Christoff (2005) develops the normative qualities of a democratic green state. He argues 
that “green states were they to exist would be characterised by the predominance of types of 
state activity aimed at strong ecological modernisation” (Christoff, 2005, p. 41). In pursuing 
economic activities, the state would consider the environmental limits on material activity and 
this would be reflected in institutional developments that would ensure environmental 






ranging from strong to weak green states. Green states demonstrate high levels of state capacity 
and intervention, eco-citizenship, strong commitment to biocentric values, human welfare and 
ecological protection (ibid, p. 42). States which almost exhibit the necessary criteria for being 
a green state, namely environmental welfare state, engages in weak ecological modernization. 
According to him, such states (Sweden and Netherlands) have a weaker institutionalization of 
ecological values, moderate values of eco-citizenship and environmental capacity for state 
intervention. Environmental neoliberal states such as the US and Australia are defined by 
strong market orientation, weak ecological modernization and low budgetary commitment to 
social and environmental welfare protection. Christoff also outlines an ideal type of ecofascist 
characterised by authoritarian features but with high commitment to biocentric values. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical approach 
 
The empirical evidence can be divided into two school of thoughts: one that pays attention to 
the importance of environmental movements in enabling environmental reform and the other 
pays attention to the institutions and policies that states have introduced to address ecological 
crisis. The potential for environmental reform according to Dryzek et al. (2003) lies with social 
movements and deliberations in civil society and the green public sphere (see also Dryzek and 
Hunold, 2005). For a long period of time social movements have been critical agents in steering 
social change within a state (Dryzek et al., 2003; Oberschall, 2017; Almeida and Chase-Dunn, 
2018). Social movements are organisations that pursue collective action towards a particular 
issue facing humanity using non-institutional strategies by either challenging or defending the 
principles upon which society is organised (Tilly, 2019). For instance, the social movements 
of the working class emerged from the need for better conditions of employment and higher 
wages and were responsible for the formation of the welfare state. Social movements emerge 
as a result of the following elements: 1) a sustained campaign with a collective claim; 2) various 
forms of political action such as creation of associations, public meetings, rallies, 
demonstrations, petition drives and; 3) public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, 
numbers and commitment (Tilly, 2019).  According to Almeida and Chase-Dunn (2018), the 
mobilization of social movements in the 21st century has largely been driven by global issues 
such as climate change, models of economic liberalization and international migration. Other 
social movements are associated with political identities, for instance, feminism and black 







Environmental movements are often advocates for the protection of the environment and 
conservation of biodiversity. These movements usually question the state as well provide 
solutions on how the state can deal with environmental issues (Saunders, 2013; see also 
Ramutsindela, 2020). Environmental movements often critique the state on account of the 
inability of the state to address environmental issues such as climate change, loss of 
biodiversity, poaching and pollution, and so on. These challenges have provided a basis 
through which environmental movements interact with the state. There are those movements 
that collaborate with the state and that oppose the state (Saunders, 2013; Ramutsindela, 2020). 
Environmental non-governmental organisations such as WWF, IUCN, CI often collaborate 
with the state with the aim of conserving biodiversity. They work with the state so as to 
influence state policies as well as work closely with government agencies. Those movements 
that oppose the state usually do so through political processes by participating in the electoral 
process, for instance, the Green Parties such as the German Green and the European Federation 
of Green Parties (Ramutsindela, 2020).  
 
For the state to respond to the demands of the social movements they should link their interests 
to the state’s core imperatives. Whenever the movement interests come up against the core, the 
movement loses or it is co-opted (Dryzek et al., 2003).  According to Dryzek et al. (2003, p.  
679) a green state is likely to emerge when “there is a connection of environmental values to 
both economic and legitimation imperatives contingent on the presence of an active 
oppositional public sphere”. Focusing on case studies in Europe and North America, Dryzek 
et al. (2003) classify states into two categories, namely exclusive versus inclusive, and active 
versus passive. Combining the two produces ideal green state types. Using these criteria, they 
contend that their country cases represent four different types: expansive corporatism in 
Norway considered to be actively inclusive; pluralism in the US (passively inclusive); 
authoritarian liberalism in the UK (actively exclusive) and legal corporatism in Germany 
(passively exclusive) (p. 660). They conclude that a polity that is inclusive but dictates 
participation of civil society in formalized ways is less conducive to environmental policy 
making than a model that allows for pluralistic environmental deliberations in the public sphere 
and outside formalized organized channels. In their analysis, the latter is found in passively 







Other ideas of the green state accommodate a range of aspects of environmental governance. 
Scholars have reflected on institutional reforms and policies put forward by the state to 
integrate environmental concerns into their everyday functioning (Mol et al., 2009; Duit et al., 
2016). In response to the ecological crisis, Duit et al. (2016) contend that the state integrates 
the management of environmental problems into its administrative core and solves them within 
one or two decades by means of regulative measures in the techno-scientific sphere (what is 
known as ecological modernization) (Mol et al., 2009). Duit et al (2016, p. 5) conceptualize 
the green state in broad terms, as a state that consists of a “significant set of institutions and 
practices dedicated to the management of environmental and socio-environmental 
interactions”. The green state encompasses the administrative (e.g. taxation, fines), regulatory 
(legal frameworks), financial and knowledge structures (teach society about environmental 
issues) to deal with ecological problems (Duit 2014, 2016). Through such functions the state 
can steer society towards the sustainability path. By breaking down the green state into these 
functions, Duit (2016) identifies more specific indicators that broaden the idea of an 
environmental governance regime (EGR), which he describes as either established, emerging, 
partial or weak.  
 
From the perspective of ecological modernization (EM) theorists, a green state emerges from 
regulations that foster ecological innovation (Sonnenfeld and Mol, 2002; Mol and Janicke, 
2009; Mol, 2016). EM scholars consider the importance of the market arguing that “economic 
actors and market dynamics have constructive roles to play on the state of environmental 
reform’’ (Sonnenfeld and Mol, 2002, p. 132). Considering this, it is assumed that economic 
growth can chime in with environmental protection. States can use their capital to introduce 
less polluting and more resource efficient technologies. As the economy evolves over time, to 
become increasingly efficient and less resource intense eventually leading to decoupling that 
the economy can grow without environmental damage.  
 
Proponents of EM argue that for environmental reform to take place, technological innovation 
is seen as an essential part of any path towards sustainability (Spaargaren and Mol, 2009). 
Through the development of clean technologies and renewable energy environmental concerns 
can be integrated into production and result in energy efficiency. In order to facilitate 
technological innovation, the government must play a critical role in providing funds for 






and beyond, create markets for scarce environmental goods and setting progressive 
environmental standards that will stimulate technological progress. Concepts such as the green 
economy1 and green growth represent more recent attempts to reconcile economic growth and 
environmental protection (UNEP, 2011). For this to be achieved, Mol and Janickë (2009, p. 
19) argue that the green state has moved away from a “bureaucratic, hierarchical, reactive, 
command and control state towards  more flexible, decentralized and preventive institutions 
that create networks with other societal actors and applies a variety of approaches and 
instruments to guide society into directions of sustainability’’. While this literature 
acknowledges the role of the state in facilitating environmental reforms and achieving 
environmental sustainability, it does not feature any sustained discussion on African states for 
reasons discussed in the next section.  
 
2.3 The exclusion of African state in green state debates 
The discussion on the green state is silent on developing nations yet environmental issues have 
played a crucial role in the evolution and transformation of the African state. Consequently, 
the African state has over the years transformed environmental governance to steer society 
towards ecological rationality (see Ramutsindela and Büscher, 2019). States in Africa are 
excluded from the discussion on the green state because they are viewed as weak and often do 
badly in most indices of environmental performance and governance (Death, 2016). Secondly, 
the green state in advanced states is post-materialist. However, such pessimism risks 
overgeneralizing our understanding of politics and environmental governance in Africa. In this 
section, I pay attention to this negative narrative on African countries. Contrary to this 
pessimistic narrative, the African state is pluralistic (Mbembe, 2001), and there is considerable 
variation between states in terms of national economies, governance performance and 
environmental related indices. For instance, countries such as Botswana and Mauritius have a 
record of good governance in the management of natural resources whereas Mozambique, 
Democratic Republic of Congo have squandered their natural resource wealth due to bad 
governance. In terms of economics, countries like Botswana, Mauritius or Cape Verde have 
grown at between 4 and 6 percent per capita per year since their independence whereas citizens 
 
1 UNEP (2012, p. 4) defines a green economy as one that results in improved human well-being and 
social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. It can be seen 
as a means to achieve a resilient economy that provides a better quality of life for all within the 






of Chad, Djibouti or Mozambique have gotten about 2 percent poorer every year over the same 
period (Englebert and College, 2000; see Mkandawire, 2015). In light of these examples, any 
theory which seeks to explain Africa’s poor performance should take into account such 
diversity.   
2.3.1 Weak states 
 
The common narrative on the African state is that African political structures are ‘weak’, 
‘failed’, ‘collapsed’ or ‘fragile’ when measured against the Weberian bureaucratic nation state 
(Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Howard, 2010; Woodward, 2017). Considering this perspective, 
it is assumed that African states lack the necessary capacity to implement and enforce policies. 
The premise is that countries in Africa have not fully developed state institutions, lack 
democracy and exhibit a lack of control over substantial segments of the country’s territories 
and populations (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982, Englebert and Tull, 2008, 2013; Woodward, 
2017). In terms of environmental governance, the African state is regarded as “lacking 
capacity, expertise, stable structures and as altogether unsuitable for progression toward the 
post-Westphalia transnational environmental or ecological state” (Death, 2016a, p. 38).  
Viewed through the lens of ecological modernisation, the African state does not have sufficient 
financial resources to develop clean scientific technologies necessary for implementing 
environmental reforms as compared to states in advanced industrialised regions. This is partly 
due to the fact that financial resources are used to solve challenging developmental issues such 
as health, unemployment and so on – hence environmental issues do not often take priority in 
a nation’s budget. This explains why African states do badly in most indices of environmental 
performance and governance such as Yale’s Environmental Performance Index (EPI) or 
Colombia’s Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), Happy Planet Index (see Death, 2016a, 
b).  
 
The key question then becomes, what explains the weakness of state structures in Africa?  
There is a claim among political theorists that African states are subverted by neo-patrimonial 
system of governance. Scholars in political theory contend that neo-patrimonial practices are 
the hallmark of post-colonial politics in Africa, where rational-legal bureaucratic institutions 
coexist with informal institutions based on giving and granting of favours (Bratton and van de 
Walle, 1997; van de Walle, 2001; Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Mkandawire, 2015; Hoffman, 






and their cronies/associates. Van de Walle (2001, p. 52) argues that patrons and clients 
“personally exert discretionary power over a big share of the states resources’’ as a form of 
private property (see also Diamond, 2008). The system is held together by the personal 
distribution of socio-economic resources (rents) to clients. In such a system, appointments in 
state institutions are not based on competence, merit and experience. For as long as one is a 
preferred choice, they would easily get an appointment over those qualifying for the position. 
In what Allen (1999, p. 377) calls ‘spoils politics’, the author argues that “public office is 
valued not for its powers or potential, nor to serve the public interest but in order to achieve a 
cash return to the investment made in obtaining the office’’. In this regard, neo-patrimonialism 
plays a significant role in influencing policy outcomes. Government is mostly concerned with 
satisfying its cronies. Individuals who do not belong to these networks are marginalised as they 
are denied a voice in policy processes (Beresford, 2015; Sigman and Lindberg, 2017). 
Ultimately this leads to poor governance, corruption, non-implementation of policies thereby 
affecting delivering of public goods and services.  
 
Arguably, neopatrimonialism in Africa is a product of colonial governance (Cooper, 2002; 
Mamdani, 1996; Mbembe, 2001; Mkandawire, 2015; Hoffman, 2018). Colonial 
administrations were designed to serve western European interests, including the protection of 
colonial economic interests, the extraction of natural resources and the maintenance of order. 
At independence, most of these administrative structures were left intact and new set of roles 
were placed on them without taking into consideration the financial, human and organisational 
constraints that African states experienced (Sigman and Lindberg, 2017). Colonial governance 
has largely affected institutions and organisations of the modern African state negatively 
(Hoffman, 2018).  
 
Mamdani (1996) contends that indirect rule particularly in British colonies contributed to the 
weak state structures (see Ali et al., 2019). It signified control of citizens and natural resources 
through traditional authority in what he calls decentralised despotism. The system was 
grounded in a legal dualism where “alongside the received law was implemented a customary 
law that regulated non-markets relations in land and in personal (family) and community 
affairs’’ (Mamdani, 1996, p. 145). Within this system traditional authorities (chiefs and 
headmen) were used as colonial agents for enforcing colonial policies, collecting tax and 






public goods like roads and garnering the resources and manpower necessary to build them. 
So, the tribal leadership became an extension of the colonial states as they became more 
accountable to colonial power thus making them more despotic and unaccountable (Acemoglu 
et al., 2014; Wucherpfenning et al., 2016). This despotism persisted after independence and 
influenced both local and national governance. They also played a significant role in the 
collapse of democracy in post-colonial Africa. In writing about weak states in the Global South, 
Migdal (1988) points out that the weak African state is being opposed by strong local actors 
(chiefs) in society preventing them from carrying out good governance. These strong actors 
exert such a great influence on the local economic, social, cultural and political affairs that the 
ability of the central state to establish formal system of rule and have their citizens comply with 
it was and still is very limited in Africa (Baldwin, 2014, 2015; Roessler and Ohls, 2018).  
 
Contrary to the weak state narrative, the African state is not entirely bleak. Not all African 
states have been negatively affected by neo-patrimonialism. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012, 
p. 394) argue that patronage politics can be used to strengthen the state and depends on 
“whether rent management is directed towards short term-enrichment of members of the 
political class or its allies or alternatively towards ‘growing the pie’ of the national economy, 
maximising opportunities for long-term accumulation”. They illustrate this line of argument 
with a focus on the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame, which has relied on 
long-horizon economic planning to promote poverty reduction and most notably economic 
growth through which the ruling party’s sizeable business interests have directly benefited 
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). To do so, it has kept tight central controls over rent-
seeking behaviour and a firm anti-corruption line so that state capacity and economic growth 
are not undermined. Rwanda prides itself as a hub for the implementation of sustainable 
development goals (SDGs) in Africa and has thus established Kigali-based SDGs center for 
Africa (Ramutsindela and Büscher, 2019). 
 
In Southern Africa, scholars have argued that countries like Botswana do not fit the 
categorisation of weak states on the continent. The Botswana state has demonstrated strength 
and capacity in terms of economic growth, political stability and governance of the country’s 
two main resources, diamonds and cattle since independence (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Leith, 
2005). The country experienced one of the fastest growth rates in per capita income among 






resulted in many scholars praising Botswana as an ‘African miracle state’ (Samatar, 1999), 
‘exemplary post-colony’, ‘Norway of Africa’, etc. The exceptionality of Botswana is attributed 
to the political and economic unity of the elites under the tutelage of a political leadership that 
is disciplined and conscious of the institutional requirement of its project (Samatar, 1999; 
Botlhale, 2018). According to Samatar (1999), the small size of the elites, their narrow and 
relatively homogeneous economic base (with roots in the cattle industry) and common 
ideological views provided the basis for this unity and enabled the political leadership to pursue 
a capitalist development policy. This unity not only limited corruption but also limited 
patronage and clientelism as there was no need to finance new networks of political support 
(Englebert, 2000). The political leadership set up state institutions such as the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) and Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), which 
were instrumental in driving Botswana’s economic development and good governance. The 
ruling elites were assisted by expatriate technocrats who were slowly being understudied by 
the locals (Samatar, 1999). This external influence was not limited to the bureaucracy of 
Botswana but also manifested in the development of environmental policies as we shall see in 
Chapter Four.  
 
Botswana has had a tradition of strong traditional leaders and yet despite this, chiefs have not 
hindered Botswana’s development. The traditional leadership were absorbed into new state 
institutions, and this in turn enabled the blending of traditional and modern institutions. 
Botswana’s success is a testimony that developing countries can establish good policies and 
institutions that promote sustainable utilisation of resources for economic growth and 
development. However, the exceptionality discourse of Botswana does not feature sustained 
discussions of environmental politics, yet environmental governance has contributed 
significantly to state building in the country. As I will show in this thesis, the state was able to 
pursue its greener model of capitalist accumulation and gross domestic growth through the 
wildlife economy that is anchored on environmental policies that fuse together domestic and 
global interests (Chapters Four and Five).  
 
Despite Botswana being Africa’s success story, some scholars have questioned certain 
attributes of the country and its representation in literature as a model for Africa (Good, 2008; 
Good and Taylor, 2008; Hillboom, 2008; Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh, 2017). For instance, 






is highly concentrated in the head of state (see Chapter Five). One of Botswana's other side is 
its extremely high level of social inequalities in relation to the country’s natural resource 
endowment compared to the level of development (Hillboom, 2008). These social inequalities, 
which emanate from social relations of production and distribution embedded in a capitalist 
system, are systemic rather than aberrant. Good (2008) claims that the wealth produced by 
diamond mining and the luxurious tourism sector has not led to greater prosperity for all. 
Botswana’s economic growth has allowed “for significant poverty rates and extremely unequal 
resource and income distribution to prevail in the midst of plenty” (Hillbom, 2008, p. 191). 
Ulriksen (2017) argues that Botswana’s success story has not translated into the reduction of 
poverty and social inequality of her citizens with the country having one of the highest Gini 
co-efficient of 0.65 in the world. Historically disadvantaged populations such as the Basarwa 
(commonly known as the San) remain politically and economically marginalised. Such 
marginalisation would disqualify Botswana as a green state because in the eyes of green state 
theorists, such a state is characterised by social justice in which the state aims to include all 
citizens in the affairs of the state on an equal basis without discrimination.  
 
2.3.2 Environmentalism as post-materialist 
 
Environmental protection is viewed as a consequence of the attainment of higher standards of 
living as evidenced by countries in the Global North (Inglehart, 1995; Millennium Ecosystem 
Assesment, 2005; Manfredo et al., 2016). The assumption is that affluent societies have greater 
interests in protecting the environment. It is claimed that the relatively improved economic 
conditions of modern society afford people the opportunity to focus on or develop values that 
go beyond those of wealth creation or making material gains (Inglehart, 1995; Manfredo et al., 
2016). Following the post-war period, countries in the Global North experienced economic 
stability that saw the satisfaction of material needs as well as a rise in the levels of education, 
information opportunity and welfare systems that played a role in influencing the values of 
society (Dalton, 1996). This caused a shift in focus from material needs such as those of basic 
survival and economic security to post-materialist values such as freedom of speech and self-
expression, aesthetic satisfaction and quality of life (Inglehart, 1995, 2000; Dalton, 1996). As 
such the post-war period saw a rise in environmental movements such as Friends of the Earth, 
Green Peace Movement and environmental green parties in Europe and North America. Thus, 







It is worth highlighting that the green state in the Global North is not entirely post-materialist. 
States in North America and Europe are strongly guided by the imperatives of profit making 
as anywhere else in the capitalist world. In terms of environmental justice, the poor – often 
racialized groups – are disproportionately exposed to environmental harm (Martinez-Alier, 
2002; Bullard 2018). For example, in the USA, Bullard (2018) found out that “black 
communities, because of their economic and political vulnerability, have been routinely 
targeted for the sitting of noxious facilities, locally unwanted land uses and environmental 
hazards and are likely to suffer greater risks from this facilities than is the general population” 
(Bullard, 2018, p. xiv). Furthermore, these poor communities do not derive maximum benefits 
from environmental resources located in their areas, just like states in Africa.    
 
The post-materialist logic applied to green states in Global North suggests that states in Africa 
do not have environmental concerns because they have to deal with pressing challenging issues 
such as unemployment, health, water shortages, food insecurity, infrastructure and political 
instability. These issues take precedence over environmental concerns in developing countries. 
The assumption is that African states are too engaged with economic and physical survival to 
be concerned with the environment. However, this line of thinking does not hold water. African 
indigenous communities have, since time immemorial, been, concerned about the environment. 
This is because the environment plays a crucial role in their survival. As such indigenous 
communities established social and cultural norms which are inherent in nature and established 
via long standing social relationships (Ostrom, 2000). These social and cultural norms were 
meant to ensure sustainable use of natural resources. For instance, the Basarwa (commonly 
known as the San) nomadic lifestyle allowed for resource renewal and regeneration as they 
moved from one place to another (Madzwamuse and Fabricius, 2004).  
 
However, the interest in environmental protection was disrupted by the advent of colonialism 
in Africa. The African environment became embedded in global capitalism thereby leading to 
unsustainable or exploitation of the environment by external hegemonic forces. Colonialism 
alienated indigenous communities from their environment by removing them from their 
ancestral land that they had occupied for centuries. In the process, indigenous communities’ 
lost access and control of the environment to the detriment of environmental protection. 






their immersion in social struggles directed at accessing power over the environmental space 
for hitherto expropriated and repressed groups” (Obi, 2005, p. 6).  
 
Prominent examples of environmental movements in Africa include the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Niger Delta and the Green Belt Movement (GBM) 
in Kenya. MOSOP emerged in response against the exploitation of the Niger Delta by the Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (Obi, 2010; Ikerionwu, 2014; Wetzel, 2016). The GBM 
advocated for the sustainable management of forest resources and economic empowerment of 
women (Ikerionwu, 2014; Wetzel, 2016; MOSOP, 2019). These movements work with 
international organisations and are often limited within national borders. It should also be noted 
that African states have also upped their efforts in sensitising their citizens on issues of 
environmental sustainability and climate change. Recently, Ethiopia planted over 353 million 
trees in 12 hours as part of the country’s national ‘green legacy’ initiative despite the ongoing 
struggles in governing the multi-ethnic country. The country aims to tackle deforestation and 
effects of climate change by educating Ethiopians on the environment and planting different 
eco-friendly seedlings (BBC, 2018). Furthermore, African states are working towards 
integrating education into school curriculum (see Chapter Four). These efforts suggest that 
African states are on the path towards greenness and should therefore be considered in the 
debates of the green state. Next, I demonstrate the ways through which African states pursue 
the green agenda.  
 
2.4 The greening of the state in Africa  
 
Considering the arguments on the exclusion of African states from green states debates 
highlighted above, Death (2016a) challenges the normative assumptions that the green state is 
associated with economically developed democracies. He considers the strategies that 
countries in the Global South have internalized to become green and argues for their inclusion 
in the debates on the green state. Death (2016a) makes a compelling argument that 
environmental and ecological imperatives have been central to the production and 
transformation of the state in Africa even though African states are weak and do badly in most 
indexes of environmental performance and governance. From a biopolitical perspective “the 
African state is actually a product of particular attempts to govern land, species, human 
populations, water resources, and so on” (Death, 2016b, p. 123). He further argued that the 






environmental resources”, including efforts by colonial and post-colonial governments towards 
managing socio-ecological problems (Death, 2016a, p. 59). 
 
Therefore, the potential for the emergence of the green state need not be limited to countries of 
the Global North because many countries in the Global South also pursue environmental 
agendas as, for example, signatories of different kinds of environmental-related conventions 
and treaties. They have also domestically developed green institutions and policies to manage 
the environment and nature-society interactions. As a result, there has been an element of 
greening taking place within African states. In this thesis, I align my argument with Death’s 
view on greening the state in Africa using evidence from Botswana, which has had a green 
agenda since independence in 1966. I support Death’s argument for two reasons. First, he 
shows that environmentalism is involved in the making of the African state (see Ramutsindela 
and Büscher, 2019). Second, and more importantly, he draws attention to the process of 
greening which is as important as the environmental performance of the state. 
 
Although Death’s work advances our understanding of environmental politics and greening in 
African states, his work can be deemed to be broad. Death has sought to cover as many 
countries in the African continent on various environmental themes ranging from wildlife 
conservation, minerals, land reform, climate change, environmental education and green 
citizenship policies, green economy strategies, ecosystem services programmes and 
international environmental negotiations. While for the most part it becomes clear his overall 
argument of what a green state in Africa is, I am of the view there is a need to drill down to 
each of these themes. It is for this reason that I have chosen to focus on wildlife conservation 
policy and political leadership over time. This helps us to understand how policies and 
institutions evolved and how they have been sustained or broken. In what follows, I focus on 
attempts to bring the green agenda into the African state through processes and practices of 
territorialisation and how this has transformed it.    
 
2.5 Regulation by territorialisation  
My point of departure is that the state in Africa has placed the environment at the center of 
state making through territorialisation. The state is a political organisation that claims and 






through strategies of territorialisation. Territorialisation is a form of resource control whereby 
a state controls and regulates the environment and human-environment relations in organised 
geographic boundaries within its territory to achieve environmental goals (Vandergeest and 
Peluso, 1995; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Whitehead, 2017).  
Control over environmental resources plays a key role in defining, constituting and 
operationalising state power (MacLean, 2010; Badiey, 2014). Neumann (2004, p. 202) asserts 
that “the process of mapping, bounding, containing and controlling nature and citizenry are 
what make a state a state. States come into being through these claims and the assertion of 
control over territory, resources and people’’. This involves various mapping exercises or even 
geographical information systems (GIS) but essentially enables the state to know nature 
through its spatial form and location. The modern state uses territorial strategies such as zoning, 
policing, surveillance to physically control nature and social interactions with the environment 
and make themselves governable. It is through this mechanism that states include and exclude 
individuals or social groups within certain geographic boundaries such as protected areas. This 
may involve the regulation of nature using national geographic boundaries but also involves 
the control of nature in sub-national geographic boundaries like wildlife management areas. 
Within these geographic boundaries’ laws, regulations and authorities are established to enable 
the state to extend and maintain control over wildlife resources and to alter nature-society 
interactions. Biodiversity conservation is fundamentally a spatial practice. States have used 
biodiversity conservation to consolidate and deepen state power in rural-remote areas in Africa 
as well as to accumulate wealth (Lunstrum, 2013, 2019).  
 
Practices of environmental statecraft emerge “via the interactions and negotiated consent of 
many different actors’’ (Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p. 483) and are spatially and temporally 
contingent because they depend on how power is distributed in particular contexts. The 
outcomes of state territorialisation are therefore dependent upon the state-society relations. In 
order to curb biodiversity loss and enforce the green agenda, the modern state in Africa has 
deployed various exclusive and inclusive modes of territorial strategies. Exclusive territorial 
strategies include protected areas and green militarisation which often invoke physical force to 
exclude certain people from accessing wildlife resources. Others involve inclusive territorial 






conservation areas (TFCAs) aimed at including local communities in managing wildlife 
resources as it will become clear below.   
 
2.5.1 Protected Areas/Fortress conservation 
 
Wildlife conservation has always been associated with the establishment of protected areas 
such as national parks and game reserves. According to the IUCN a protected area is a “defined 
geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed through legal or other effective means 
to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural 
values” (IUCN, 2008, p.8). This definition is expanded with a series of six management 
categories (I-VI) ranging from strict protection with limited human access to protected 
landscapes and seascapes, which are cultural landscapes often with settled human communities 
managed as protected areas (see Table 2.1). The dominant discourse of protected areas is the 
preservation of ecosystems and wildlife species to the exclusion of indigenous communities. 
PAs are also becoming key components of climate change mitigation strategies. 
 





Strict nature reserve: protected area managed mainly for 
science 
 
Wilderness area: protected area managed mainly for 
wilderness protection 
Category II National park: protected area managed mainly for ecosystem 
protection and recreation 
Category III Natural monument: protected area managed mainly for 
conservation of specific natural features 
Category IV Habitat/Species Management Area: protected area managed 
mainly for conservation through management intervention 
Category V Protected Landscape/seascape: protected area managed mainly 
for landscape/seascape conservation and recreation 
Category VI Managed resource protected area: protected area managed 
mainly for sustainable use of natural ecosystems 






The architecture for the protected area system in Africa can be traced back to Western colonial 
thought and practice as the majority of PAs were created during the colonial era. Underpinning 
the development of protected areas in Africa is the idea that African wilderness areas are earthly 
Edenic, that is untouched, unspoilt and free of humans (Neumann, 1998, Dowie, 2009).  
Following this assumption, protected areas were created to preserve and maintain the unspoilt 
environment from human destruction. National parks like Yellowstone and Yosemite in the 
United States of America (USA) created in 1872 and 1890 respectively, became a reference 
point for protected areas in Africa and elsewhere (Carruthers, 2017). The park was founded on 
the principle that nature as something pristine should be devoid of humans. As a result, these 
protected areas were carved out of land originally belonging to native Americans. This state-
led exclusive model became a template that was imported into Africa and elsewhere by white 
settlers (Brockington, 2002; Brockington and Igoe, 2006).  
 
The creation of protected areas in Africa became synonymous with human rights violations 
against indigenous communities who were forcefully removed from land they had occupied 
for centuries. They were considered to be disturbing the romantic notion of unspoiled and 
untouched wilderness (Adams and MaCshane, 1992). In light of this, state power was 
strengthened in far-flung remote areas, where the exercise of that power has been marginal. In 
the process of deepening state power, local people lost access to resources that were important 
for the security of their livelihoods as a result of their removals (Ramutsindela, 2004; 
Brockington, 2002; Brockington and Igoe, 2006; West et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2014). Local 
communities were therefore not allowed in conservation spaces; should an indigenous person 
be found within the boundaries of the parks they were brutally supressed by the park authorities 
or heavily fined (Peluso, 1993). In this way, their traditional way of living was criminalized; 
indigenous communities became the enemy of the state thus labelled as poachers, squatters etc. 
This policy was appropriately called the ‘fines-and fences’ approach or fortress conservation 
(see Brockington, 2002). Local communities developed negative attitudes towards protected 
areas, and they would often trespass and poach animals as a way of resisting their removal 
from land that belongs to them.  
 
In order to safeguard wildlife and exclude local people from protected areas, states not only 
erected fences but also applied barbed wire around the conservation spaces (Spierenburg and 






life of animals more than the life of humans (Hulme and Murphree, 2001). It is for this reason 
that local communities today often associate protected areas with the interests of white people. 
Some states such as Botswana did not erect fences as fences hinder the movement of wildlife, 
but the government deployed militaristic tactics to police conservation spaces (see Chapter 
Four and Five).  
 
While protected areas predates independent statehood in most African states, their networks 
have since increased significantly, and now covers nearly 17.5% of sub-Saharan territory and 
parks such as the Serengenti, Kruger, Masai Mara, Okavango Delta have a worldwide status 
and reputation (Dunn, 2009).  Countries such as Central African Republic, Namibia, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Botswana have set aside 43%, 42%, 40.5%, 29.2% and 40% respectively of their 
territory for nature conservation and figure as globally influential sanctuaries of wildlife 
(Lindsey et al., 2007; UNEP, 2014; see Chapter Four). Setting aside land for conservation 
transforms the state in that it weakens the grip of state power in the territory because as more 
land is protected it brings in more actors that have direct influence in the operation of PAs. 
There are states such as Tanzania that gave up land for conservation in order to access foreign 
development aid for its budget, which brings in more actors in the planning and implementation 
of environmental policies consequently weakening the grip of the state (Death, 2008; 2013; 
Gardner, 2017; Noe et al., 2017). It is estimated that Tanzania gets approximately 40% of its 
total budget from donors and scholars contend that the private sector is at the helm of operating 
Tanzania’s conservation areas (Death, 2013). In Madagascar, Duffy (2006) points out that 
conservation practices shaped state governance when WWF and Conservation International 
solicited US$8 million worth of debt for nature swaps, and donors and NGOs directly operated 
elements of national parks. In addition, the World Bank funded and designed the National 
Environment Action Plan (NEAP) and a Charter for the Environment.  
 
Protected areas are key attraction for both foreign investors and international tourists. African 
countries have taken advantage of the pristine wilderness image portrayed by Europeans to 
reinforce their economies. Private safari tourism operators such as Wilderness Safaris2 and 
state tourism enterprises often market conservation areas to affluent western consumer markets 
 
2 Wilderness Safaris is widely acclaimed as the continent’s foremost ecotourism operator, dedicated to 







as pristine and undisturbed wilderness. This has boosted tourists’ interests and increased 
revenue for governments. Wildlife tourism is one of the top foreign exchange earners for 
several sub-Saharan countries including Botswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Tanzania (see 
Chapters Four and Five). The turnover from tourism in sub-Saharan Africa was estimated at 
USD66 billion in 2016, with wildlife tourism generating a significant percentage of that total 
(World Travel and Tourism Council, 2018, hereafter WTTC). Furthermore, the industry has 
created 8.4 million direct jobs and 20.7 million indirect jobs (WTTC, 2018). This implies that 
tourists’ expectations are met as they can see Africa’s charismatic megafauna and rare species.  
 
2.5.2 Green militarisation 
To secure natural resources against illegal off-take, states adopted military tactics to monitor 
protected areas. Since most of the protected areas are located along the borders of a country, 
they became sites of illegal smuggling of guns and were infiltrated by poachers. The increase 
in rhino and elephant poaching between 2009 and 2016 in sub-Saharan Africa forged a renewed 
sense of urgency in wildlife conservation.  Hence African governments reverted to militaristic 
intervention. This form of state intervention, which usually involves force or violence, is 
commonly known amongst conservation scholars as green militarisation. Lunstrum (2014, 
p.817) defines green militarisation as the “use of military and paramilitary (military-like) 
actors, techniques, technologies and partnerships in pursuit of conservation”. Proponents of 
green militarization consider the approach as legitimate, in that, it saves endangered species 
from extinction (Henk, 2005, 2006; Hübschle and Jooste, 2017; Mogomotsi and Madigele, 
2017). Therefore, green militarisation is an attempt by the state to enforce the green agenda.  
Green militarisation is enabled by a wide range of actors. States have brought in their national 
armies to fight poachers. For instance, the Botswana state has enlisted the Botswana Defence 
Force (BDF) in the war for conservation and has somehow become a model example of how 
to deal with poachers (see Chapter Five). Elsewhere in Africa, anti-poaching units (APU) have 
been trained by foreign military instructors and security companies with others engaging 
former military personnel (Lunstrum, 2014; Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016). Furthermore, 
APUs have now resorted to camouflage uniforms which resemble military gear. There is a 
discernible shift towards a greater use of physical force, which include the use of shoot to kill 
or shoot on site, surveillance technologies, informant networks, drones and camera traps 






Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conservationists engage 
in moral boundary drawing, grounded in colonial stereotypes of black poachers and rebels 
versus the white saviours of the park management authority. By adopting such measures, 
Ramutsindela and Büscher (2019, p. 17) contend that “African states and their citizens are 
placed under their surveillance while being enabled to themselves become surveillance states 
with the aim of protecting environmental assets”. 
 
Such initiatives chime with state objectives to put an end to or displace rowdy populations or 
groups operating across international borders via counter insurgency operations in which 
biodiversity conservation plays a legitimate role (Duffy, 2016). They also deepen and extend 
state power in rural and remote areas, where state authority has often been limited (Dunn, 2009; 
Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Duffy, 2016; Ybarra, 2016). It should also be noted that military 
tactics have been used to forcibly remove indigenous populations when protected areas were 
established (Peluso, 1993; Neumann, 2001). In this regard, Death (2016a, p. 88) argues that 
the green state in Africa can be considered “an authoritarian conservation state in which vast 
tracts of land are exclusively territorialised and secured against local populations, for the 
protection of wildlife rents and the enjoyment of foreign tourists”. 
  
2.5.3 Decentralised environmental governance 
It was not until the 1990s that international conservation NGOs and governments began to 
realise that the state-led exclusive protected area approach was inefficient in addressing 
biodiversity conservation. In 1992, delegates at the World Congress on National Parks and 
protected areas acknowledged that denying indigenous communities rights and benefits from 
protected areas undermines conservation efforts. The real turning point however came in 2003 
at the World Parks Congress in Durban, South Africa. A commitment was made by 
governments to include local communities in the management of protected areas on a fair and 
equitable basis and in full respect of their human and social rights (UNEP, 2004). It was 
considered that indigenous rural Africans have a better understanding of environmental 
processes. For instance, indigenous communities have established social and cultural norms 
which are often inherent in nature (e.g. established via long standing social relationships) and 
not necessarily codified or written down (Ostrom, 1992). Hence, they must be recognized as 






shift towards a more inclusive, flexible and hybrid approach towards natural resource 
management. These featured the importance of decentralised and quasi autonomous networks 
in biodiversity conservation. Decentralized approaches present a platform on which to build 
capacities of rural African societies and local level institutions where natural resources are 
located. It also represents an arena in which the transformation of the state takes place.  
The decentralised governance involves devolution of power and transfer of responsibilities 
from the central government to local government and rural communities in wildlife 
management (Murombezi, 2001; Dryer et al., 2014). Through decentralised governance, local 
communities are able to self-organise themselves to manage resources and coordinate with 
state actors through formal (regulatory or bureaucratic frameworks employed by the state) and 
informal mechanisms (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). In addition, decentralised approaches provide an 
important avenue for establishing novel public private partnerships between various actors to 
share both authority and responsibility over resources. Rather than a complete transformation 
of conventional environmental statehood, decentralized approaches depend on the re-
regulation of conservation and use of natural resources, which often combine state-oriented 
and market-oriented practices (Harris, 2012). 
 
Initiatives such CBNRM in Botswana, Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, communal conservancies in Namibia, 
Kenya and wildlife management areas in Tanzania epitomize decentralised approaches in 
Southern and East Africa. These initiatives are a tool to achieve biodiversity conservation and 
improve livelihoods in rural communities in Africa. The basic assumption of CBNRM is that 
communities will sustainably manage wildlife within their locality if they directly derive socio-
economic benefits from the use of wildlife (Murphree, 1993; Thakadu, 2005; Twyman, 2000, 
2017). Hence it is presented as a win-win opportunity by the state and non-state actors and is 
considered as crucial for achieving sustainable development goals.  
 
CBNRM has mostly been promoted and implemented on areas adjacent to protected areas. The 
aim here is for communities to sustainably manage wildlife resources while contributing to 
reducing poverty among indigenous communities. These peripheral areas act as transition zone 
between a protected area and local community settlements thus they are able to retain the 






of not only communities but the private sector as well. The peripheral areas are zoned by the 
state into what is known as tourism concessions3. These concessions serve as economic unit of 
production (Twyman, 2000). There are community concessions where the land is governed by 
a democratically elected body which adopts a management plan for its land use (see Chapter, 
Six). This management plan must be approved by a relevant environmental agency to ensure 
that the activities are carried out on a sustainable manner. The local community usually zones 
their concessions for various activities, including consumptive or non-consumptive use. There 
are also private concessions for the private safari operators.  
 
When the state transfers power over wildlife, it is an illustration that it trusts its citizens, and 
this act gives the state a democratic outlook to the public. However, this characterisation has 
been questioned by scholars (Nelson and Agrawal, 2007; Nelson, 2010; Poteete & Ribot, 2011; 
Hoon, 2014). This is because, the initiative has been externally driven by powerful 
environmental foundations and NGOs as well as developmental agencies in the Global North 
(see Chapter Four). The aim of these NGOs is to limit the power of the state by pressing for 
the devolution of power to locals to influence the use and ownership of resources. Contrary to 
the state giving local communities the autonomy to decide on their economic projects, the state 
actually influences the implementation of community projects. In certain instances, the central 
government has been able to influence the distribution of revenue with the national government 
having a major stake from community projects (see Chapters Five and Six; Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson, 2012; Hoon, 2014; Mbaiwa, 2015). The rent-seeking behaviour of states is one way 
to ensure that the state extends its authority where it has been marginal. Ramutsindela and 
Buscher (2019) contend that decentralised initiatives can literally make states particularly 
where there is no local state structures to infuse the initiative. They note how Lesotho through 
the Maloti-Drakensburg Transfontier Project (MDTP) was able to establish a local state 
structure to decentralise community conservation through the assistance of the Global 
Environment Fund (GEF).  
 
 
3 A concession is a lease, license, easement or permit for an operation undertaken by any party other 






2.5.4 Transfontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) 
Another key element of the green state in Africa is the implementation of trans-border mega 
parks commonly known as transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs). TFCAs are an attempt to 
experiment with the green agenda in Africa.  These modern conservation areas are established 
between two or more countries and involve merging formally isolated protected areas, wildlife 
management areas, freehold, state and communal land across state borders (Ramutsindela, 
2007). Just like protected areas, TFCAs have colonial roots. Wolmer (2003, p.266) argues that 
“TFCAs are driven by Cecil Rhodes clones, rather than seeing great expanses of red on the 
map (the color of British empire) they want to see a great wedge of green as their legacy to 
Africa”.  It is widely acknowledged that Cecil Rhodes had a vision to expand the British empire 
from Cape to Cairo hence the TFCA dream is to join Africa’s protected areas along this axis.  
TFCAs challenge the bordering processes in Africa by seeking to move beyond the removal of 
fences to allow for free movement of wildlife across the borders. Political boundaries are an 
obstacle to the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems (Fall, 2005, 2011). It is claimed 
that borders are physical features imposed by colonialism that disrupt natural processes and 
inhibit the migration of wildlife. Duffy (2001) contends that ecological boundaries do not 
follow political boundaries. Therefore, TFCAs promotes a ‘borderless’ notion in conservation 
(Hanks, 2003; Ramutsindela, 2009) while portraying a dream of a united Africa without fences.  
 
Against this backdrop, TFCAs are justified for ecological, economic and political reasons 
(Wolmer, 2003; Ramutsindela, 2007; Büscher, 2013).  From an ecological point of view, 
TFCAs are created to restore fragmented ecosystems that have been disrupted by political 
borders. They do so, by re-connecting protected areas and other land uses across borders 
through ecological corridors. These allow the “re-establishment of wildlife seasonal migratory 
routes, which in turn reduce the extinction risk due to stochastic events” (Munthali, 2007, p.52). 
The initiative is regarded as an activity directed at accomplishing biodiversity protection in 
accordance with global commitments to the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity of 
1992.  
Economically, TFCAs serve to increase tourism revenue that bolsters regional and local 
economies by providing an extensive ecotourism industry. It is hoped that this extensive 






communities living near TFCAs (Sandwith et al., 2001; Ramutsindela, 2007). They are 
therefore an avenue for the penetration of capital into nature (Büscher, 2013). To realize this 
dream, for instance, the KAZA TFCA has introduced uni-visa for tourists. Just like the 
Schengen visa, the uni-visa allows tourists to move freely across five partner countries with 
ease with the aim of contributing significantly to the economies of the participating countries.  
Politically, TFCAs are viewed as necessary for peace building and present an arena in which 
the dream of the ‘African Renaissance’ can be attained (Mbeki, 2002) hence also known as 
peace parks. It is through TFCAs that nature is used to maintain peaceful relations thus 
promoting a philosophy of goodwill, cooperation and co-existence. Thus, the green state in 
Africa is a vast, interconnected Pan-African conservation estate (Death, 2016a). Büscher and 
Ramutsindela (2016) aptly note that ‘the global solution’ or ‘telos’ of conservation has been 
under severe pressure from rhino poaching and the aggressive militarised response to it. The 
authors argue that poaching presents the greatest threat to the peace compelling rationale in 
Southern African peace parks. The Great Limpopo Transfontier Park was at the centre of rhino 
poaching in 2015 and has over the years been the flagship of the PPF (Lunstrum, 2014; Büscher 
& Ramutsindela, 2016). Büscher and Ramutsindela (2016) argue that implementers of peace 
parks use violent tactics against people who are framed as poachers which contradicts the 
notion of peace and harmony that peace parks promote.  
The African continent has since experienced a significant increase in transborder conservation 
projects the majority of which is found in Southern Africa. Examples of TFCAs in Southern 
Africa include, the Kgalagadi Transfontier Park which includes Botswana and South Africa; 
the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier conservation area (KAZA) one of the largest by far 
comprising of five countries including Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe; the 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Park (South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe) (see 
Figure 2.1). The literature on TFCAs frames TFCAs as a manifestation of global environmental 
governance where an array of non-state actors and environmental organisations are 
increasingly responsible for driving conservation policy and practice globally in an era 
characterised by a surge of neoliberalism (Duffy, 1997; Büscher and Dressler, 2007; Büscher, 
2013). Scholars argue that TFCAs are an epitome of the rise in globally driven market-oriented 
environmental interventions and mega parks are evidence that most governments have 






Rupert, the late South African business mogul and co-founder of Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) 
has been instrumental in driving the TFCA agenda in Southern Africa. The PPF has since 
collaborated with international environmental organisations such as World-Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and Conservation 
International (CI) who channel funds and provide technical assistance in TFCA projects. The 
foundation has drawn the attention of governments who support the vision of TFCAs while 
also serving as honorary patrons.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Map showing TFCAs in Africa (Source: Peace Parks Foundation, 2018) 
 
The implementation of transborder projects are endorsed by the SADC protocol on Wildlife 
Conservation and Law Enforcement of 1999. Article 4(2f) of this convention confers the 
responsibility on the SADC states “to advance the conservation of the shared wildlife resources 






commitment to the protocol, participating countries contribute a significant amount of land to 
form part of TFCAs. It is within this contributed land that the implementers cooperation with 
governmental environmental agencies to design and create ecological corridors.  Hence TFCAs 
force the state to give away part of its sovereignty over wildlife (Ramutsindela, 2007, 2017) to 
various actors involved in TFCAs; a process that weakens the power of the state. The 
involvement of various actors in the planning and implementation of TFCAs transforms the 
role of the state. When the state agrees to include part of its conservation areas into a TFCA it 
shares its responsibilities over such areas with other participating states. Thus, TFCAs force 
the state to work with other actors, including government departments of various countries, 
powerful international financial institutions, and environmental NGOs. The conservation 
spaces which are part of TFCAs are governed by international protocols and rules that constrain 
the power of the state over such land. In essence, the more actors are involved in the planning 
and implementation of TFCAs, the less control the state has. Furthermore, participating 
countries are expected to integrate TFCAs protocols and rules into their domestic policies. The 
involvement of non-state actors in TFCAs constitutes global environment governance in which 
the responsibility to manage conservation areas is moved away from the state to the hands of 
non-state actors. In short, power and authority shift from the state to non-state entities most of 
which originate from the Global North.  
Despite TFCAs ambitious promises, local communities continue to find themselves on the 
receiving end from large scale conservation projects across Africa. TFCAs are characterised 
by marginalisation, displacement and loss of access to natural and cultural resources (Ferreira, 
2006; Spierenburg et al., 2006; Ramutsindela, 2007; Milgroom and Spierenburg, 2008). Since 
TFCAs are conceived and implemented in a top-down manner, Mayoral-Phillips (2002) found 
that the government of Botswana did not consult with the San community in the planning and 
implementation of the KTP. Mogende (2016) noted that communities on the Botswana side 
were not aware about KAZA and that they have not been involved in the planning phases of 
the same.  The creation of the GLTP has resulted in the forced removal of approximately 7,000 
people from Coudata 16 in Mozambique to give way for the creation of the Limpopo National 
Park (Milgroom & Spierenburg, 2008; Lunstrum, 2010, 2015). Such practices nurture complex 
issues of rights, proprietorship, governance and authenticity (Adams & Hutton, 2007). 
Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2013) observe that communities are often seen as a threat to 






further note that communities who were reclaiming their land or using resources in GLTP have 
been labelled as squatters in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Judging from these examples, 
Ramutsindela (2009) argues that TFCAs reflect trends in the colonial-era of environmental 
injustice and the contradictions between domestic needs and international environmental goals.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has tried to give a review of conceptions of and discussions on the green state. 
Drawing mainly on the Global North experiences, the literature of the green state has 
demonstrated that the state is a critical actor in facilitating environmental reforms that 
altogether enhances sustainability. This literature tends to evaluate the greening of the state in 
terms of ecological outcomes of countries in the Global North. It is for this reason that green 
state theorists assume that green states are largely liberal democracies. This view of the green 
state raises questions about whether and how African states fit into this categorisation of the 
green state. Furthermore, the chapter has demonstrated that environmental issues are central to 
the making and transformation of states in Africa (Death, 2016; Ramutsindela and Büscher, 
2019). In order to understand how the process of greening unfolds, I needed a qualitative 
methodology to investigate this. In the next chapter I discuss the methodology and techniques 
used to collect and analyse the process of greening in Botswana through the lens of wildlife 















Methodological reflections towards understanding Botswana as a green state 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the methods and procedures through which various empirical data sets 
were collected and analysed to understand how the process of greening unfolded in Botswana. 
The research was aimed at understanding how the Botswana state has been produced through 
green discourses and practices and the key drivers behind policy changes over time (1966-
2018) in the wildlife sector. The chapter includes the justification of the selection of the study 
site, research design, methodological approach, data collection and analysis used to explain the 
complex processes that enable the greening of the Botswana state and the consequences and 
contestation of the greening process on local communities in the Okavango Delta. In the last 
section I discuss the ethical issues and challenges I encountered during data collection.  
3.2 Setting  
Botswana’s wildlife conservation estate which accounts for approximately 39% of the 
country’s territory makes it an interesting case study in understanding state processes of 
environmental governance in greening the country. Wildlife conservation is central to 
Botswana’s burgeoning high-end tourism industry and features prominently in the country’s 
international conservation profile. Wildlife-based tourism is the second largest source of 
foreign income for Botswana after mining and is largely concentrated in the northern part of 
Botswana with the Okavango Delta playing a significant role in the national and local 
economy. The study was carried out in the Okavango Delta - a Ramsar site and World Heritage 
site – one of Africa’s most incredible wildlife sanctuary and one of the largest inland delta 
systems in the world (Ramsar, 2006). The Okavango Delta derives its water from the upland 
plains of Angola through the Kubango River, which is joined by the Kuito River, and then 
criss-crosses the desert land of Namibia to later form the Okavango River. The river then 
empties into the low plains of north-western Botswana as alluvial distributaries thus forming 
an inland delta. The delta is part of the KAZA TFCA, an area of approximately 520 000km2 







The Okavango Delta is chosen purposively for this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is 
a popular tourist destination, often considered as the jewel of Botswana’s tourism industry 
operating a multi-billion-pula luxurious tourism that contributes US$1.5 billion to the GDP in 
Botswana (WTTC, 2018). The luxurious tourism in the Okavango Delta encourages 
environmentally friendly tourism that is anchored on green branding promoted by the 
government of Botswana grading system called the Eco-Certification programme. This grading 
system allows private tourism operators and local communities involved in CBNRM in the 
Delta to minimise environmental impacts while at the same time promoting green growth in 
tourism concessions.  Secondly, the delta is also considered by many as a paradox; an area that 
is rich in natural resources but poor at the same time (Mbaiwa, 2017; Mogalakwe and 
Nyamnjoh, 2017). Botswana’s high-end tourism industry is largely located in what is still one 
of the country’s most poverty-stricken areas – the Ngamiland district in North West Botswana 
covering the Okavango Delta. Many local communities have not yet realised the benefits from 
the thriving wildlife-based tourism industry in the delta hence there is a need to establish the 
link between the concept of the green state and environmental (in)justice.   
 
Thirdly, wildlife is subjected to various models of environmental governance in the Okavango 
Delta although the resource is state property. These consist of state-led park model, 
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and privatisation (see Figure 3.1). 
These various models of wildlife governance offer the government of Botswana an avenue to 
greening the state and maintaining the high-end tourism in the Okavango Delta. Under the 
state-led park model wildlife is sustainably managed in protected areas such as Moremi Game 
Reserve (MGR). MGR is controlled and managed by the state through the Department of 
Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) housed under the Ministry of Environment, Natural 
Resources Conservation and Tourism (MENT). In this type of model, the state has exclusive 
and discretionary power in the control of wildlife as an ecological and economic asset. It is 
widely acknowledged that state control and ownership is the most notable model in Africa in 
the majority of resource sectors. Within this model, only non-consumptive activities are 
permitted by the state.  
 
The CBNRM model is premised on the devolution of power and authority from the central 
state to local communities in managing wildlife. This is meant to promote and empower local 






CBNRM was implemented in 1989 with few local communities in the Okavango Delta 
embracing the concept (see Chapters Four and Six). Wildlife conservation takes place within 
concessions often leased to local communities by the relevant land board authority (see Chapter 
Six). Within CBNRM, local communities can engage sustainably in both consumptive and 
non-consumptive activities guided by the relevant department. Local communities are 
important in the greening process in that they assist with the implementation of the green 
agenda at the local level in Botswana with the premise that they will generate rewards crucial 
for uplifting their livelihoods.  
 
With the private sector model, the state has granted foreign investors or private safari 
companies the right to sustainably extract wildlife resources in concession areas through leases 
in the Okavango Delta. The state is not directly involved in the resource management structures 
but draws taxes and royalties from the investors. The most notable one is Wilderness Safaris 
which operates safari camps in several African countries. Wilderness Safaris through 
Okavango Wilderness Safaris (Pty) Limited (OWS) operates approximately 23 safari camps in 
the delta. OWS pays lease fees and taxes to the government. A total of over BWP41 million 
(approximately US$ 5.9 million) has been paid in terms of lease fees and taxes in the financial 
year 2009 -2013 (Spenceley & Snyman, 2016). Spenceley and Snyman (2016) contend that the 
company has participated in conservation and tourism policy and planning at the national level 
in Botswana, both formally and informally. The private companies assist in reinforcing the 
green agenda by adopting the latest technological innovation that minimises environmental 
impacts while at the same time promoting green growth in Botswana complementing the 








Figure 3.1 Various models of wildlife governance in the Okavango Delta, Botswana (Data 
source: Botswana Tourism organisation, 2017)  
 
Khwai village, located in wildlife management area (WMA) NG19 in the northern part of the 
Moremi Game Reserve and along the Khwai river was selected as a case study because it helps 
us understand the unfolding process of greening at a local level and the relationship between 
the state and its citizens in environmental governance. The village was established as a result 
of forced removals of various families from Moremi Game Reserve at the time of its 
designation in 1963 and the subsequent extension of the reserve in 1969 (Taylor, 2000; 
Bolaane, 2002; see Chapter Six). The community of Khwai mainly comprises of the Bugakhwe 
or River Bushmen, a Basarwa group. Just like other Basarwa, the Bugakhwe were hunters and 
gatherers before being relocated from the game reserve.  
 
Khwai village is surrounded by wealthy rich wildlife populations making the area ideal for 






CBNRM when the program started in 1989 (see more discussion in Chapter Six). As part of 
CBNRM the community established a community trust, Khwai Development Trust (KDT) to 
run and develop an eco-tourism enterprise that aims to protect the environment and generate 
revenue from the area’s unique environment. Khwai was purposively chosen for two reasons. 
Firstly, the CBNRM programme has been operational in the village since 2000. The Khwai 
community was the first community to stop trophy hunting in 2008 and solely focus on 
photographic tourism before the implementation of the nation-wide hunting ban in 2014 (see 
Chapter Six).  
 
Secondly, Khwai epitomises the challenges and interactions between the state, private sector 
and KDT regarding tourism development and conservation. Khwai is surrounded by three 
prime luxurious photographic tourism lodges – Tsaro lodge, Khwai River lodge and Machaba 
lodge – most of which are and have been operated by private safari tourism operators.  For 
decades, the community through their trust have been at the centre of resource conflicts with 
tourism companies in the area, the Tawana Land Board (TLB), Botswana Tourism 
Organisation (BTO) and the national government over ownership of Tsaro Lodge (see Chapter 
Six). All these conflicts are a result of the fact that Khwai is in a wildlife rich area suitable for 
tourism development and wildlife conservation desired by the government, political and 
economic elites and private safari tourism operators.  By paying attention to the relationship 
between the state and its citizens in Khwai concession, this case study helps us establish the 
possible link between the concept of the green state and environmental (in)justice. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, when a state achieves a greener status, environmental justice and poverty 









Figure 3.2: Map showing the location of Khwai settlement in the Okavango Delta 
(Source: Okavango Research Institute, 2019) 
 
3.3 Research design and methodology 
The study was designed to understand the complex processes that enabled the greening of the 
state in Botswana through the lens of wildlife conservation. This study is situated in the 
interpretivist paradigm.  An interpretive approach is the “systematic analysis of socially 
meaningful action through the direct detail observation of people in natural settings in order to 
arrive at understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain their social 
worlds” (Neuman, 2000, p.68). The interpretive approach is of the view that the world is 
subjective and best understood in terms of individuals subjective meanings rather than the 
researcher’s objective definition (Neuman, 2000; Myers, 2009). Hence, the interpretive 
approach is largely shaped by human experiences and social context and best studied within its 






participants involved in the study (Walsham, 1995; Neuman, 2000). The research is dependent 
on participants experience including participants knowledge, views, interpretations and 
experiences on the processes of greening Botswana since independence. The interpretive 
approach focuses on meaning and employs multiple meaning in order to reflect on different 
aspects of the issue. This enabled me to appreciate the difference and similarities between 
participants views. 
Contrary to the positivist research paradigm that depends on quantitative data, interpretive 
research is mainly informed by qualitative data and analysis. Qualitative data is based mostly 
on non-numeric data such as interviews and observations as it tends to focus on meanings 
generated from the perspectives of respondents. As such qualitative research involves a 
collection of broad narrative data in order to gain deeper insights into the complex processes 
that enable greening in Botswana. Proponents of qualitative research are of the view that this 
approach offers naturalistic inquiry, in that it allows the phenomena under investigation to be 
carried out within their natural setting. Since social phenomena are often situated within and 
cannot be isolated from their social context, interpretations of such phenomena must be 
grounded within their socio-historical context (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Myers, 2009). 
Qualitative methodology enables data collection and analysis to be done simultaneously and 
iteratively. This strategy allows the researcher to correct potential flows in the interview 
protocol or adjust the questions to capture the phenomena of interest better (Creswell, 2015). 
Furthermore, the researcher may even change his/her original research questions if they realise 
that the original questions are unlikely to generate new or useful insights. Qualitative research 
encourages the use of open-ended interview questions in data collection and thus allows the 
researcher to capture not only questions asked but also those that one may not have thought of 
when designing the study. There are various methods of data collection and analysis employed 
in qualitative research, including interviews, focus group discussions, observations and 
document analysis. The use of more than two methods often termed data triangulation enhances 
the credibility of the data.  
There are various strategies of inquiry that qualitative researchers can choose from to collect 
and analyse data and they include: narrative, phenomenology, ethnography, case study and 
grounded theory (Creswell, 2015). For the purpose of this research which attempts to explain 






deemed suitable to collect and analyse data. Grounded theory consists of a set of inductive 
procedures for analysing data to discover new theoretical insights from the data and avoids 
traditional logical deductive reasoning (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; 
Charmaz 2003; Stern and Porr, 2017). The methodology of grounded theory is iterative, 
requiring a steady movement between concepts and data. Corbin and Strauss (1990) note that 
sampling in grounded theory is not drawn from samples of specific groups and units of time 
but in terms of their concepts, properties, dimensions and characteristics. Thus, a purposive 
sampling technique guided the selection of participants. This type of sampling strategy allows 
a researcher to use judgement to select participants who will best answer the research questions 
and meet the objectives of the study (Creswell and Clark, 2007; Patton, 2015).  
 
3.4 Data Collection 
The empirical evidence for understanding the complex processes that enable the greening of 
the Botswana state is primarily based on key informant interviews, observations, document 
analysis and historical archival work. Fieldwork was carried out in Botswana from April 2018 
to April 2019 in Gaborone4; in the administrative capital of Ngamiland district, Maun and 
Khwai village in the Okavango Delta. In early April 2018, I left Cape Town for Gaborone to 
begin interviews. I spent two months in Gaborone conducting interviews with key informants 
from the various governmental and non-governmental organisations working on environmental 
conservation. In the beginning of June, I travelled to Maun where I spent two months doing 
fieldwork. I then took a break of two weeks, spending time in Cape Town reflecting on 
fieldwork data with my supervisor. This assisted me to identify gaps and determine the kind of 
questions to ask in the next field visit.  
In September, I travelled back to Maun to continue with the interviews. I then proceeded to 
Khwai village to interact with villagers to understand how the state interacts with the 
community in wildlife conservation and the role they play in rolling out the green agenda in 
their concession. Khwai was not foreign to me. I first came to Khwai in 2013, when I was a 
research assistant to a PhD scholar, Annette LaRocco, from Cambridge University. I was 
accompanied by Mr Thebe Kemosidile, a research assistant from the Okavango Research 
 
4 This is where the Ministry of Environment, Natural resource conservation and Tourism (MENT), 
headquarters for Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP), Department of Environmental 






Institute (ORI). We spent almost two weeks in the area sleeping in camping tents at the old 
abandoned DWNP camp near the northern gate of Moremi Game Reserve. After finalising 
interviews and doing observations in Khwai, I went back to Maun to complete interviews 
before heading to Gaborone. The purpose of travelling back to Gaborone was to interview 
informants whom I did not get a chance to interview whilst on my first visit to Gaborone. It is 
also during this time that I visited the Botswana National Archives and Records Service 
(BNARS). I spent almost two months in my second visit to Gaborone before going back to 
Cape Town.  
 
The data gathering was further informed and complemented by research and historical archival 
work since independence on key natural resources (i.e. land, minerals and wildlife) in 
Botswana. These mainly took place in university libraries including University of Botswana 
(UB), Okavango Research Institute (ORI)5, University of Cape Town (UCT) as well as the 
BNARS in Gaborone. I also conducted news media, policy and legislative documents relating 
to wildlife conservation and wildlife-based tourism in Botswana since independence. The use 
of these various techniques of data collection provided a basis for triangulation across multiple 
sources of data thus strengthening the quality and robustness of the research (Creswell, 2015; 
Denzin, 2012; Fusch et al., 2018). Furthermore, it enabled me to explore the similarities and 
differences across the data set. Data collection and analysis were interwoven throughout the 
research process. The techniques for data collection are discussed in the following section.    
 
3.4.1 Interviews 
To gain a deeper understanding of how the Botswana state placed the environment at the centre 
of state making, semi-structured interviews were used to seek information from key informants. 
The broad themes explored with key informants included: historical development of wildlife 
conservation policies, institutional transformation and practices in post-independence 
Botswana under the administration of the four presidents from 1966 to 2018. It included 
questions relating to the character of the state; relationship between political authority and 
control over the environment; actors involved in environmental reforms; rationale behind 
environmental reforms in Botswana and sustainable use of wildlife at community level. For 
 
5 ORI is a UB multi-disciplinary research institute that has been established to carry out studies 






the purpose of this research, key informants are individuals who are conversant with 
environmental and wildlife conservation policies and practices in Botswana usually through 
experience and expertise (Bernard, 2006).  
I engaged with officials and senior figures including the Minister, deputy permanent secretary, 
directors and deputy directors from national and local government environmental related 
departments. These included the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resource Conservation and 
Tourism (MENT), Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP), Department of 
Tourism (DOT), Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), Botswana Tourism 
Organisation (BTO) and district level government officials of these institutions located in the 
administrative capital of Ngamiland District, Maun. I had the opportunity to interview the 
former Minister of MENT, Honourable Onkokame Kitso Mokaila6 who at the time of data 
collection was the Minister of Transport. I also had the privilege to interview the former 
president of Botswana, Lieutenant (Lt.) General Seretse Khama Ian Khama. Ian Khama who 
is well known by the international community for his commitment towards environmental 
conservation in Botswana since 1980s when he was the commander of the Botswana Defense 
Force (BDF) (for more on this see Chapter Five). He has been instrumental in driving green 
initiatives such as green militarisation, hunting ban and restocking of rhinos in Botswana’s 
green spaces.  
 
In addition to government personnel, I interviewed academics in the fields of political science, 
sociology, historians, tourism, political ecology and natural sciences most of whom work as 
academics at the University of Botswana main campus (Gaborone) and ORI in Maun. 
Personnel from private safari tourism operators (both photographic and hunting), 
environmental conservation non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development 
agencies were also interviewed. These include organisations such as OWS, Rhino 
Conservation Botswana, Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) Botswana and United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). Furthermore, I engaged with politicians both from the 
ruling and opposition parties. At the village level, in Khwai, key informants included the kgosi 
(chief), headman, the Trust manager and assistant manager; village development committee 
 
6 It is important to highlight that Minister Kitso Mokaila has been in MENT since the Festus Mogae 
administration before being moved to the transport ministry by Ian Khama in 2010. When President 






(VDC) chairperson and the current and previous members of the board of trustees of KDT and 
the village councillor (see Table 3.1). The informants at Khwai were mostly asked questions 
pertaining to the state-citizen relationship in the wildlife governance through their participation 
in CBNRM and how greening is carried out through CBNRM initiatives at the local level.   
 
The informants were selected carefully based on my prior knowledge of their responsibilities, 
participation and influence in Botswana’s environmental and wildlife conservation policies and 
programmes. I personally knew some of the respondents as I have interacted with them during 
my field visits in 2015/16 for my master’s project on the politics of Kavango-Zambezi 
Transfrontier conservation area (KAZA) on the Botswana side. Some of the respondents were 
approached through the researchers’ close friends and contacts without any difficulties. In 
order to get a broader network of key informants, each respondent was asked who I should talk 
to, at the end of the interview.  
 
Requests for interviews were made via email in Botswana at least 4 weeks before each 
scheduled meeting. The emails described the purpose of the study and invited the informants 
to participate. I also made sure that I attached the research permit for every email I sent to the 
informants. In an event that I did not get a response a follow up was made via telephone after 
two weeks of sending the email. At the beginning of every interview, I introduced myself and 
allowed the respondents to introduce themselves. This gave me an opportunity to develop 
rapport with the respondent. The respondents were also briefed on the project and the 
procedures to be followed during the interview. Key informant interviews were mainly 
conducted in English. I conducted semi-structured interviews, guided by the interview guide. 
The interview guide allowed the same questions to be asked to the respondents. This increased 
the comprehensiveness of the data and made the data collection systematic for each participant 
(Patton, 2015). The interviews also allowed me to pursue other themes that arose during the 
discussion through probing (Gibson and Brown, 2009; Patton, 2015). This allowed respondents 
to elaborate on their brief responses (Gibson and Brown, 2009) which gave rise to effective 
interpretation of responses. Furthermore, when conducting interviews, I always asked 
respondents to substantiate the claims that they make either by recounting examples or 
providing documentation.  
With the consent of the interviewees, I audio recorded the interviews. In a case where the 






during the interview and worked them out as soon as the interview was done. Interviews were 
later transcribed verbatim and sent back to informants so that they could give their opinion on 
whether my interpretation of our interview was correct. The process of cross checking led to 
the generation of new data that the informants might have left out during the interview. A total 
of 80 key informant interviews were completed and analysed because theoretical saturation 
was achieved with the 80th participant. Fresh data neither provided valuable additional insights 
nor revealed new properties of the core theoretical themes (Morse, 1995; Charmaz, 2006; 
Mason, 2010).  
 
 
Organisation Code Number 
Ministry of Environment, Natural Resource 
conservation and Tourism  
MENT official 7 
Former President Ian Khama  1 
Hon. Minister Kitso Mokaila (MENT)  1 
Department of wildlife and National parks  DWNP official 6 
Department of Environmental Affairs  DEA official 3 
Tawana Land Board  TLB 2 















Environmental consultants ENVC 2 

















United Nations and Development Programme (UNDP) 
Botswana 
UNDP official 2 
United States Agency for International Development 
Botswana 
USAID 1 
Environmental Non-governmental organisations  ENGOs 5 
Journalists Journ 3 
Chiefs or Headmen Chiefs 5 
Khwai Development Trust leadership KDT 3 
Escort guides Khwai ESG 5 
Village Development Committee VDC 2 
 Total 80 
Table 3.1 Total number of respondents and their affiliation (Source: Author) 
 
3.4.2 Informal interviews 
At the village level in Khwai, I engaged informally with community members. Before 
interacting with local community members, I first liaised with the trust management who are 
based in Maun. Upon arrival in Khwai, my first point of contact was the tribal authority, that 
is the kgosi7 (chief or headman). I went to the kgosi to introduce myself and the research project. 
The kgosi gave me permission to interact with the locals and introduced me to the chairperson 
of the village development committee (VDC). During my field visits in 2015/16 for my 
master’s project in Mababe, I had noticed that local communities are not always comfortable 
and free to speak when recorded. For this reason, I resorted to having informal conversations 
with community members in Khwai. I engaged with locals though the assistance of a research 
assistant Mr Thebe Kemosedile from ORI. The research assistant usually assists researchers 
and students from University of Botswana in these areas when conducting research. As a result, 
Mr Kemosedile is well known in the area and has established rapport with the locals hence it 
became easier to interact with locals. The interviews with locals took place in informal settings 
such as under a tree, open spaces and their respective homes. I conducted the interviews in a 
local language Setswana and at a later stage translated into English.  The collection of 
narratives from locals provided an empirical basis for discussing state-citizen relations in 
 
7 Traditionally, in order to feel welcome in a village, outsiders usually go to the chief at the Kgotla to 






Botswana wildlife sector; reorientation of community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM); the contribution of CBNRM practices towards the production of the green agenda. 
In order to capture the widest array of views, prospective interviewees included community 
escort guides (CEGs) and members of the community who are not affiliated to any of the 
community structures.  A total of 30 informal interviews were completed and analysed in 
Khwai village. 
3.4.3 Observation 
Fieldwork observation was carried out during my stay in Khwai village where I spent time with 
villagers. Being able to live and stay in the community allowed for greater insights into the 
villager’s day to day activities. In this setting, I paid attention to CBNRM day to day activities 
at the KDT office in Khwai, the behaviour and actions of CEGs in policing natural resources 
in their concession. CEG embark on daily wildlife resource monitoring patrols to ensure the 
sustainable use of natural resources in their concession. They record wildlife sightings, rare 
and endangered species, mortalities, meat harvesting and problem animals within their 
concession (see more on Chapter Six).  
While making observations, I kept a separate field notebook to record observations made and 
informal daily conservations with villagers. I also took photos of lodges present in Khwai. This 
allowed me to reflect on the research process itself, the issues that unfolded and allowed me to 
formulate new questions. Observation allowed me to develop a level of trust among villagers 
as time passed and they witnessed my continued presence at the local supermarket and bar, the 
tribal office and the trust office. 
 
3.4.4 Archival data and document review 
Conservation is a historical process as it relates to the past, present and future. The interviews 
were supplemented by archival work. This part of data collection involved retrieving historical 
accounts relating to environmental and wildlife conservation in Botswana. Archival materials 
were obtained from the Botswana National Archives and Record Services (BNARS) in 
Gaborone. Upon arrival at the archives centre, I visited the search room where I lodged a 
request on archival materials relating to environment and wildlife conservation in Botswana 
since independence. Under the strict supervision of the archivist, I used a digital camera - 






scanners and photocopy machines were not working. In this regard, materials such as 
newspaper articles, parliamentary debates (Hansard’s), wildlife conservation policies and acts, 
state of the nation address (SONA) for the period 1966 - 2017, biographies of Sir Seretse 
Khama and memoir of Sir Ketumile Masire (2006), state budget speeches (1966 – 2017), press 
release statements issued by the government on environmental conservation and national 
development plans (NDPs, 1 to 10) were reviewed. The review of the archive material revealed 
the grounds on which the green agenda was set and how it evolved over time, key actors, their 
roles and motivations thus stimulating further investigations that helped to understand how the 
state placed the environment at the centre of state making.   
I also engaged with international and regional agreements, scientific reports and technical 
guidelines by international environmental organisations such as RAMSAR, Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
secretariat and the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF). These international policies often influence 
national policy making and implementation, provide finances for environmental projects thus 
they are critical agents in rolling out the ideas and discourses behind many policy reforms and 
often collaborate with government environmental agencies either formally or informally. This 
was important in understanding where ideas come from, how they shape practice in different 
contexts and how they are shaped by local practices and interests. At the community level, I 
obtained several copies from KDT. Copies obtained include: CBNRM lease agreement 
between Tawana Land Board (TLB) and KDT; minutes of KDT annual general meetings; 
letters of funding for the refurbishment of Tsaro lodge; letters between TLB and KDT 
concerning lease renewal of NG19 and letters between KDT and Botswana Tourism 
Organisation (BTO).   
 
In addition, document review involved a literature search on scholarship in environmental 
governance, green state, environmental state, eco-state, political ecology, ecological 
modernisation, state theory and third world political studies. I also adopted a reverse grapevine 
approach, where I read literature referenced by other scholars. I always made sure that I kept 
track of scholarly articles in relevant scientific journals. I also delved into the existing academic 
and journalistic/public relations discourse around Botswana’s exceptionalism. I engaged with 
the exceptionalism literature inaugurated in many ways by Abdi Samatar ‘an African Miracle 






Furthermore, I obtained additional information from the internet and social media platforms 
such as government of Botswana (BW) Facebook page and Twitter accounts. I also followed 
with keen interest conversations on the unbanning of hunting in Botswana by the 
administration of president Mokgweetsi Masisi in local and international online news sources 
such as CNN and BBC.  This enabled me to find out and fill the gaps (Gibson & Brown, 2009).  
 
3.5 Data analysis and interpretation 
Data analysis was simultaneously done with data collection. The first step towards analysing 
qualitative data is transcribing the interview data sets from various participants. Transcription 
of data began during fieldwork, whilst still fresh in my mind.  There are various ways to 
transcribe interview data (see Edwards and Lampert, 1993) but for this research, the interviews 
were transcribed verbatim. That means, I reproduced the exact spoken words from audio 
recorded interviews in a written form in an Ms Word document to provide a detailed account 
of the interaction between myself and the respondents.  I was more interested in the content of 
the interviews hence data was presented in a denaturalised format. That means that I excluded 
certain mechanics of speech such as emotional content e.g. coughs, laughter, sneezing, long 
pause etc. I checked the accuracy of all transcripts by reading them alongside the original 
recording and making changes as appropriate. It is through this process that I familiarised 
myself with the data set and searched for emerging themes from the responses to each of the 
questions asked. Verbatim transcription has been cited as critical to the reliability (Seale and 
Silverman, 1997) and to the validity and trustworthiness of qualitative research (Easton et al., 
2000).  
The next step was to code the transcribed data. Coding is a process whereby the researcher 
makes judgments about the meanings of continuous blocks of text (Denzin & Lincon, 2000). 
As suggested by Danzin and Lincoln (2000), the fundamental task associated with coding are 
identifying themes, building codebooks, and marking texts.  Braun and Clarke (2006) note that 
there are two ways to approaching qualitative data analysis namely, the deductive approach or 
theoretical thematic analysis and the inductive or bottom-up approach. When using the 
deductive approach, the researchers usually organize data according to the research 
questions/objectives whereas the inductive approach is mainly driven by the data itself. For 
this research, themes originated from the data and were grouped in chronological order. In 






different periods of presidency covering the eras of Seretse Khama, Ketumile Masire, Festus 
Mogae and Lt. General Ian Khama. This periodization scheme allows us to trace shifts and 
continuities in wildlife conservation policies and practices but is also crucial for understanding 
the contribution of each president towards the greening process of Botswana. As such under 
each presidency, I paid attention to the wildlife policies, practices and institutions as well as 
actors behind each policy and institutional transformation and how the ideological orientation 
of the presidents facilitated the greening process. I employed content analysis to analyse 
documents such as legal and policy documents, speeches and letters.  
 
3.6 Ethical considerations 
University of Cape Town has stringent research guide in place that must be followed by 
researchers. This process requires the researcher to obtain Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval from the relevant committee, in this case the Faculty of Science research ethics 
committee. Hence this research was ethically approved by the faculty of science research ethics 
committee (approval code, FSREC 22 – 2018, see Appendix A). In February 2018 I applied 
for a research permit from the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resource Conservation and 
Tourism (MENT). In Botswana, researchers cannot undertake research without a valid research 
permit even if it is for academic purposes. It is worth noting that fieldwork took place at the 
time the ministry had taken a decision to suspend issuing of research permits to researchers. 
The decision was taken out of realisation that international researchers and filmmakers fail to 
comply with statutory requirements of the research permits in Botswana. For this reason, I 
struggled at the beginning to get a research permit even though I am a citizen. I had to seek an 
endorsement letter from the ORI, an institution I am affiliated to as a staff development fellow 
in natural resource governance. Finally, upon arrival in Botswana in early April the MENT 
granted me a research permit (EWT 8/36/4 xxxx (172), see Appendix B). Before conducting 
an interview, consent was sought from respondents therefore written consent forms were 
agreed to and signed. In all interviews, respondents were granted confidentiality in order to 
ease full disclosure. In order to maintain this confidentiality references to individual in this 
thesis are formatted using codes and numbers that represent the organisation that the 
respondent is affiliated to (e.g. Department of Wildlife and national parks = DWNP official, 
Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and tourism =MENT official, Department of 






to each respondent is according to the sequence of interviews conducted during fieldwork in 
2018/19 e.g Interview2, DWNP official, 23POL.  
3.7 Study limitations 
I undertook data collection at a time when people of Botswana and the international community 
were embroiled in highly political, sensitive and difficult conversations about elephant 
conservation and management, the possibility of reintroducing trophy hunting by the new 
government of President Mokgweetsi Masisi, the controversial presidential Tourism Land 
Bank and the transfer of tourism concession scandal involving the Tawana Land Board (TLB) 
officials, Botswana Tourism Organisation (BTO) and the billionaire Richard Branson8.  For 
this reason, government and land board officials were wary of my request to access some 
documents, for instance, documents relating to awarding of photographic tourism concessions 
in the Okavango Delta, the Tourism Land Bank policy guidelines. Revisions to the public 
service act and changes in the practice of public administration under the leadership of 
President Ian Khama (2008 – 2018) have restricted access to government records. Officials 
could lose jobs if they provide access to information without the express approval of their 
superiors. Officials were reticent to volunteer access to official documents or even to make a 
request on behalf of the researcher, especially if there is any hint of controversy.  This applies 
even for documents that ought to be accessible to the general public. The behaviour of  officials 
reflect the securitisation of the administration by former President Ian Khama (see Chapter 
Five) as well as  the risks associated with commenting on controversies emanating from some 
of Khama’s decisions and the reversal of these decisions by President Mokgweetsi Masisi, who 
took office on 1 April 2018. However, this limitation does not compromise the results of the 
study.   
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the rationale for the methodological approach and methods I used to 
collect and analyse data to understand and investigate the development of wildlife conservation 
policies and institutional transformation over time in facilitating the greening of the Botswana 
 
8 Four board members of the Tawana land Board were removed from office after challenging the 
decision to award a prime tourism spot in Moremi Game Reserve by the Minister of MENT Tshekedi 







state. The study adopted an interpretive approach which is based on qualitative instruments of 
data collection. Key informant interviews, observations, archival work and document review 
enabled me to understand how the greening process was carried out over time in Botswana 
through wildlife conservation policy.  Green state literature often puts emphasis on the 
characters of the state but without paying attention to how these characters have evolved over 
time. Hence the production of Botswana as a green state is analysed and presented within 
historical periods of presidency from 1966 to 2018. This allows us to account for changes and 
continuities in Botswana’s engagement with green discourse and practices and key drivers 
behind the greening of the state. The next chapter focuses on the role played by each of the 
presidents in the greening of Botswana (Seretse Khama, Ketumile Masire and Festus 
Mogae,1966 to 2008). Their role is limited to wildlife conservation, which is a lens through 
which this thesis engages with debates and theories of the green state.  The Ian Khama (2008 
– 2018) era is treated separately in Chapter Five because it is embodied as a significant turning 


























Building on debates on the state-environment relations (cf. Chapter Two), this chapter traces 
the evolution of the alliance between state and non-state actors in the development of wildlife 
conservation policies, institutional transformation and practices in post-independence  
Botswana in the period 1966 to 2008 to account for the processes that enable the greening of 
the state. As noted in Chapter Three, the aim is not to write a biography of the presidents but 
to locate them within the evolving wildlife conservation policy and institutional transformation 
towards the greening of Botswana. This chapter does not include the presidency of Ian Khama 
(2008-2018) because it is an era in which Botswana experienced major transformation in 
wildlife conservation policy and practices that need to be explained in detail. Furthermore, Ian 
Khama’s era provides material on which the argument of the thesis is anchored and also 
advanced (see Chapter Five).  
The starting point for this chapter is that the ideological orientation of leaders has impact on 
the greening of the state. In the context of Botswana’s liberal capitalist economy, the four 
presidents should be treated as political elite, who adopted different approaches towards 
greening the state. Their approaches also reflected changing strategies and paradigms in the 
protection and use of environmental resources. These strategies have produced uneven 
relations between the state and its citizens and also created space for the dominance of 
multinational companies in the wildlife-based tourism industry. The chapter is organised as 
follows. In the first part, the chapter considers the presidency of Seretse Khama (1966-1980). 
This section pays attention to how Seretse Khama, as the first president of the country, brought 
forth wildlife conservation into the national agenda after independence even though wildlife 
was not a priority during his presidency. The second part, which focuses on the longest serving 
President Ketumile Masire (1980-1998), highlights how the development of wildlife 
conservation policy coincided with global environmental strategies and the consequent reforms 
of environmental programmes in the country. The third part examines the internal restructuring 
of the Botswana state under Festus Mogae’s administration (1998-2008), which re-aligned state 
activities with the green agenda. The last section concludes the chapter by capturing the main 






4.2 SIR SERETSE KHAMA ERA, 1966 – 1980 
Seretse Khama is the founding father of the modern nation-state of Botswana who served as 
the first post-colonial leader from 1966 until his death in 1980. He is also one of the founders 
of the ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), a party that has been in power for 
a continuous period of 53 years. A heir to the dominant Tswana group, Bamangwato 
chieftaincy, Seretse Khama was an educated elite who studied in South Africa and England at 
University of Fort Hare and University of Oxford, respectively. While studying in England 
Seretse married Ruth Williams, a white British woman. Their marriage caused controversy not 
only with the Bangwato tribal leaders but also with the neighbouring South Africa, which at 
that time had established a system of racial segregation, well known as Apartheid. Attempts 
were made by his uncle regent Tshekedi Khama and the government of South Africa to nullify 
the marriage.   
The apartheid government in South Africa urged Britain to nullify the marriage and prevent 
Khama from assuming chieftainship. The marriage led to him being sent into exile in Britain 
(Rotberg, 2003) and later renouncing his right to chieftaincy. Although the Bamangwato 
initially opposed his marriage, they later – as a result of a series of kgotla meetings – accepted 
his wife and supported his reinstallation as a chief. Apart from being a chief and a president, 
Seretse was a well-known cattle rancher. Good (2008) estimates that Seretse owned about 
30 000 cattle. In colonial and post-colonial Botswana cattle were a major source of wealth, 
social status and economic security (Parsons, 1981). Seretse Khama’s system of governance 
was greatly influenced by his own experiences and educational background. This together with 
his love for cattle influenced the policies that were adopted by his government. Of relevance 
to this thesis is how Khama’s government managed natural resources. 
  
4.2.1 Centralised management of natural resources in post-independent Botswana 
Botswana’s exceptionalism is attributed to the successful juxtaposition of traditional and 
modern democratic institutions by the post-colonial leaders (Sebudubudu and Molotsi, 2011; 
Sebudubudu and Mooketsane, 2016). Through such process, the leaders of independent 
Botswana were able to bring key natural resources such as land, minerals and wildlife under 
the control of the central state away from the traditional system of governance. During the pre-






under the traditional system of governance, with dikgosi (chiefs) enjoying total legitimacy and 
authority over resources in their respective tribal reserves around the country. That means, 
chiefs assisted by headmen had absolute powers in determining the patterns of resource access 
and use for their subjects hence the British colonial government recognised them as legitimate 
rulers. Therefore, under British colonial rule, chiefs became an extension of the colonial state 
(Mamdani, 1996). Despite this, their powers were curtailed through the promulgation of 
various laws such as the Chieftaincy Act of 1965, the Mines and Minerals Act of 1967 and the 
Tribal Land Act of 1968 that were promulgated Seretse Khama’s government. Regarding the 
role of chiefs, Masire argued that: 
The role of chiefs was almost nothing. If anything, it was inclined to be on the negative 
side. They were ambivalent. In the first place, they envisaged that when we become 
independent, we would only be reverting to the old times where each one would be a 
boss in his area. Now we as politicians felt the course, greatly opposed to this relegation 
of what had become a nation into tribal groups (Botswana National Archives and 
Records Services hereafter, BNARS. 15th May 1978).  
Unlike other African countries that abolished traditional institutions after independence, 
Botswana did not go that route. For instance, Mozambique decided to get rid of traditional 
institutions whereas in countries such as Uganda, Lesotho and Ghana traditional institutions 
“became either too powerful or became a stubborn opposition to the success of the modern” 
state (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2011, p. 23). Swaziland decided to make new institutions 
subservient to the traditional ones and this has not worked well as the country has become 
bitterly divided and conflict ridden. In Botswana, it was a different case, laws and new 
institutions were built on chiefs’ powers and authority while at the same fashioning a new role 
for chiefs. Chiefs were successfully incorporated into modern institutions even though their 
powers were curtailed.  Taylor (2005 p. 50) argues that:  
 
Whilst accorded respect and status, their role within Botswana was re-invented and 
chiefs became agents of the government at grassroots level, communicating at the 







The first transformation of chief’s powers came through the promulgation of the Chieftaincy 
Act of 1965. This legislation gave the president of the country the power to recognise or de-
recognise the chief, making the chiefs subordinate to the central government (Taylor, 2005). 
In modern day Botswana, chiefs have their parliament in the form of House of Chiefs, which 
acts as an advisory institution with no legislative powers. The leadership of Seretse Khama 
advocated for the centralisation of natural resources for the development of the country. For 
this reason, land, diamonds and wildlife were nationalised by transferring them from the tribal 
authorities to the state. Regarding land, at independence the country’s land tenure stood at 48% 
tribal land, 47% state land and 5% freehold (Taylor, 2005; Sebudubudu and Molotsi, 2011). 
To develop the country, the leadership was of the view that they needed to take control of land 
away from the chief’s authority. Hence, in 1968 the government introduced the Tribal Land 
Act of 1968. This legislation created Land Boards as the custodian of tribal land allocation, 
administration and the recipient of any revenue generated from such land (Sebudubudu and 
Molotsi, 2011). The Land Boards initially included chiefs as non-voting members and 
depended heavily on traditional authorities for information about past allocations. In Chapter 
Six, I will show how this institution facilitates the allocation of green concessions in the 
Okavango Delta thus playing a crucial role in enabling the greening of a state at the local level.  
 
Just like land, the same was done with ownership of mineral rights. The government introduced 
the Mines and Mineral Act of 1967 which vested all sub-soil resources in the state. Masire 
(2006, p. 200-201) asserts that “even before we understood our potential mineral wealth, we 
knew that vesting mineral rights in the state would be critical for both our overall economic 
development and our political unity and stability’’. The vesting of mineral rights in the state 
was made easy because most of the mineral deposits were situated in the Bangwato area, 
Seretse Khama’s territory. It is argued that Khama negotiated with his tribe to cede mineral 
rights to the state so that mineral wealth can be equally shared with the whole nation. As a man 
respected by his subjects, it became easy for President Khama to consult and persuade other 
tribes to follow in the footsteps of the Bangwato (Masire, 2006). For this reason, the ownership 
of natural resources is legally vested with the state irrespective of who owns the land upon 
which they are found. The state is understood to be acting as the steward not only for the 
citizenry but also for future generations (Masire, 2016). This basic principle is equally true for 
wildlife. Diamonds and wildlife have become key resources for economic development in 






controlled by multinational companies. For example, diamond production is controlled by 
Debswana, a joint venture partnership between De Beers and the government of Botswana.    
This coalition has successfully “mined and managed sales and shared revenues in such a way 
that it has benefited the country’s development programme in a sustainable way” (Sebudubudu 
& Molutsi 2011, p. 27). This partnership was necessary because at the time Botswana did not 
have the expertise to exploit the diamonds. The political leadership then accepted and entered 
into a partnership with De Beers with 15% of the shares going to the Botswana government 
and 85% to De Beers. In 2006, the two parties renegotiated this arrangement on 50 -50 
partnerships for 25 years. However, the agreement between Botswana and De Beers remains a 
secret, even the parliament does not have access to its documentation. Only the executive has 
access to the negotiations. The wildlife-based tourism industry is controlled by multinational 
tourism companies. The immense wealth produced by both industries has not led to prosperity 
for all but the country is instead marked by disparities of wealth (Good, 2008; Hillboom, 2011; 
Ulriksen, 2017). A close analysis of the political economy of Botswana shows that most of the 
wealth is accumulated by the traditional Tswana elites i.e. bureaucratic, business and the ruling 
political elites – who often sit as board of directors in these influential companies. For instance, 
De Beers had at one point made financial contributions to the ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP) (Good, 2016).   
 
Through the centralisation of key resources of the state, Botswana avoided the trap that many 
post-independent African states fell into – the resource curse. The resource curse literature 
postulates that economies that have abundant resources will experience negative effects such 
as unsustainable growth rate, rent seeking or conflict (Sachs and Warner, 2001; Badeeb et al., 
2017). Resource curse can either be political or economic. A political resource curse associates 
resource wealth with rent-seeking, authoritarian rule, corruption and political instability (Ross, 
2012). The argument is that, political elites from resource rich countries are bound to utilize 
resource rent for their personal gain and  distribute it for the benefit of their immediate circles 
rather than investing it to upgrade infrastructure and sustainable economic development 
(Deacon, 2012). This causes social tensions and widens income inequalities. Economically, the 
main reasons why resource-based paths of development inhibit long run economic growth are 
traced to the Dutch disease phenomenon, the volatility of commodity prices and failures of 
economic policy (Sachs and Warner, 2001). There is compelling evidence from the resource 






Mozambique and Nigeria have failed to convert resource wealth into economic growth let 
alone economic development.  
 
Contrary to the resource curse literature, natural resource abundance has been a blessing to 
Botswana. The country’s political elites pursued growth-promoting policies such as providing 
free public goods and ensuring macro-economic stability (Leith, 2005; Taylor, 2005). These 
policies were popular among the constituencies of the ruling party and brought direct benefits 
to the elites. Despite Botswana averting the resource curse, the country has not been able to 
diversify the economy, which remains heavily dependent on few economic sectors such as 
ecotourism and diamond mining (Hillboom, 2008, 2011). The reluctance to diversify the 
economy is accompanied by “significant poverty rates and extremely unequal resource and 
income distribution to prevail in the midst of plenty” (Hillbom 2008, p. 191, see also Good, 
2017). Economic strategies put in place favours the political elites from the ruling party as well 
as bureaucratic and business elites who are well connected to the political elites. As a result, 
this has continued to widen the income and resource gaps between the rich and the poor (Good, 
2008; Ulriksen, 2017).What follows is the analysis of how the presidency of Seretse Khama 
guided the development of wildlife conservation in the post-colonial period.  
 
4.2.2 Crafting wildlife conservation policy 
Botswana’s wildlife conservation policy provides an avenue through which we can understand 
the ways in which the state has placed the environment at the center of state (re)making. At 
independence, wildlife was not an immediate priority during Seretse Khama’s presidency as 
the political leadership was preoccupied with more pressing development priorities such as 
economic development, infrastructure, education and health. This is largely because, at 
independence, Botswana was undeveloped with no promising economic base to finance its own 
administrative costs. For instance, Masire (2006) estimates that at independence in 1966 
approximately 90% of the population lived in poverty; literacy rate stood at around 25%; per-
capita income was at US$60 and infrastructure barely existed with around 10km of tarred road 
(Masire, 2006). As such the presidency of Seretse Khama was keen on establishing Botswana 
as a ‘financially viable entity’, (GoB, 1966), a mission that was achieved as witnessed by the 






when we attained independence in 1966, we had no economic base from which to 
proceed with the development of our country. Our chances of survival as a viable 
country were almost nil but we were not discouraged nor could we ever willingly return 
to the old days of colonial neglect. Having accepted the challenges of independence we 
had no alternative but to get down to work to make our independence a meaningful one 
(Khama, 1980, p. 323). 
 
Seretse Khama’s administration set the foundation for the transformation of Botswana from a 
poor to an upper middle-income country. The country achieved one of the fastest growth rates 
in per capita income among Third World countries between 1980-89 (Acemoglu et al., 2010). 
Its rapid economic growth has been at the center of debate among scholars and political 
practitioners alike. This has resulted in many assessments praising Botswana with Samatar 
marking the country an ‘African miracle state’ (Samatar, 1999).  
 
As a cattle baron, analysts assert that Seretse was not sentimental about the protection of 
wildlife in his political career (Bolaane, 2004; Interview 4, Historian, 24th April 2018). Bolaane 
(2004) argues that Khama was more concerned with marketing and selling beef to European 
countries hence the cattle industry had to take priority. It is worth noting that the beef industry 
played a critical role in the political economy of Botswana before and after independence 
contributing over 40% to the gross domestic product (GDP) (Samatar, 1999; Faucus & Tilbury, 
2000).  As a result, the cattle sector had monetary, logistical and expertise from the government 
(Samatar, 1999). This is because the political elites had a homogenous interest in the cattle 
industry.   
 
Wildlife was considered a threat to the beef industry, particularly because there was lack of 
knowledge and expertise in the control of foot and mouth disease (FMD). Cattle and beef 
exports to the European Economic Community (EEC) was the backbone of the national and 
rural economy. Furthermore, cattle were a major source of wealth, security and social status 
among Batswana although cattle ownership was skewed, with only 5% of the population 
owning about 50% of the national herd (Fidzani, 1998). Amongst the 5% of the population was 
the traditional Tswana elite i.e. the economic, bureaucratic and ruling political elites (Leith, 
2005). While diamond mining does not conflict with the cattle or wildlife-based tourism 






cattle and wildlife are dependent on the same natural resource base of pasture and water (Rahm 
et al., 2006). This competition has been witnessed in areas with abundant water resources and 
grazing land such as the Okavango Delta. For many years the Ngamiland district which 
encloses the Okavango Delta has been susceptible to frequent outbreaks of cattle diseases such 
as foot and mouth disease and the cattle lung disease (Darkoh and Mbwaiwa, 2002). As a result 
of this, the value of cattle depreciated, and the beef industry struggled to access markets as 
required by EU regulations. The expansion of cattle posts were also viewed as a potential threat 
to wildlife in the Okavango Delta (Thompson, 1976; Perkins and Ringrose, 1996).  
 
When debating the game policy, in relation to contending interests and priorities, during the 
legislative council (LEGCO) meeting in 1961, Khama noted that: 
 
I have heard it expressed that we should allow these at one time, dreadful animals to 
roam the whole of Bechuanaland protectorate regardless of the harm they may do to 
our economy but the basis of this game policy is in relation to the cattle industry of this 
country which we all know is most important, it appears that some honourable members 
think that they have a choice and if in fact they have they must make up their minds 
whether they would rather breed wildebeest and various other objectionable animals 
like that or breed cattle. I feel that if we must agree that certain species of game do 
transmit or help transmit foot and mouth, we should do everything in our power to 
reduce them and stop this disease. I cannot see any reason why we should suddenly feel 
sorry for the poor animals (BNARS. 26 October 1961). 
 
Although Seretse Khama was not sentimental about the protection of wildlife, he did not 
advocate for the destruction of wildlife. Khama argued that: 
 
We do not want to destroy all our wildlife. We have to consider the fact that there are 
various people in this country who are very much attached to game, who have a soul, 
who appreciate beauty and love to see a springbok jumping all over the veld, even if 
they jump into a herd of prime cattle, infecting them with foot and mouth disease 







It is worth noting that for Botswana to sell its beef to the European market, the EU requires the 
country to put in place stringent livestock disease control measures such as veterinary fences. 
In response to the conflict between wildlife and cattle, the government erected veterinary 
cordon fences to prevent the transmission of foot and mouth diseases and to restrict the 
movement of livestock into areas designated for wildlife use. By erecting veterinary fences, 
the government of Botswana was able to secure the tourism potential of the Okavango Delta 
which necessitated keeping the Delta cattle free as well as securing the Europe-bound 
Botswana beef exports from foot and mouth contamination (Kgomotso, 2013).  
 
There were attempts to conserve the country’s wildlife by Seretse Khama’s government 
through colonial and new wildlife policies and protected areas. The country’s biodiversity 
conservation policies can be traced from the British colonial administration. The British 
colonial government enacted the Fauna Conservation Act of 1961 – amended in 1979 – with 
the objective to regulate the high rates of commercial hunting, illegal poaching and trading in 
wildlife and wildlife products by foreigners (BNARS, 1987). This policy was adopted as a 
result of declining wildlife species such as elephants. Before the passage of this Act, the 
International Convention for Wildlife Conservation, popularly known as the London 
Convention of 1933 had already introduced the national park system in Africa (Spinage, 1991; 
Kameri-Mbote and Cullet, 1997) but the Convention had little impact on Botswana as the 
country had no national park9 but rather game reserves at independence. 
 
Just like other African states, the protected areas system in Botswana is a product of colonial 
rule. In Botswana protected areas separating humans from their ancestral land were created 
between 1930 and 1965. The establishment of these protected areas alienated indigenous 
people from natural resources that had sustained them for centuries. At independence Botswana 
inherited several game reserves from the British colonial administration. These included the 
Gemsbok Game Reserve gazetted in 1932; Chobe Game Reserve (1961); Central Kalahari 
Game Reserve (CKGR) (1961) established to safeguard the nomadic and gathering lifestyle of 
Basarwa (San); and Moremi Game Reserve established by Batawana tribal leaders and 
expatriate conservationists in 1964. The establishment of game reserves in African countries 
 
9 The difference between a national park and a game reserve is that a national park is established on 
state land whereas a game reserve is established on tribal land. However, there is no functional 






by the British colonial governments was a response to the adoption of the 1933 London 
convention to protect African wildlife.  
After independence, the Seretse Khama government promulgated the National Parks Act of 
1967, which formed the basis for the establishment of national parks in Botswana. The Act was 
predicated on and advocated a preservationist approach anchored on a western conservation 
ethic. This Act allowed Botswana to accord the internationally accepted level of state 
protection on land as well as on the animals within them. During his state of the nation address, 
Khama (BNARS. 03 October 1968) noted: 
Legislation passed during 1967 to come into force this year provides for better control 
for the conservation of wildlife, the establishment and control of national parks, the 
control for tribesmen hunting on tribal land and control of hunting by residents on state 
land in the Ghanzi and Kgalagadi districts. 
 
The National Parks Act came into effect on the 8th March 1968. Through this Act, it became 
possible to upgrade existing game reserves into national parks.  For instance, the Chobe Game 
Reserve - created in 1961 - on unoccupied state land was upgraded into the country’s first 
national park in 1968. This followed an ecological survey by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The FAO 
survey recommended the elevation of the reserve to a national park status and modification of 
its boundaries partly to resolve conflict both in land use and between wildlife and forestry 
departments to prevent timber exploitation (Spinage, 1991; Interview 51, Senior Wildlife 
official, 18th July 2018). Also, it is argued that the game reserve regulation had indicated 
government intentions to manage the area as a national park (Child, 1968; Spinage, 1991).  
 
In 1967, the Department of Wildlife and National parks (DWNP) instituted an ecological study 
along the Boteti River – Nxai pan area. The ecological study was carried out by the American 
Fulbright ecologist scholar, Dale Birkenholz. In his study, Birkenholz observed wildlife 
migration from Nxai Pan to western Makgadikgadi along the Boteti and thus recommended 
that the Nxai Pan area be declared a national park (Spinage, 1991; Campbell, 2004). Birkeholz 
proposed that the western side of Boteti river and the area along the Nata-Maun road be set 






Birkeholz’s proposal, the government decided to set aside the area as a game reserve, 
Makgadikgadi Pan Game Reserve. However, the proposal to declare both Nxai Pan a national 
park and Makgadikgadi Pans a game reserve were opposed by the Director of Veterinary 
Services who was of the view that the protected areas will inhibit the movement of cattle in 
those areas (Campbell, 2004). After lengthy discussions, Makgadikgadi Pans game reserve was 
declared in 1970 with Nxai Pan being declared a national park in 1971 (Spinage, 1991; 
Campbell, 2004). A recent study published in the journal Nature, proposed that all modern 
humans originate in Botswana around the Makgadikgadi Pans (Chan et al, 2019).  They assert 
that: 
By establishing mitogenomic timelines, frequencies and dispersals, we show that the 
LO lineage emerged with the residual Makgadikgadi-Okavango palaeo-wetland of 
Southern Africa (Chan et al., 2019, p.185). 
 
In the same year that Nxai Pan National Park was established, the Gemsbok game reserve was 
given a national park status. In modern day Botswana, the Gemsbok National Park forms part 
of the Kgalagadi Transfontier Park (KTP) between Botswana and South Africa. It is worth 
noting that national parks were established by an order of the President published in the 
government gazette and can only be created on state land or on land bequeathed or donated to 
the president or to another for the purpose of a national park and it is subject to appeal.  
 
This was followed in 1971 by the establishment of two more game reserves: the Mabuasehube 
Game Reserve adjacent to the Gemsbok National Parks; and the Khutse Game Reserve 
adjoining the southeast border of the CKGR. In 1976, the boundaries of the Moremi Game 
Reserve were extended eastwards to connect with the southwest corner of the Chobe National 
Park and westwards to include the traditional protected area of the Chief’s Island. This reserve 
was administered by a Fauna Conservation Society (FCS) of Ngamiland. By 1979, the FCS 
transferred the management of the reserve to the central government and this was partly due to 
the general policy of centralization of land and other resources as well as financial constraints 
experienced by the FCS to run the day to day operations of the reserve (Interview 4, Historian, 
24th April 2018). When the transfer happened, it could not be given a national park status 
because the reserve is on tribal land. In 2013 a bitter debate ensued between the state and 
Batawana royals about ownership of the reserve as they sought to get back their land. The total 






country’s territorial land. The National Eco-tourism strategy for Botswana states that wildlife 
and wilderness areas are by far Botswana’s biggest holiday tourism attraction particularly 
protected areas in the northern conservation zone that includes areas such as Moremi Game 
Reserve, Okavango Delta and Chobe National park.   
 
 
Figure 4.1 Map showing protected areas in Botswana (Source: Okavango Research 
Institute GIS lab, 2019) 
 
Having been a victim of racial discrimination, Seretse Khama’s government imbued the zebra 
(pitse ya naga) as an important national symbol. The black bars and white borders on 
Botswana’s flag (see Figure 4.2) inspired by the colours of the zebra, depicts harmony between 
people of different races and ethnicity (Interview 5, former government 
spokesperson/historian, 30th April 2018). The symbolism of the zebra was more a reflection of 
Khama’s ideology of racial equality and peaceful co-existence of various cultural groups than 
a pre-occupation with protection of wildlife. Two zebras adjourn the Botswana coat of arms 
(see Figure 4.3) and the national football team is nicknamed the zebras. Furthermore, the zebra 






of the state to pay attention to wildlife and to bring wildlife into the national agenda of the 
state.  
 
                      
Figure 4.2 Botswana coat of arms                        Figure 4.3: Botswana flag 
 
4.2.3 National conferences on environmental issues 
The development of the country’s wildlife conservation policy cannot be attributed to the 
Khama government alone as it was also influenced by external actors. Through various studies 
and conference participation, the government of Botswana invited new external actors into the 
country who had to help set and shape the conservation agenda of Botswana.  For instance, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) with the assistance of, among others, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK), 
United States of America (USA), Germany, Netherlands, De Beers and Okavango Wildlife 
Society conducted various scientific studies on environmental issues and recommended 
programmes to curb environmental degradation in the country (Botswana Society, 1976). 
Subsequently, the Botswana Society10 convened several symposia among others the 1971 
symposium on the sustained use of the Kalahari, 1976 symposium on the Okavango Delta and 
its future use and the 1978 on Drought. The symposia were financially sponsored by external 
 
10 This non-governmental organisation was established in 1969 to advance knowledge of Botswana in 
all disciplines through lectures, workshops and symposia on vital questions of the country’s national 
development. The organization publishes an annual peer reviewed journal Botswana Notes and 







organizations such as the British High Commission, United Nations Educational Scientific and 
Cultural organizations (UNICEF), UNDP, United States Agency and International 
Development (USAID), Embassy of the USA, De Beers, Okavango Wildlife Society 
(Botswana Society, 1971, 1976, 1978). Technical presentations were made to the society by 
experts with links to these organizations and universities from the Global North with 
widespread participation of government officials. These symposia resulted in a well-informed 
body of opinions and directly informed and shaped government policies. For instance, the 1971 
symposium on the sustained use of the Kalahari led to the formulation of the country’s tribal 
land grazing programme and the Tribal Land Grazing Policy (TLGP) of 1975 that sought to 
reduce overgrazing through land zonation (Botswana Society, 1976; Government of Botswana, 
1975). The TGLP categorized land into three zones namely commercial farming areas, 
communal grazing areas and reserved areas (Government of Botswana, thereafter GoB,1975). 
The reserved area category was further divided into two: 1) areas reserved for future use by 
those with only few cattle and 2) areas reserved for alternative uses such as wildlife, mining 
and cultivation (GoB, 1975). The reserved area category for alternative use paved the way for 
the establishment of wildlife management areas (WMAs) which were endorsed by the wildlife 
conservation policy of 1986 under the presidency of Ketumile Masire.  
Another important layer in the development of the country’s wildlife policy was the 1976 
symposium on the Okavango Delta and its future use that focused on wildlife conservation and 
tourism.  It was in this symposium that stakeholders advised the government of Botswana to 
prioritise wildlife conservation and tourism in areas of the Okavango Delta since there was 
conflict between wildlife and cattle due to foot and mouth disease. Stakeholders encouraged 
the government to consider commercial tourism above livestock production in the Delta. The 
erection of veterinary fences noted earlier meant that cattle ranchers were denied access to 
water and grazing hence the shift towards developing commercial enterprise anchored on the 
high-cost low volume (HCLV) model (Botswana Society, 1976). One of the presenters at the 
symposium, Keith Thompson (1976, p.8) from the University of Waikato, New Zealand, noted 
that “Botswana encourages at least for the foreseeable future, high-cost, low density tourism, 
so as to minimize the detrimental effects of large number of visitors”. This tourism strategy 
was practiced by Mr. Harry Selby11, who operated the Khwai River lodge on the northern edge 
 
11 Mr Harry Selby is a renowned professional safari hunter in Africa. He started his professional safari 






of the Moremi Game Reserve in 1970.  Johnston (1976) a presenter at the conference noted 
that Mr Selby had witnessed over-crowding in Kenya wildlife which spoiled wilderness areas 
thus his move to Botswana. Johnston (1976) argues that Selby went for the more expensive 
form of tourism, which consequently attracts less people but is based on the sound principle of 
the high cost and low volume trade. Sound because low volume means better controls, less 
disturbance to the environment and greater economic viability (Johnston, 1976). This tourism 
strategy laid the foundation for the dominance of the private sector and individual 
entrepreneurs in the country’s wildlife economy, and for the development of the tourism policy 
of 1990 which was consolidated under the Masire’s government. The main objective of this 
tourism policy was to ensure that tourism activities which are wildlife-based are carried out on 
an ecologically sustainable basis (see Section 4.3). The implementation of the tourism policy 
marked a significant shift from the beef industry to tourism. The existing cattle interest did not 
wither away but entrepreneurs shifted their focus towards tourism. Analyses of the political 
economy of Botswana reveal that the interests of same groups of people in the economic sectors 
of Botswana gained the most benefits from this shift (Makgala and Botlhomilwe, 2017; 
Mbaiwa and Hambira, 2020). As the tourism industry was already controlled by a small white 
expatriate elite, a strong alliance was formed between this sector and the traditional Tswana 
elite (Swatuk, 2005).  
4.2.4 Genesis of Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) 
Conservation practices and policies are crucial for state-making in that they often – though – 
not always – transform the internal structure of the state. As with many other states, state 
agencies in Botswana are responsible for enacting and implementing green policies, spending 
and generating knowledge for the health of biodiversity and ecosystem (Duit, 2015). The 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) was created in 1967 to give effect to the 
National Parks Act of 1967. The creation of this entity should be credited to the father of the 
nation because as the head of state, he had constitutional powers to authorize the establishment 
of state institutions. DWNP formerly the game department was part of the civil service 
bureaucracy that Botswana inherited from the British administration. Under the colonial 
administration, the main function of the department was to control the troublesome elephant’s 
due to the increase in elephant population in the Tuli Block. The elephants raided local peoples’ 
crops and threatened people’s lives and in retaliation people would kill these charismatic 






similar trend can also be gleaned from Tanzania where the British colonial government 
established the same department in 1919 with the aim of controlling elephants (see 
Mkumbukwa, 2009).  
Because of indigenous staffing shortage, Botswana relied on conservation expatriates’ officers 
in senior advisory and administrative posts (Samatar, 1999). Located in Francistown, the 
department was led and managed by expatriates.  Major Pat Bromfield and Graham Child were 
brought through the UNDP multi-lateral aid programme which was implemented by FAO. 
Major Bruce Kinlock undertook an assignment on behalf of the UK Ministry of Overseas 
Development to suggest how the department should be re-engineered and transformed (Child, 
2009).  It is argued that this group of expatriates together with Alec Campbell, a naturalized 
motswana formulated much of the departmental policy (Child, 2009). The Game department 
was renamed the DWNP in 1967 and its offices moved to the capital city Gaborone.  By 1971 
there were wardens and support staff stationed at Kasane, Maun, Francistown, Ghazi, Serowe, 
Molepolole and Tsabong. The DWNP continued to expand resulting in the department being 
represented throughout the country to adequately service the wildlife resource. DWNP 
provides an effective leadership and coordination role at the national and district level on all 
matters concerning wildlife and national parks.  
 
At independence Botswana did not have a dedicated environmental conservation ministry 
(Interview 6, former MENT minister 24th April 2018). As such DWNP was housed under the 
Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Investment. The government recognised that wildlife was 
an asset to be utilised towards achieving economic development (Interview 51, Senior DWNP 
Official, 18th July 2018). In 1976, the department was merged with the Tourism unit in 
recognition of the fact that tourism is and will continue to be a wildlife-based (Interview 51, 
Senior DWNP official, 18th July 2018). Therefore, the department was renamed the Department 
of Wildlife, National Parks and Tourism, with only 4 posts under the tourism unit.   
 
Apart from coordinating wildlife and national parks, DWNP played a crucial role in promoting 
environmental awareness in the country in the 1970s. The department established a 
Conservation Education Unit in 1975 with the view of educating the nation on the importance 
of wildlife as an economically and aesthetically valuable national asset (Ministry of Finance 






official, 23rd July 2018). The unit was established as a response to the over-exploitation of 
wildlife by local people. The state recognized that the protection of the country’s wildlife 
resource could not be guaranteed by prosecutions and incomprehensible restrictions. The first 
government in postcolonial Botswana believed that teaching people the value and benefits of 
thriving populations of wildlife was an essential preventative measure (MFDP,1978). An 
education programme, ‘Tshomarelo Tikologo’ (environmental conservation) was initiated in 
the Botswana national radio by the unit. The government also sought to improve rhino 
conservation through the reintroduction of 50 white rhinos in their ancestral range in Moremi 
and Chobe areas with the assistance of the Southern African Nature Foundation (MFDP, 1976, 
1978).   
 
Furthermore, this unit through the financial assistance of the African Wildlife Leadership 
Foundation introduced Wildlife Clubs in primary and secondary schools across the country 
(Interview 58, former Senior wildlife official, 23rd July 2018). According to Modise (1978, 
cited in Ketlhoilwe, 2007, p. 157), the objective of the unit was to “develop skills and attitudes 
necessary to understand and appreciate the interrelatedness between man (sic), his (sic) culture 
and his (sic) biophysical surroundings”. The project enabled students to undertake specific 
educational and action projects in relation to their environment. These efforts by the Botswana 
government, through DWNP contributed to the public environmental awareness as a way of 
preparing the nation to be positive towards the green agenda (Ketlhoilwe, 2007).  
 
Seretse Khama was instrumental in creating the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, a 
department that played a crucial role in developing an environmentally conscious behavior in 
the citizenry of Botswana. The efforts on wildlife conservation development during Seretse 
Khama’s presidency illustrate the initial steps taken by the state to insert the environment into 
national agenda of the state.  
 
4.3 THE PRESIDENCY OF SIR KETUMILE MASIRE, 1980 – 1998 
The period 1980-1998 marks the presidency of Sir Ketumile Quett Masire, one of the respected 
leaders of Botswana. Ketumile Masire served as the vice president to Seretse Khama and took 
over the presidency upon Khama’s death in 1980. Whilst the vice president, he oversaw the 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), an institution that has been credited 






graduate of Tiger Kloof in South Africa. In his book ‘Memoirs of African democrat’ he recalls 
how he suffered at the hands of his own chief Bathoen 2nd who hated and frustrated him simply 
because he was educated, modern and very successful in farming (Masire, 2006). This could 
have influenced him together with Seretse Khama to denounce chiefly rule. Besides politics 
Masire was a passionate cattle famer and a game rancher. As a game rancher, he stocked zebras 
and ostriches on his farms (Masire, 2006). He was of the view that wildlife should be managed 
on a commercial basis hence his involvement in game farming (Masire, 2006).  
4.3.1 Global environmental ideas and strategies 
The presidency of Ketumile Masire coincided with two major catalysts of environmental 
policies, namely severe drought in the region and global environmental ideas and strategies 
such as the implementation of sustainable development and decentralised natural resource 
governance approaches. Nature conservation policy in Botswana emerged in part as a response 
to environmental degradation and drought experienced by the country in the 1980s. In its 
attempt to coordinate conservation efforts, the government of Botswana invited the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to conduct a Clearing House mission in 1983 
(BNARS, 1990). The clearing house mission report reflected the importance of identifying 
measures that will ensure sustainability of renewable energy resource use and development and 
for the rational use of non-renewable natural resources (BNARS, 1990).  Several 
environmental problems were identified by the report and these included water resources, 
degradation of rangeland pasture resources, depletion of wood resources, exploitation of veld 
products, pollution of air, water, soil and vegetation, depletion and conservation of wildlife 
resources and the need to improve environmental awareness (BNARS, 1990). Considering 
these environmental problems, sixteen recommendations were proposed and one crucial one 
was the need to prepare a national conservation strategy and this was readily accepted by the 
government. The National Conservation Strategy (NCS) was initiated with the financial and 
technical assistance of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Norwegian 
Agency for International Development (NORAD), Swedish Sida, European Commission, 
USAID and UNDP in 1984 with the final policy approved by parliament in 1990. The NCS 
aimed to reverse natural resource externalities while achieving effective growth and national 






The global discussions on environment and development that took centre stage at the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 focused attention to the concept of 
sustainable development (SD) in the 1980s. According to the Brundtland report (1987), 
sustainable development is “development that meets the needs of the present generation 
without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs”.  At the 1992 
Rio Earth Summit national governments agreed to pursue sustainable development via Agenda 
21. It is therefore not surprising that the government of Botswana infused sustainable 
development in its national development plans and conservation policies. In opening the 
Gaborone Game Reserve in 1988, Masire submitted that: 
  
Botswana is firmly committed to two propositions; first that economic development 
and natural resource conservation are complementary rather than competing goals. 
Second, Batswana will pursue them both with rigour and determination.  
 
The commitment of Masire’s government to sustainable development through environmental 
conservation was summarised in the 1989 budget speech by the Vice President of Botswana, 
the Hon. Peter Mmusi: 
 
Concerning the environment, it is vital that our development be sustainable. Botswana 
has only finite quantity of groundwater, grazing land and forests. If we use up these 
resources faster than the nature can replenish them, production that relies on them will 
be lower in future years, lowering the standard of living of our sons and daughters.  
 
In practice, four strategies were adopted to pursue sustainable development in Botswana during 
the presidency of Masire. These include the implementation of hunting licenses, wildlife 
conservation policy underpinned by sustainable development, community based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) programme and the consolidation of the high cost, low 
density model. In order to involve citizens in prudent wildlife utilisation, the Masire 
government implemented the Special Game License (SGL). The SGL was introduced under 
the 1979 hunting regulations. The licences were issued to persons whose traditional livelihoods 
depended on hunting and gathering of veld products, particularly those living in remote areas 







We are dedicated to improving the lives of our people in rural areas and creating more 
employment for our people. But we intend to conserve our resources wisely and do not 
destroy them. Those of us who happen to live in the 20th century is not more important 
than our descendants in centuries to come (cited in Global Sustainable Tourism 
Council, hereafter, GSTC, 2012)  
 
The government held the view that the sustainable utilisation of wildlife would improve the 
welfare or rural households as a source of food in the form of animal protein, and as source of 
income through sales of trophies and curios (BNARS, 1988). 
 
4.3.2 Wildlife management areas (WMAs) 
To realize the economic benefits of wildlife, a Wildlife Conservation Policy was enacted in 
1986. It encouraged the development of a commercial wildlife industry that is viable on a long-
term basis, underlined the importance of wildlife towards economic development and called 
for the participation of citizens in wildlife-based tourism (GoB,1986).  The policy also set the 
tone for landscape conservation through the establishment of wildlife management areas 
(WMAs) whose primary focus is wildlife use and only activities that are compatible with 
wildlife are permitted (Interview 51, Senior Wildlife official, 18th July 2018). As noted earlier, 
the concept of WMA arose from the TGLP under Khama’s government (BNARS, 1988). The 
wildlife conservation policy converted stretches of land designated as reserved under the 
TGLP. For their part, WMAs form a buffer between protected areas and agricultural areas. 
They also serve as migratory corridors to allow for the movement of wildlife. The WMAs were 
further subdivided into controlled hunting areas (CHAs) which today serve as the major 
economic land units leased as tourism concessions to private safari operators and local 
communities participating in CBNRM projects. The creation of WMAs ensured that wildlife 
resource was not displaced thus aiding biodiversity conservation and provided a platform on 
which eco-tourism could thrive. At the time of doing fieldwork in 2018, WMAs covered 
approximately 22% (116 000 km2) of land in Botswana (Interview 51, Senior Wildlife official, 







Figure 4.4: Botswana's wildlife management areas (Source: Okavango Research 
Institute GIS lab, 2019) 
WMAs formed the basis for the devolution of wildlife management to local communities and 
the private sector to instil greater accountability of the wildlife resource.  The dark side of 
colonial and post-colonial conservation has been accompanied by forced removals of 
indigenous populations from their ancestral lands by states thereby disrupting the deep-rooted 
patterns of resource use and management of resources of local people. Analysts argued that 
state centralised management failed to consider the multidimensional aspects of the 
environment and associated institutions (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). As such, efficient use of 
resources continued to face significant challenges rendering state policies ineffective and 
inadequate. It is often argued that effective conservation requires the full participation of all 
stakeholders, and that communities can participate effectively only if they derive socio-
economic benefits from conservation. Therefore, WMAs became an important avenue for 
addressing the legacy of environmental injustice associated with colonial wildlife conservation 
by including local communities as important stakeholders in the management of natural 






In the 1980s and 1990s, a people centred approach in the form community-based conservation 
strategies such as CBNRM was promoted (Ostrom, 1990; Neumann, 2001; Agrawal, 2005). In 
theory, CBNRM entails the devolution of power and authority from the central state to the local 
communities and institutions in the management of wildlife. CBNRM was introduced in 
Botswana in 1989 as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC’s) natural 
resource management programme (NRMP) (BNARS, 1992). The Botswana NRMP was jointly 
funded by the government of Botswana and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) (BNARS, 1992; USAID, 1996). The Botswana government 
contributed approximately US$ 5 500 000 whereas USAID contributed US$ 19 900 000 for a 
period of 8 years (1989 – 1997) (USAID, 1996). A pilot project of CBNRM was initiated in 
the Chobe Enclave in the northern conservation zone of the country (Thakadu, 2005). From 
this initiative, a community-based organisation (CBO) most commonly known as community 
trust in Botswana was established in 1993 with the registration of the Chobe Enclave 
Conservation Trust (Thakadu, 2005). The second CBNRM project created the Sankuyo 
Tshwaragano Trust registered in 1995. The project was implemented jointly by the Department 
of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) community extension unit and the NRMP project team 
which was led by the United States-based consulting firm, Chemonics, which provided the 
Chief of Party or team leader (Swatuk, 2005). They provided technical and financial assistance.  
 
The other actors involved were IUCN, Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Foundation 
of Netherlands Volunteers (SNV). Together these actors assisted in the formulation of CBNRM 
support and advocacy organisations which mainly represented CBOs in wildlife management. 
They established the Botswana Community Based Organisation Network in 1998 
(BOCOBONET)12; the CBNRM support programme in 1999 and the National CBNRM forum 
in 2000. The IUCN acted as a secretariat for the national CBNRM forum. 
 
The implementation of CBNRM in Botswana was important because it formed a basis for the 
greening of the state by including local communities as important agents in that process. In 
Chapter Six I demonstrate how the green discourses and practices have been invoked by local 
communities within the context of CBNRM and how local communities are important 
 
12 BOCOBONET is currently a defunct body. BOCOBONET was dependent on donor funding. As such 






stakeholders in the greening of the state at the local level.  The devolution of state power over 
wildlife is crucially important in the making of the state and in forging relations between the 
state and its citizens. It is a demonstration that the state cherishes democratic values, and it 
gives a good face of the state to the public even though this characterisation of the state has 
been questioned (cf. Chapter Two; Poteete & Ribot, 2011; Hoon, 2014). In Chapter Six I will 
show how the recentralisation of power and authority in wildlife management in Botswana has 
(re)shaped the relations between the state and its citizens in the Okavango Delta.  
 
4.3.3 Green militarisation 
The move towards militarisation of wildlife conservation was initiated under the leadership of 
Masire by then the commander of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) Lt. Gen Ian Khama. It 
was prompted in part by waves of massive poaching in Botswana which was linked to liberation 
struggles in Southern Africa and organised raids for commercial biltong by South Africans 
living closer to the country’s borders (DWNP, 1970; Henk, 2007). Lt. General Ian Khama 
(Interview 78, 4th March 2019) asserts that: 
There was a single incident, and someone called notifying us about a poached rhino in 
the Okavango Delta and they asserted that it could be the last rhino, so I dispatched a 
group of BDF soldiers into the area and they found evidence of massive poaching. 
As the commander of the BDF, Ian Khama brought in the secretive commando squadron of the 
BDF to assume anti-poaching mission in 1987 (Henk, 2007). President Masire was fully 
supportive of the anti-poaching efforts of the secretive commando squadron and authorised the 
BDF to play an active role in anti-poaching as poaching was considered a risk to national 
security and country’s eco- tourism that depend on wildlife (Interview 78, Lt. General Ian 
Khama, 4th March 2019). In the early 1990s anti-poaching was extended to the rest of the BDF.  
In the next chapter I will demonstrate how the process of militarisation of wildlife conservation 
became intensified under the presidency of Lt. General Ian Khama (2008-2018).  
4.3.4 Forced policy change towards saving the Okavango Delta 
 
Environmental politics is constituted through contestations, conflicts and negotiations over 
interests, identities and values which often results in policy changes (Death, 2016). In the early 






Okavango Delta through the Okavango Integrated Water Development project (SOIWDP). The 
project commonly known as the ‘Boro Dredging Project’ was intended to supply water for 
domestic needs in Maun and Orapa, watering livestock and large-scale commercial irrigation. 
However, the project was vigorously contested with much success by Tshomarelo Okavango 
Conservation Trust (TOCT) and Green Peace International. TOCT, which mostly represented 
local tourism tour operators and local communities, opposed the project on the basis that the 
initiative would  negatively impact conservation and tourism as well as alter traditional uses of 
resources by indigenous communities  in the Okavango Delta (IUCN, 1992; Thomas, 2003). 
Green Peace International threatened to cause harm to Botswana’s diamond export or lobby to 
reduce Botswana’s European Commission beef quota (Thomas, 2003). With this in mind, the 
government of Botswana invited Green Peace International so they could conduct their own 
investigation into the project. Upon their visitation, Green Peace International advised the 
Botswana government to suspend the project pending further scientific inquiry (Thomas, 
2003).  An independent study was commissioned by the IUCN who recommended the 
termination of the project (IUCN, 1992). The recommendation was based on several 
environmental externalities. The contestation marked an important shift from exploitation of 
water resources towards conserving the Delta. The Okavango Delta is a fragile ecosystem. In 
a recent article published by the Conversation, Murray-Hudson and Dauteuli (2019) contend 
that any changes to the processes that form the delta will have an impact on the wildlife and 
local economic activities. It is quite important that management of the delta takes into account 
all components of the ecosystem. Today the Okavango delta is a premier safari and wildlife 
holiday destination contributing significantly to the national and local economy.  
 
The democratic credentials of the administration of Masire paved the way for the negotiations 
between the various actors involved in the opposition to the project. When responding to a 
question in relation to water shortage in Maun in 1994, Masire asserted that: 
 
I suppose this is where democracy conflict with development. We could have built a 
dam here a couple of years ago and there would be water galore but mainly because 
those who have interests in the tourism industry, they thought it was going to spoil the 
environment or bring in lots of people here to whet the appetite of government to build 
even more dams. So, there was Green Peace, there was the local people, they incited 






in a democratic setting, people must make their beds and lie on it (Masire, 1994 cited 
in Thomas, 2003, p. 222).  
 
IUCN also lobbied Botswana to list the delta as a Ramsar site (BNARS, 1991). Botswana 
ratified the Ramsar convention in 1996. The mission of the Ramsar convention is to promote 
“the conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local, regional and national actions and 
international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable development” (RCS, 
2006, p.6). Furthermore, Green Peace International appealed to the government to establish the 
Okavango Delta Ecosystem as a world heritage site (BNARS, 1991). 
 
4.3.5 High-cost low volume (HCLV) tourism model 
One of the main outcomes of the wildlife conservation policy in Masire’s government was the 
consolidation of the model of high-cost, low volume tourism through the implementation of 
the Tourism Policy of 1990. Considering that the government of Botswana did not have 
expertise in ecotourism development, the industry has been driven by the private sector. The 
private sector has thus played a crucial role in the consolidation of the high cost low volume 
tourism which Botswana is well known for. The implementation of the Tourism policy of 1990 
by the government of Botswana laid a foundation for the dominance of multinational tourism 
companies (Mbaiwa and Hambira, 2020). Multinational tourism companies have formed 
alliances with the traditional Tswana elites to ensure profit making and legitimacy. This 
partnership has prompted a shift in the role of the state as a central authority figure in wildlife 
governance to one of facilitator working in collaboration with multinational companies. As I 
shall show in the next Chapter, this has paved way for an increased role of the multinational 
companies in wildlife strategies and the distribution of concessions, which is guided by profit-
making and environmental protection. The dominance of multinational companies in decision 
making resulted in policy outcomes that shift government control away from wildlife 
conservation and the distribution of concessions in the Okavango Delta.  
The high cost low volume tourism model was first introduced in the Okavango Delta, where 
its elitism became visible (Mbaiwa, 2005, 2008). The World Tourism and Travel Council 
(WTTC) (2007, p.48) cautioned that “the focus on low volume, high value markets have 
fostered an image of exclusivity, even raising the spectre of apartheid-style segregation of 






practices. To illustrate, in 2010 the Delta won the Tourism for Tomorrow Award for destination 
management (BTO, 2013). Then in 2012 the Delta also became one of the Global Sustainable 
Tourism Council Early adopters, in recognition that the Delta was being managed in line with 
the GSTC destination criteria (Wilkinson, 2012). Sustainable tourism is further highlighted 
within the Okavango Development Management Plan (ODMP, 2007, p.124) with a vision “to 
strive for the development of a world class nature-based tourism destination that is 
economically sustainable and optimises benefits to local communities and the nation within 
agreed limits of acceptable change’’. This focus on wildlife conservation and the policy 
articulation that supported it contributed to the greening of Botswana. In Chapter Six, I will 
show how this policy is enhanced by the private safari operator’s tourism concessions in the 
Okavango Delta.  
4.3.6 National Conservation Strategy advisory board 
 
To give effect to the NCS, the National Conservation Strategy advisory board and coordinating 
agency were established. The agency placed under the Ministry of Local Government, Lands 
and Housing was developed with the technical assistance of IUCN. It was responsible for the 
overall implementation of the NCS. Furthermore, it was charged with coordinating the 
integration of environmental management into government planning. The agency initiated an 
environmental education program in the 1990s and has been instrumental in infusing 
environmental education (EE) and conservation issues into the primary and secondary school 
curriculum in collaboration with the Ministry of Education (Interview 16, DEA official, 28th 
May 2018). The overall aim of EE in Botswana is to produce citizens who are ecologically 
aware of and concerned with ecological problems for society to respond in an eco-friendly 
manner (BNARS, 1993; Dobson, 2007). 
  
The creation of the NCS meant that governments departments had to re-align their policies and 
legislation with the new thinking of sustainable utilization of natural resources. For instance, 
DWNP reviewed the National Parks Act of 1967 and Fauna Conservation Act of 1961 and 
consolidated them into a single act, the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992. 
This act incorporated the provisions of the 1973 CITES which Botswana ratified in 1978. 
Further, DWNP began to prepare management plans for national parks and game reserves 
which were aimed at facilitating better management of wildlife resources (Interview 51, Senior 







Masire’s government aligned Botswana’s model of ecotourism with the global sustainable 
development frame of the 1980s. Under his government, international support for CBNRM 
grew in the country, and wildlife conservation became central to environmental management 
in Botswana. This was recognized in the country’s national development plans (NDP’s) and 
the development of the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986.  In the next section, I pay 
attention to the internal restructuring of the state that re-aligned state activities with the green 
agenda.  
 
4.4 FESTUS MOGAE, 1998 – 2008  
The third president of Botswana Festus Mogae is a graduate from the prestigious British 
university, Oxford University with qualifications in economics. Before ascending to the 
presidency, Mogae held critical influential positions such as Governor of the Bank of 
Botswana, permanent secretary to the president as well as being Minister of MFDP. He was 
also the board member of Debswana, a company which has been instrumental in Botswana’s 
economic success. As such he had a wealth of experience in steering and managing Botswana’s 
economy. In terms of greening the state, Mogae’s economic experience guided the internal 
restructuring of the state in pursuit of the green economy anchored on the HCLV tourism model 
that was consolidated under Masire’s administration.  
Mogae is highly renowned for his vigorous and steadfast efforts in fighting against the HIV 
and AIDS pandemic that threatened the future of the country and its citizens. Despite the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, President Mogae ensured stability and economic growth. In recognition 
of his good work as the president of the country, he won the Mo Ibrahim Prize13 for 
achievement in African leadership in 2008. His presidency was mainly characterized by the 
internal restructuring of the state in pursuit of a green agenda as well as embracing 







13 The Mo Ibrahim Prize established by Mo Ibrahim Foundation recognizes and celebrates African 






4.4.1 Neoliberal agenda  
 
As an economist, Mogae embraced the neoliberalization of conservation by linking 
conservation with business. At the ‘conservation is good business’ symposium held in 
Washington DC in 2003, Festus Mogae said: 
 
in our land use policy, we have made conservation a priority. These policies have 
ensured that the utilization of wildlife resources is sustainable. There is no doubt in my 
mind that conservation is good business (cited in AWF, 2003).  
 
In practice, this meant the commercialisation of safari hunting took precedence over the SGL, 
the introduction of a communal quota system, and the establishment of joint-venture 
partnerships (JVPs) between community trusts and private hunting/photographic companies. 
President Mogae was of the view that the private sector is the engine of growth hence the 
promotion of public-private partnerships in CBNRM. The community trusts would sub-lease 
the resource use rights – the communal quota - to a private tour hunting operator at a fee. The 
expectations of JVPs are that they would enable better wildlife management and bring 
economic and material benefits to rural households. It was during Mogae’s presidency that the 
tourism sector became the second highest contributor to the country’s GDP and created 
thousands of jobs (Gaolathe, 2007). Wildlife-based tourism became a potential driver of 
economic diversification, environmental sustainability, community empowerment and job 
creation.  
 
Mogae’s government  involved Botswana in the establishment of southern African peace parks: 
large conservation areas straddling the borders of two or more countries with the aim of re-
establishing or protecting the integrity of ecological systems, promoting peaceful co-existence 
among neighbouring nations, and providing an avenue for local economic development 
through ecotourism (Ramutsindela, 2007). Peace parks, also known as transfontier 
conservation areas (TFCAs) have been described as a neoliberal project in that they are 
underpinned by a business model that treats habitats and wildlife as assets for the maximization 
of profits (Büscher, 2013; Ramutsindela, 2017). It is expected that TFCAs would enable 
tourists to move freely across international borders without a need for a visa hence expanding 






that this process transforms the state by rolling back the state, reregulation, and developing 
state-led public services along private lines (Brockington et al. 2012; Büscher, 2013).  
Botswana signed the first peace parks in post-apartheid Southern Africa, the Kgalagadi 
Transfontier Park (KTP) in 1999. This was followed by the signing of memorandum of 
understanding for the creation of the Greater Mapungubwe and the KAZA in 2006 (Gaolatlhe, 
2006).  
 
4.4.2 Internal re-structuring of the Botswana state 
The emergence of wildlife and environmental conservation policy necessitated the internal 
restructuring of the state. State managers are crucial in the greening process in that they have 
the powers to develop green institutions or to facilitate the transfer of such institutions for 
improved green governance necessary for managing the environment (Johnson, 2019). The 
absence of a dedicated environmental conservation ministry meant that the management of the 
environment was the responsibility of several departments in different ministries. For instance, 
the DWNP fell under the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Investment; the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA) was housed under the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and 
Housing; Forestry and Range resource was placed under Ministry of Agriculture (Interview 
51, Senior MENT official, 11th July 2018). This resulted in fragmented approaches and lack of 
concrete action towards addressing negative environmental externalities. In realising the need 
to bring environmental issues under one roof for better coordination and implementation of 
green policies, strategies and programmes a Ministry of Environment, Natural Resource 
Conservation and Tourism (MENT) (formerly Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT)) 
was created in 2002 (Interview 10, Minister of MENT, 24th April 2018). The minister of MENT 
notes that:  
every act depends on the environment; hence the environment comes first. When you 
have a healthy environment, you will have a healthy biodiversity and tourism will be 
sustainable. Environmental sustainability is inevitable – the sustainability of wildlife 
and tourism depends on a healthy environment, hence the name of the ministry 
(Interview 10, 24th April 2018).  
 
As part of an effort to coordinate environmental issues, the following departments were 






Tourism (DOT), Meteorological Services, Forestry and Range Resources, Waste Management 
and Pollution and National Museum and Monuments. The Mogae administration established a 
corporate entity, Botswana Tourism Board (BTB) in 2004. This Board was established to 
facilitate the marketing and promotion of Botswana’s tourists’ attractions to the international 
community as well as to attract investors to the tourism sector. Furthermore, it was meant to 
classify and grade tourism accommodation facilities within the country to align them with the 
HCLV tourism model particularly in the Okavango Delta. In 2008 the entity was renamed 
Botswana Tourism Organisation (BTO). In Chapter Five, I will show how the organisation has 
changed its role under the presidency of Ian Khama as part of the recentralisation process and 
how this redefined the relations of the state with citizens in Chapter Six.  
 
Part of the rationalities for institutional restructuring emanates from the fact that Botswana as 
a signatory to international conventions such as CBD, the Ramsar, the country needed relevant 
institutions with environmental expertise to coordinate, develop and implement policies and 
strategies that align with agreed principles of these conventions. For instance, the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) requires member states to develop national biodiversity strategy 
and action plans (NBSAPs). With the financial assistance of the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), the government of Botswana established NBSAPs in 2004. The role of the NBSAP was 
to contribute to the long-term health of Botswana’s ecosystems and related species and to 
encourage sustainable use of resources through the provision of a framework of specific 
activities designed to improve the way biodiversity is perceived, utilised and conserved (DEA, 
2008; Kgomotso, 2013). The strategy was relevant for the fragile ecosystem of the Okavango 
Delta. The mosaic and variety of habitats found within the Delta is home to many fauna and 
flora. The project was financed by the GEF (US$325,000.00) and the government of Botswana 
(US$25,000.00) (MEWT, 2007). The project adopted the IUCNs Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the WRI/IUCN/UNEP guidelines for preparing national biodiversity 
strategy and action plans (Kgomotso, 2013). 
 
The pursuit of the Ramsar status in the Delta contributed to the restructuring of management 
structures in the Okavango through the formulation of the Okavango Delta Management Plan 
(ODMP) in 2007. The process was enabled by external funding. IUCN financed the project 
with a total of US$1 million and provided technical backstopping through the provision of a 






approximately US$1.5 million; SIDA provided US$720,000.00 and German Development 
Service (DED) contributed US$190,000.00 (DEA, 2008; Kgomotso, 2013).  
 
All the land use and resource management components of the project were funded by the 
government and coordinated by state agencies. The government contributed US$3.5 million 
(DEA, 2008). The Ramsar organisation also partially funded the development of the ODMP. 
The ODMP vision was to create a “carefully managed, well-functioning ecosystem that 
equitably and sustainably provides benefits for local, national, and international stakeholders” 
(DEA, 2008, p. xvi). The overall goal of the ODMP was to “integrate resource management 
for the Okavango Delta that will ensure its long-term conservation and that will provide 
benefits for the present and future well-being of the people, through sustainable use of its 
natural resources” (DEA, 2008, p. xvi). This goal was supported by three strategic goals: a) to 
establish viable management institutions for the sustainable management of the Delta; b) to 
ensure the long-term conservation of the Delta and the provision of existing ecosystem 
services; and c) to sustainably use the natural resources of the Delta in an equitable way and 
support the livelihoods of all stakeholders. The DEA was tasked with the primary responsibility 
of overseeing the implementation of the ODMP (Interview 26, DEA official, 28th May 2018).  
 
The ODMP has been considered as the initial step towards ensuring adaptive management for 
the Okavango Delta, as it takes into account the need to respond to the high level of uncertainty 
and complexity of the Delta ecosystem (Motsumi and Cassidy, 2012). Furthermore, it is 
claimed that the ODMP is the first plan to involve all resource stakeholders including local 
communities in the development of the plan (Magole, 2008). Although the ODMP has 
succusfully been able to include all stakeholders in the planning process, the central 
government continues to dominate the actual decision making (Magole, 2008). This is at least 
in part because local entities lack the financial and human resource capacity to successfully 
implement plans such as the ODMP at the local level. 
 
4.4.3 Environmental injustice 
Mogae’s presidency was marred by his government’s attempts to relocate Basarwa (mostly 
referred as the San) from their ancestral lands in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) 






CKGR was promulgated in 1961 with the intention to safeguard the nomadic hunting and 
gathering lifestyle of the Basarwa and to prevent cattle farmers from moving into the area 
(Campbell, 2004; Child, 2009). Campbell (2004) asserts that George Silberbauer, then District 
officer was influential in the creation of the reserve. Campbell (2004, p. 59) notes that: 
Silberbauer recognised the difficulties Bushmen underwent in their relations with other 
groups and particularly their inability to retain rights on land wanted by others. He 
worried about encroaching farming and sought to secure land for Bushmen on a 
permanent and legal basis. His main concern was that Bushmen be free to decide their 
own future in their own time. 
In early 2001 the government decided to relocate the Basarwa from the reserve. There are at 
least three narratives on the removal of Basarwa.  First, central to the relocation of Basarwa 
has been the government notion that Basarwa cannot live with animals in the reserve. Good 
(2008) is of the view that the government of Botswana viewed the lifestyle of the Basarwa as 
primitive. Mogae called Basarwa ‘stone age creatures’ who had no place in the modern world 
(Brown and Saunders, 2008). The government wished to provide better socio-economic 
services to Basarwa if they were outside of the reserve. As a result, in August 2001 the 
government threatened to cut off social services to the remaining Basarwa in the park as a way 
of forcing them to relocate (Good, 2008). The forced relocation from CKGR meant that 
Basarwa would be cut off from natural resources, especially hunting and gathering activities. 
Second, the relocation of Basarwa has also been linked by the desire of the government to start 
diamond mining following prospecting (Marobela, 2010; Vidal, 2014). Third, the relocation 
was also viewed as paving the way for tourism and conservation in the CKGR. The government 
argued that Basarwa were responsible for reducing the number of wildlife in the CKGR. In 
2013, it was reported that half of the reserve was allocated to Wilderness Safaris, a 
multinational tourism company dominating Botswana’s booming ecotourism industry (Vidal, 
2014). It can be argued that the relocation of Basarwa was strongly guided by profit making.  
 
In response to this action by government, an NGO specialising in defending the rights of 
indigenous peoples worldwide, Survival International accused Mogae’s government of 
marginalising the Basarwa community. In 2006, after a prolonged legal battle, the Botswana 






ruled Basarwa were “unlawfully despoiled of their possession of the land which they lawfully 
occupied in their settlements in the CKGR” by the government (Botswana High Court, 2006). 
Although the High Court ruled that government acted unlawfully in forcing Basarwa to 
relocate and asserted their constitutional rights to live in their ancestral land, the Botswana 
government still denies Basarwa the right to live freely in the reserve. The CKGR became a 
potent symbol of Basarwa territorial claims to wildlife areas and is often the focal point of 
deployment of historical memories in the contestation of land ownership. 
 
The relocation of the Basarwa is a form of environmental injustice that would, in the view of 
green theorists, disqualify Botswana as a green state, because a green state delivers 
environmental justice (Saward, 1998; Barry, 2001; Eckersley, 2004). However, the relocation 
of the Basarwa shows how the government of Botswana is involved in the creation of green 
spaces even if that process involves the violation of the human rights of indigenous groups. 
Therefore, environmental injustice is relevant to the analysis of the green state in Africa as it 
is a manifestation of environmental histories and state making processes (Death, 2016). The 
top-down authoritarian control of local communities, land and the environment, sometimes 
through force is very much part of the model of greening in Africa. This case of the CKGR is 
important for thinking about how the relationships between the state and its citizens are shaped 
through the medium of the environment. These relations were more pronounced under Ian 
Khama’s presidency (see Chapter Five).  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the context through which the process of greening emerges by tracing 
the development of wildlife conservation policy in the period between 1966 and 2008, which 
covers the presidency of Seretse Khama, Ketumile Masire and Festus Mogae. This chapter 
shows that the three presidents were instrumental in shaping the green agenda of the state 
through the development of the HCLV tourism model between 1966 and 2018. They also 
opened up the country to non-state actors who financed environmental-related programmes and 
facilitated the development of green institutions. Death (2016) argues that environmental issues 
are integral to the formation of the state in Africa. The state in Botswana has used the 
environment and conservation issues to build a neoliberal state through its eco-tourism model 






the state in Botswana has positioned itself as offering a unique product in the Southern African 
region that resonates with aspirations of international conservation actors and upmarket tourists 
from the Global North. As I shall show in the next Chapter, this image that has been crafted 
between 1966 and 2008 was enhanced under the presidency of Ian Khama with state in 
Botswana viewed by international conservation NGOs as the ‘darling of conservation’ and 
‘safe haven for wildlife’  in Africa (Great Plains Conservation, 2018; New York Times, 2019).   
This chapter has demonstrated thatthe presidents’ ideological orientation provided fertile 
ground for the greening of Botswana. During the presidency of Seretse Khama, environmental 
policy was still at its infancy because the country was pressed with more economic 
development issues. Hence, wildlife protection was not an immediate priority. His leadership 
saw the formation of DWNP, formerly the game department that was inherited from the British 
colonial administration. The seed for Botswana’s high cost low volume tourism model which 
subsequent governments built on and enhanced, was sown under Khama’s government and 
consolidated under Masire’s presidency. The democratic ideals advanced by Masire’s 
government attracted the interest of international actors and donors who advanced the green 
agenda. Aklin and Urpelainen (2014) argue that democratization seemed to allow the 
expansion of national environmental regulation only under favorable international conditions. 
It is under Masire’s administration (1980 -1998) that the presence of international actors in 
Botswana was deepened and further extended as a result of environmental degradation in the 
1980s and the adoption of the global sustainable development frame as evidenced by the 
implementation of CBNRM.  
 
CBNRM emanated from the promotion of decentralized approaches worldwide and was mainly 
driven by donor agencies and international conservation NGOs who provided the financial and 
technical assistance in rolling out the program. It was an attempt to address the anomalies of 
protected area approaches that had alienated indigenous communities from the utilisation of 
wildlife resources. In important ways, CBNRM underscores the involvement of local 
communities in greening the state at the local level, especially in communal areas. This in turn 
shaped the relationship between the state and its citizens. The presidency of Festus Mogae 
(1998-2008) was characterised by the internal restructuring of the state through the creation of 






were important because they put Botswana on the green growth path. These green institutions 
were also critical in the sense that they provided an oversight on the implementation of 
CBNRM while also useful for creating laws and policies in line with international protocols 
and conventions. It was during Mogae’s administration that tourism became the second largest 
economic sector after mining. The next chapter examines the transformation of the Botswana 


































The strengthened role of the state in wildlife conservation in Botswana 
 
5.1 Introduction  
For a long time, Botswana has been portrayed as an exceptional state and a beacon of 
democracy (cf. Chapter Four) without paying attention to how each of the presidents led the 
country and the roles each of them played in advancing environmental agendas. Despite the 
claim that it is a miracle and a democratic state, Botswana has undergone significant changes. 
Some of the profound changes were more visible under the presidency of Ian Khama (2008-
2018) with respect to the militarization and greening of the state. The militarization of the state 
in particular has led political analysts to claim that Botswana has evolved into an autocratic 
state (Good, 2017; Seabo, 2018). This chapter focuses on the transformation of the state of 
Botswana through the lens of militarization of the state, militarization of wildlife and 
recentralization of state power in wildlife governance. Militarization of the state is understood 
as a style of governance in which former (and current serving) high ranking military officers 
are posted in senior positions in state and parastatal institutions. Such postings were used to 
build and discipline state institutions.  
The militarization of wildlife entails the deployment of the military personnel and military 
grade-weapons in anti-poaching mission to protect wildlife by displacing unruly behavior 
within Botswana’s green spaces. Although militarization of wildlife has been in place since the 
late 1980s in Botswana under the leadership of president Ketumile Masire (cf. Chapter Four), 
it took a profound turn during the time of Ian Khama. This process of green militarization 
during Khama’s government should be contextualized beyond Botswana borders. It was part 
of the general trend towards ensuring the protection and safety of Africa’s wildlife against the 
surge of commercial poaching and criminal syndicates that have targeted Africa’s protected 
areas. The proliferation of commercial poaching between 2008 and 2016 undermined 
conservation efforts of countries as witnessed by states in Eastern and Southern Africa. As a 
result, the Ian Khama government operated at the time when protection of African wildlife was 
taking this important dimension. His military background enabled him to fit into and facilitate 
this process. Furthermore, there was a great interest by international conservation non-
governmental organizations to protect African wildlife from commercial poaching and the 






outlook. The processes of militarization of the state and wildlife involves command and control 
of resources and are crucial to the exercise and legitimation of state power.  
 
Militarization also became a precursor to the recentralization of state power. Such 
recentralization is reflected in wildlife governance through the decisions to allocate resource 
royalties to a national conservation fund, to suspend hunting and to establish the controversial 
tourism land bank. These green decisions as the next chapter will show have altered the pro-
community CBNRM approach. In the first part of this chapter, I foreground the ideological 
orientation of Ian Khama. This is crucial because it allows us to understand how his military 
background (re)shaped the state and strengthened the greening of Botswana. In the second part, 
I consider how his military outlook translated into the militarization of the state while the third 
section shows how militarization is reflected in the greening of the state. The fourth section 
pays attention to how Ian Khama reasserted state authority over decision making in wildlife 
governance in Botswana.  
 
5.2 Ian Khama: ‘the preeminent environmentalist’ and the centralization of power    
In order to discuss and understand the transformation of the state of Botswana there is a need 
to pay attention to the ideological orientation of Ian Khama that enabled the militarization of 
wildlife and centralization of power in wildlife governance. Good (2010, p. 318) summarizes 
Khama’s leadership style as relatively confined “to three areas alone: the military, chieftaincy 
and dynastic politics and state power, briefly at the highest level”.  Ian Khama is the first son 
of the first president of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama who was the Paramount chief (Kgosi) of 
the Bangwato, one of the largest tribal groups in Botswana. Traditionally Ian Khama is the 
apparent heir to the Bangwato throne. In April 1979, Ian Khama inherited the chieftaincy 
position from his father becoming Kgosi Khama IV of Bangwato.  
In terms of profession, Ian Khama is a renowned military man in Botswana. It is in the army 
where he built his name and enhanced his profile. He did his military training in Sandhurst 
Military Academy in Britain from 1972-74. Thereafter, Khama joined the newly formed 
Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977 where he was appointed by his father as Brigadier and 
deputy commander of the BDF at the age of twenty-four (24), becoming the youngest to have 
served as brigadier in the history of Botswana’s army (Henk, 2007; Good, 2009). Twelve years 






1998 when he resigned to join politics. Upon joining politics, Khama first stood for 
parliamentary elections in his constituency, Serowe North where he won a parliamentary seat. 
He was appointed as a Minister of Presidential Affairs on 1st April 1998. The next day, 
president Mogae appointed him as the vice president. Political commentators argue that Mogae 
brought Khama into politics partly to help unify the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) which 
at the time was riddled with factionalism (Taylor, 2005). It is understood that Mogae appointed 
Khama as the vice president based on the recommendation of the Schlemmer report. Molomo 
(2000, p. 101) claims that, the report advised that for the “BDP to improve its chances of 
winning the 1999 elections, it needed to bring into its fold a person with enough dynamism 
who was untainted by factional fights”. Despite being brought to unite the party, Sebudubudu 
and Botlhomilwe (2015) argue that he went on to divide the party resulting in the new 
formation of the new party Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD)14.  
 
Furthermore, it is said that Ian Khama joined politics on his own terms. He refused to relinquish 
his position as the Paramount Chief of Bangwato despite legislation his father introduced in 
1972 that a chief ought to have resigned from chieftainship before qualifying for parliamentary 
elections (Good, 2009). He is quoted as to have made it clear that, “I am a kgosi. If you want 
me into politics, then do not ask me to follow Bathoen’s example of abdicating my chieftaincy” 
(cited in Good 2009, p.319). He ascended to state power in April 2008, thanks to the automatic 
succession provided for by the constitution, whereby the vice president assumes the presidency 
when the incumbent president steps down. Ian Khama stepped down from presidency after his 
10-year term came to an end in 1st April 2018. As a leader, he has both fame and infamy, and 
despite being popular, he has been described as divisive by some observers (Lucas, 2011). In 
his leadership, he is a front man who is seen as forthright and decisive by some observers (Henk 
2004) and as ‘authoritarian’, ‘autocratic’, ‘dictatorial’ by others (Good, 2010).  
 
Not only is Khama a politician and military man, he is an avid wildlife conservationist. His 
interest in wildlife protection goes a long way back: he had been instrumental in advocating 
wildlife protection by bringing the army to conduct anti-poaching in the 1980s as highlighted 
in the previous chapter (Henk, 2006). He was a patron for international and locally based 
 
14 This is an offspring of the ruling party BDP that was formed in 2010 by the disgruntled members of 






environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) including the Peace Parks Foundation 
(PPF), Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS) and the Khama Rhino Sanctuary. His 
commitment to wildlife conservation has earned him international acclaim. He has been called 
‘father of conservation’, ‘preservationist’, ‘preeminent environmentalist’, the ‘unsung hero of 
conservation’ (Henk, 2007; Rihoy & Maguranyanga, 2010). He has received several awards 
from foreign based organisations including the Africa Conservation Award from the Safari 
Club of Washington (1991), the Paul Harris Fellow and Endangered Wildlife Statesman Award 
(2001), international conservation caucus Teddy Roosevelt International Conservation Award 
(2011), the 2014 Rhino Conservation Award for best political and judicial support and the 
Global Citizen awarded by the University of Wisconsin (2017). Having served on the board of 
directors for US-based Conservation International (CI), Ian Khama is currently serving as a 
distinguished fellow of CI. CI chairman Peter Seliigmann (2018) said in a statement on CI 
website that: 
 
CI will tap into his vision, commitment and institutional knowledge to help preserve 
Africa’s rich resources. As a distinguished fellow Ian Khama will help African 
countries forge a more sustainable development path that involves boosting socio-
economic progress of the people without destroying natural resources.   
 
He will do so through the platform of the Gaborone Declaration for sustainability in Africa 
(GDSA), an initiative aimed at bringing together African countries to mainstream sustainable 
development principles and practices in their development agenda. CI manages the GDSA on 
behalf of the Botswana government.  The next section will show how Ian Khama’s militaristic 
outlook is reflected in the state as well as wildlife conservation.  
 
5.3 Militaristic outlook of the state of Botswana  
For a long time, Botswana has been portrayed as a frontrunner in democracy and good 
governance, with analysts  labelling the country as a success story - ‘An African Miracle’ 
(Samatar, 1999). However, political commentators have questioned this outlook. Critics are of 
the view that democracy regressed into autocracy under the leadership of former president Ian 
Khama (Good and Taylor, 2008; Good, 2010; Botlhomilwe et al., 2011). When questioned 
about Botswana at the African leadership forum in Tanzania in 2014, former president Festus 






Ian Khama, which is ascribed to his military background where the chain of command is the 
norm (Good and Taylor, 2008; Good, 2009, 2016; Molebatsi and Sello, 2018). Therefore, it is 
not surprising that militarization became the cornerstone of Khama’s administration and 
manifested in many ways.  
Upon ascending to state power in 2008, Ian Khama established a state spy security agency, the 
Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS). Prior to the establishment of DISS, 
the state was dependent on the Military Intelligence (MI) at the BDF and the ad-hoc inter 
agency cooperation structure, the Security Intelligence Services (SIS) formed in 1998 
(Gwatiwa, 2015). The SIS was made up of personnel from the military and Botswana Police. 
In addition, the Botswana Police had its own intelligence units such as the Special Branch, the 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the Serious Crimes Squad and the diamond and 
Narcotics Squad (Gwatiwa, 2015). Thaga (2005) is of the view that the security intelligence 
played overlapping roles. Gwatiwa (2015) asserts that the role of the SIS was primarily 
domestic and very limited in their legal and resource aspects. 
 
The DISS established by the Intelligence and Security Service Act of 2007 came into effect on 
1st April 2008, when Ian Khama assumed the presidency. Good (2016) claims that the spy 
agency became the hallmark of Khama’s rule. The agency was charged with the key 
responsibility of national security, advising the government on internal and external threats. 
The aim of the agency was to investigate, gather and coordinate information on national 
security issues (Gwatiwa, 2015). DISS has the power to arrest, seize and detain without warrant 
(GoB, 2007). This spy agency was housed under the Office of President hence they reported 
directly to the president. It was mainly composed of former Military Intelligence (MI) staff 
from the BDF (Good, 2010; Gwatiwa, 2015). At the top, was Colonel Issaac Kgosi, former 
director of MI and a very close friend of Ian Khama. He served as Khama’s private secretary 
when Ian Khama was the vice president. Since its operation the agency has been charged with 
unlawful surveillance and extra-judicial killings of citizens (see Good 2009, 2010). Individuals 
have been detained, assaulted and murdered. Print media reports (Mmegi, Sunday Standard, 
Botswana Gazette) indicated that 12 shooting incidents involving DISS occurred between April 
2008 and March 2009 with 8 people losing their lives. One incident that comes to mind, is the 
high-profile shooting case which involved the killing of John Kalafatis on the evening of March 






shot and murdered in his car by undercover DISS agents (Sunday Standard, 2009). Four 
security agents were convicted of murder by the courts with one sentenced to 3 years 
imprisonment while others were sentenced to 11 years imprisonment. Hardly three months in 
prison, Ian Khama shocked the nation when he pardoned the security agents who were then 
later absorbed into the army. The execution of Kalafatis brought fear into society. There was 
distrust of each other in society because you never knew who was an undercover DISS 
operative. The DISS became one of the most powerful and feared state agencies in the country. 
The Media Institute for Southern Africa (2009) noted that during Ian Khama’s reign, a cloud 
of fear had descended on civilian life, impacting on freedom of expression. For instance, the 
DISS was accused of threatening those who spoke out against the President (Sunday Standard, 
2009).  
 
Ian Khama militarized the civil service by appointing former high-ranking military officers 
into key bureaucratic institutions to consolidate state legitimacy and to bring about discipline 
in state institutions (Good, 2009). Some of the military appointments into the bureaucracy 
include: Colonel Silas Motlalekgosi (Commissioner of Prisons), Lt. Colonel Moaohi 
Modisenyane (General Manager, Central Transport Organisation), Colonel Leke Ovuya 
(Manager of the biggest government hospital, Princess Marina), Colonel Duke Masilo (deputy 
senior private secretary to the president) and Brigadier George Tlhalerwa (Senior private 
secretary to the president). Furthermore, former military personnel became part of the cabinet. 
Notable examples include: Lt. General Mompati Merafhe (vice president), Brigadier 
Ramadeluka Seretse (Defence, Justice and Security) and Captain Kitso Mokaila (Environment, 
Wildlife and Tourism). This gave the impression that competence, merit and experience did 
not matter. For as long as one was the preferred choice – loyal and had military background –
they would easily get an appointment over those qualifying for the position. Molomo (2001) 
asserts that the militarization of the state invariably leads to the strengthening of authoritarian 
rule and the erosion of democratic practices.  
 
Good (2009) claims that Ian Khama surrounded himself with a trusted group of loyalists often 
within the family and close friends. This group of people were elevated to higher and influential 
positions in government. From within the family, Tshekedi Khama the younger brother was 
appointed the Minister of Environment; Sheila Khama and Rose Seretse cousins to Khama 






and economic crimes (DCEC) respectively. Close and trusted friends include amongst others 
Thapelo Olopeng (also a former military man) was appointed the Minister of Youth, Sports 
and Culture and Pelonomi Venson Moitoi became Minister of Communications. As a former 
army general and commander in chief of the armed forces, Ian Khama knew very well that to 
captain the ship he needed unquestionable loyalty. Therefore, surrounding himself with trusted 
loyalists from the army, friends and family members, was aimed at elevating bureaucracy and 
submissiveness as well as consolidating power. Basically, this was a patronage network.  
 
Not only did Khama militarize the civil service, his government increased defense and military 
expenditure. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
Botswana had the highest percentage increase in military spending between 2015 and 2016 
than any other country in Africa. Botswana’s spending grew by 40% in 2016 (SIPRI, 2016). In 
2015, the Ministry of Defense, Justice and Security got a development budget of P1.32 billion 
with the amount increased to P3.59 billion (Mathambo, 2015, 2016). The bulk of the money 
was received by the BDF to cater for the provision of defense equipment, communication 
equipment and infrastructure in order to improve BDFs security capabilities (Mathambo, 2015, 
2016).  According to local private media reports Botswana had shown interest in procuring 
Gripen fighter jets for the BDF towards the end of 2016. In 2017, Ian Khama went for a state 
visit in Sweden with the aim of finalizing a deal to acquire the Gripen fighter jets. When asked 
by Swedish journalists on why Botswana needs Gripen fighter jets, Ian Khama said:  
 
we have responsibility to provide rapid reaction to every corner of our country if they 
feel threatened. We must use equipment that we think is suitable as a deterrence and 
for the defence of our country (Khama, 2017).  
 
Khama’s reliance on close loyalists influenced his leadership style, elevating his reclusive, 
divisive and dynastic characteristics. It is claimed that he excluded established institutions and 
processes from running the government. Following this logic, Good (2009, p. 320) concludes 
that two characteristics of Khama’s highly personalized rule stand out – “his reliance on edicts 
or directives and decision by caprice”. Although Ian Khama promised the nation of Botswana 
to uphold the principles of democracy such as consultation, he unilaterally pronounced policy 
positions of the government. To illustrate this, in 2008 he restricted the operating hours of 






to issue a presidential directive unilaterally imposing a thirty percent levy on the price of 
alcohol without taking into consideration the long-term impacts of such a decision on the 
affected stakeholders such as the entertainment industry. Commentators are of the view that 
Ian Khama acted on his dislike for alcohol (Bothomilwe and Sebudubudu, 2015; Good, 2016).  
 
Khama also unilaterally pronounced a salary adjustment of 3% in 2011 at a kgotla meeting 
while a consultative process at the Public Service Bargaining Council (PSBC) was ongoing. In 
2011 the public-sector embarked on a nationwide strike that lasted for two months. This strike 
which nearly brought Botswana’s economy to its knees was motivated by inadequate working 
conditions of public servants. Furthermore, the public servants have not had a pay increase for 
three years. As a result, the public-sector unions demanded a pay rise of 16 percent which they 
soon cut to 12 percent (Makgala and Malila, 2014). Commentators are of the view that Khama 
ignored the PSBC whose duty was to negotiate salaries of public service employees and their 
conditions of service (Makgala and Malila, 2014; Interview 13, POL, 28th April 2018). PSBC 
is made up of the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM) on behalf of government 
and public-sector unions on behalf of civil servants. Instead of meeting with union leaders to 
hear their demands, Khama went around the country consulting with non-working protesters 
comprising of old age pensioners at the kgotla where conversations are held. While the 
negotiations were underway, Khama shocked the nation when he pronounced a three percent 
salary increase at one of the kgotla meetings. It is alluded that, he stated that even if the strike 
can continue for five years, he would not change his position (Makgala and Malila, 2014). To 
further frustrate the efforts of the public-sector unions, DPSM implemented a no work no pay 
rule. In certain instances, some people lost their jobs. Consequently, this caused the strike to 
end with no results as many civil servants feared that they could be next on the line. In 
September 2019, a month before the general elections in Botswana the new President 
Mokgweetsi Masisi announced in a kgotla meeting in Lobatse that his government will 
reinstate all the workers who were fired during the 2011 strike (BW Government Facebook 
page, 2019). The announcement by President Masisi could be attributed as a campaign strategy 
to win the 2019 October elections.    
 
General Khama is also known for his strong aversion to opposing views. His critics, especially 
those in government were made to apologize to him. In response to the new liquor regulations, 






‘fundamentalist state’ (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011). The youthful MP was forced to 
apologize to Khama. Another former BDP MP Pono Moatlhodi was forced to detract his words 
after raising concerns about militarization of the civil service (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 
2011). Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in South Africa was 
put on a visa requirement entry list into Botswana presumably because he called for Botswana’s 
isolation. He must apply for a visa though he holds a diplomatic passport. Others who have 
been given visa restrictions include Gordon Bennet - who represented Basarwa on their CKGR 
case against government - as well as Survival International director Steven Corry. In the 
military, discipline is the cornerstone of rule as it implies abiding and complying with 
commands with no or little questions - too much questioning and interrogation might be 
interpreted as insubordination.  
 
5.3.1 Presidential powers of the president of Botswana 
Ian Khama exploited the constitutional provision that sanction the concentration of power in 
the presidency to promote policies and actions aligned to his interest and style of governing the 
country. As this Chapter shows, he ruled the country through directives and had more control 
in policy formulation.  Section 47, sub section 1 and 2 of the constitution empowers the 
president to take decisions on his own. The section stipulates that:  
The executive power of Botswana shall vest in the president, who shall unless provided, 
act in his own deliberate judgment and shall not be obliged to follow the advice tendered 
by any other person or authority.  
 
Furthermore, the cabinet only plays an advisory role to the president. Section 50 (11) of the 
constitution (1966) asserts that: 
 
The cabinet shall be responsible for advising the president in respect to the policy of 
the government and with respect to such matters as they may be referred to it by 
him/her.   
 
However, there is no constitutional requirement for the president to follow the formal advice 
or views of the cabinet or parliament; nor is there any constitutional basis for legitimate 






governing powers, the president is not accountable to any state institutions even parliament. 
The constitution also affords the president absolute immunity from prosecution for both private 
and official functions. Section 41 (1) of the constitution of Botswana states that: 
 
Whilst any person holds or performs the functions of the office of the president no 
criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against him in respect of anything 
done or omitted to be done by him either in his official capacity or in his private capacity 
and no civil proceedings shall be instituted or continued in respect of anything done or 
omitted to be done his private capacity.  
 
To illustrate this constitutional clause, I refer to the case in which Gomolemo Motswaledi, the 
secretary general of the BDP challenged the authority of Ian Khama to suspend him from the 
party. In 2009, Khama allegedly suspended Motswaledi from the party because of indiscipline. 
It is thought that Motswaledi was a member of the Barata-phathi (we love the party) faction 
that opposed Khama’s style of leadership. Following his suspension from the party, 
Motswaledi instituted a lawsuit against Ian Khama not as the president of Botswana but as the 
leader of the BDP. Khama argued that he took the decision in his private capacity as the leader 
of the party. Taking into consideration section 41 (1) of the constitution of Botswana, the High 
Court of Botswana dismissed Motswaledi’s case arguing that the head of state cannot be sued 
in both his official or private capacity. The ruling was also upheld by the Court of Appeal in 
Botswana.   
 
The over-centralisation of power in the institution of the presidency impedes democratic 
practice. It opens an opportunity for the president to exercise more control in policy 
formulation and allows for the abuse of state resources for personal gain. As Good (2010, p. 
363) argues “objective, rational and institutional norms are often ignored, while the personal, 
subjective and the irrational are relied upon”. As the president advances their own interest, 
transparency and accountability are affected resulting in erosion of trust and legitimacy in the 
eyes of the constituents they seek to serve. Centralized powers in the office of the president led 
to the development of features of ‘authoritarian liberalism’ in Botswana (Good, 1996, 1997; 
Taylor, 2003). Although Ian Khama’s predecessors served under the same constitution, they 
did not exercise their powers with the same intensity as Ian Khama (Botlhomilwe et al., 2011). 






became a precursor to the centralization of power which resembles authoritarian rule. In an 
authoritarian rule the chain of command and control is a norm. In what follows, I consider how 
Ian Khama enhanced the greening of the state through the militarization of wildlife 
conservation.  
 
5.4 Greening by militarization 
In this section I focus on how the state of Botswana under the tutelage of President Ian Khama 
deepened the greening of the state through militarization of wildlife. Greening by militarization 
constitutes an important aspect of the greening of Botswana but this should not be seen in 
isolation as there were other similar processes taking place in Southern and East Africa 
concerned with the protection of wildlife between 2008 and 2016 in Africa (Lunstrum, 2014; 
Duffy, 2014, 2016; Massé and Lunstrum 2016 Hübschle and Jooste, 2017). The question 
becomes what explains the intensification of green militarization in recent years by African 
states? The answer is not as simple as one may assume but commentators in geography and 
conservation studies attribute the intensification of green militarization to commercial 
poaching. Commercial poaching is in part driven by the rise in illegal wildlife trade of the rhino 
horn and ivory in the black market in Asian countries, especially China and Vietnam 
(TRAFFIC, 2009, 2012). The rhino horn is in demand in these regions because they are 
considered to have medicinal properties. In addition, Masse et al. (2017) note that rhino horn 
and ivory as often displayed as a sign of wealth. According to Masse et al. (2017) ivory costs 
USD1,000 – 2,000/kilogram on the black market while the rhino horn stands at $40,000 – 
70,000/kilogram. The UNEP and INTERPOL report (2016) estimates that illegal wildlife trade 
globally stands at $7 – 23 billion per year.  
The wave of commercial poaching has hit African states hard as evidenced by the spikes in 
rhino and elephant poaching in recent years. South Africa, a country that holds a vast majority 
of the world’s rhinos lost over a thousand rhinos due to poaching between 2014 and 2016 
(Molewa, 2015; IUCN, 2016). Similarly, deadly trends have followed the African elephant 
where poaching along with habitat loss translates into a yearly loss of eight percent. There are 
fears that the population may be halved within a single decade (Chase et al., 2016). It is 
estimated that three quarters of elephant poaching takes place in Central and Southern Africa 






The response of the global community and individual countries has grown in proportion to the 
problem. Governments of end-user countries like China and Vietnam are working to curb 
demand for wildlife products (TRAFFIC 2017). National and international efforts and 
cooperation aimed at combatting the transit and movement of wildlife products has also 
increased (DEA 2016). Despite the various international interventions, the use of military 
tactics in anti-poaching efforts has become more pronounced in protected areas in countries in 
Eastern and Southern Africa (Lunstrum 2014; Hübschle and Faull 2017). Militarized response 
by countries means that states have declared war on poaching (Duffy et al., 2015). This has 
made protecting African wildlife a dangerous business as poachers use sophisticated military 
hardware such as high-caliber hunting rifles, large ammunition and even helicopters 
(Lunstrum, 2014; UNEP and INTERPOL, 2016).  
The debate on green militarization is polarized amongst conservationist and scholars in 
political geography and conservation studies. On one side, are scholars who consider green 
militarization as an appropriate and legitimate approach to reducing commercial poaching 
(Henk, 2005, 2006; Hübschle and Jooste, 2017; Mogomotsi and Madigele, 2017; Jooste and 
Ferreira, 2018). The use of forceful approaches can reduce poaching leading to growing 
wildlife numbers.  Conversely, critics consider this trend to be morally unjust and problematic 
for several reasons (Duffy et al., 2015; Duffy et al., 2019). Firstly, scholars argue that 
proponents of green militarization fail to account and understand how and why people engage 
in poaching. Secondly, studies have failed to consider how local communities living in 
proximity to protected areas have experienced green militarization. Thirdly, Duffy et al. (2019) 
argue that we need to consider the experiences of rangers and possible impacts on their families 
and wider social networks. Fourthly, scholars need to analyse political economy of militarized 
conservation and think through challenges of conservation in contexts of armed conflict. The 
conclusion that is drawn by the authors is that a coercive agenda will have very limited 
prospects of success in the future (Duffy et al., 2019). 
5.4.1 Greening Botswana through the militarization of wildlife 
 
For now, I turn to green militarization within the context of Botswana, a country that has a 
flourishing healthy wildlife population. Wildlife is central to Botswana’s burgeoning tourism 
industry and features prominently in the country’s international conservation profile with 






about a third of Africa’s entire elephant population (Chase, 2011). These charismatic 
megafauna species has significantly contributed towards the economy of the country. 
Furthermore, wildlife is central to the CBNRM programme where local communities can 
sustain their livelihoods. With such a flourishing population of elephants, the country is prone 
to poaching just like other African countries with mega charismatic species. To protect its 
wildlife, Botswana deploys the army, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in its anti-poaching 
missions.  
 
The BDF has been involved in anti-poaching since the late 1980s and Lt. Gen Ian Khama who 
commanded the army played an instrumental role in the deployment of the BDF in protecting 
wildlife (Henk, 2005, 2006; Interview 78, Ian Khama, 4th March 2019). According to 
Ramutsindela (2016, p. 165) the deployment of the BDF in anti-poaching mission “developed 
in the context of liberation struggles in Southern Africa that involved the violation of 
Botswana’s borders by actors involved in liberation struggles from neighboring states and 
counter-insurgency” (see also Henk, 2006).  The socio-political conditions in Angola, Namibia 
and South Africa gave rise to poaching and proliferation in smuggling of illegal firearms 
through Botswana borders. Henk (2007, p. 49) contends that “weapons, rebels and predatory 
criminals flowed freely across the regions borders’ resulting in proliferation in organized 
poaching in Southern Africa”. As the liberation wars intensified Botswana’s northern territory 
became a hunting ground for transnational poachers (Interview, Ian Khama, 4th March 2019). 
Ian Khama argues that poachers wiped out nearly all the rhinos in Botswana with only five 
rhinos left in the Okavango Delta (Interview 78, Ian Khama, 4th March 2019). In view of this, 
a decision was taken in consultation with President Masire in 1987 to deploy the BDF in anti-
poaching mission to secure a resource that will benefit the country going into the future. Ian 
Khama argues that the decision to deploy the army was a rational move that has helped to 
safeguard the booming ecotourism industry that is heavily dependent on wildlife. The poaching 
of rhinos also led to the establishment of the Khama Rhino Sanctuary in 1992, a few kilometers 
from Serowe, Ian Khama’s home village.  
 
The BDF started the anti-poaching operation in October 1987 in the Kwando-Linyanti area 
along the northern border with Namibia. This mission was conducted by the secretive 
Commando Squadron of the BDF (Henk, 2007; Bugday, 2014; Interview, Ian Khama, 4th 






to the rest of the army. At the time when Ian Khama left the BDF, over 1000 soldiers were 
dispatched into the country’s national parks and game reserves. The defense force has been 
able to thwart mega-fauna poaching within the country (Henks, 2005, 2007). Furthermore, the 
BDF disciplined and pervasive presence has “re-established a perception of security among a 
population once very sensitive to armed poachers and among a jittery tourist clientele” (Henks, 
2005, p. 281; see also Mogomotsi and Madigele, 2017). Henks (2007) has lauded the BDF anti-
poaching as a success model on how to deal with poaching, with Botswana being labelled as a 
safe haven for wildlife. Furthermore, Botswana has been ranked number one in the world for 
its efforts towards conserving mega-fauna (Lindsey et al., 2017).  
 
The spikes in rhino poaching in Southern Africa between 2008 and 2016 provided a fertile 
ground for the Ian Khama government to intensify its efforts in anti-poaching. Neighboring 
countries were hard hit by poachers, with South Africa leading the pack. In 2008, 83 rhinos 
were poached in the Kruger National Park with numbers reaching 1,215 in 2014 and slight 
decline to 1,175 in 2015 (Mathieson, 2016). Namibia and Zimbabwe lost 80 and 50 rhinos 
respectively (Mathieson, 2016). With the proliferation of rhino poaching in neighboring 
countries, especially South Africa, efforts were made by the government and the private sector 
to relocate rhinos from densely populated areas that are attracting poaching to Botswana where 
poaching is virtually non-existent. Botswana is seen as a country in which rhinos have a safe 
haven (Interview, Botswana National Rhino Coordinator, 5th May 2018). By the end of 2017, 
Botswana had received over 200 rhinos which were sent out into the wild in the Okavango 
Delta (Interview 78, Ian Khama, 4th March 2019). The translocation of rhinos to Botswana 
meant that the country could become the next hit by poachers (Interview 78, Ian Khama, 4th 
March 2019). In 2012, Ian Khama asserted that:  
 
Recently, we have learnt with alarm of the senseless and tragic destruction of rhinos by 
poachers in South Africa, where last year alone more than 400 rhinos were killed by 
poachers and poaching continues to date. We are also aware that these poachers are 
now eyeing Botswana rhinos as their next target. It has come to our attention that some 
have dispatched a covert expedition into Botswana to locate rhinos for poaching 
operations. We have responded by adopting measures which include the declaration of 
such individuals prohibited immigrants. We are and will continue to use our security 






into Botswana to poach would be a very high-risk undertaking. This is a warning that 
in this country, wildlife protection is a national priority (Sunday Standard, 2012).  
 
With its economy dependent on only a few main sectors (including high-end tourism), the 
Botswana state has made it its explicit purpose to protect these sectors at (nearly) all costs. As 
the president, Ian Khama strengthened anti-poaching efforts by deploying additional law 
enforcement agencies in conjunction with the BDF and DWNP. At the time of doing fieldwork 
in March 2019, the security agencies involved in wildlife protection included: the DISS, 
Botswana Police Service (BPS) and Botswana Prisons Services (BPS). Each security agency 
has been attached to a different national park and game reserves across the country with the 
BDF mostly securing the northern conservation estate, Okavango Delta and Chobe National 
Parks15. The DWNP anti-poaching unit (APU) were staffed, trained and armed with military 
grade (arms) weapons. The DWNP were brought in for a specific reason, to protect and ensure 
the safety of relocated rhinos in the wilderness areas of Okavango Delta (Interview, Ian Khama, 
4th March 2019). A specialised para-military protection and intelligence gathering unit, the 
Elite Rhino Squad was set up in 2014 within the DWNP. An estimated 48 million Pula ($5 
million) was set aside for acquisition of equipment and training of personnel in the unit 
(Bloomberg, 2015). Minister of Environment, Tshekedi Khama stated that: 
 
The harder we hit back, the less motive they have. It’s about hitting back harder than 
what they hurt us with (cited in Bloomberg, 2015).  
 
The Ministry of Environment appointed a former military man, Major General Otisitswe 
Tiroyamodimo as the director of DWNP. The appointment of Tiroyamodimo was motivated 
by his military background and experience in anti-poaching whilst in the BDF (Interview 78, 
Ian Khama, 4th March 2019). Ian Khama noted that: 
 
the wildlife department needed to be more of a disciplined organization as compared to 
the past because of the kind of para-military operations they are conducting. As such 
some kind of regimentation needed to be imposed in DWNP.  
 
15 For security reasons, I was unable to get details regarding deployment of security agencies 







As a rule of engagement, the government of Botswana implemented an unwritten controversial 
shoot to kill policy, targeting suspected poachers. The policy aims to deter suspected poachers 
from entering Botswana (Mogomotsi and Madigele, 2017). Tshekedi Khama claims that: 
The policy is meant to send a clear message to say if you want to come and poach in 
Botswana one of the possibilities is that you may not go back to your country alive. 
 
Tshekedi Khama made it clear that poachers should carry their identity cards so that in the case 
of confrontation they could notify their next of kin. The policy is considered as the most 
aggressive step towards wildlife conservation. Critics have argued that such policy is lethal as 
it violates the right to life as poachers are denied the legal process to prove their innocence 
(Neumann, 2004). Shoot to kill is often applied when the threat is high, so one shoots to kill in 
order to protect themselves. Mogomotsi and Madigele (2017, p. 55) are of the view that shoot 
to kill is justifiable as per the constitution of Botswana. They argue that: 
 
The shoot to kill policy is arguably justified in terms of Section 4(2)(d) of the 
constitution, which provides that a person shall not be regarded as having been deprived 
of his or her life in contravention of Section 4(1) of the constitution if he or she dies in 
order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence, or if he or she 
dies as the result of a lawful act of war.  
 
The anti-poaching operations of the BDF has in the past increased border tensions between 
Botswana and Namibia. Media reports indicated that 30 Namibians and at least 22 
Zimbabweans have been killed in Botswana anti-poaching operations in the last two decades 
(Mail and Guardian, 2016). This scenario led to a simmering relation between Namibia and 
Botswana. The two countries have had territorial disputes with regards to the ownership of 
Sedudu/Kasikili Island in which both countries claimed ownership of the island. The disputed 
island was given to Botswana by the International Court of Justice. Next, I discuss the 







5.5 Recentralization of power in wildlife governance 
In this section I pay attention to how Ian Khama’s government expanded or recentralized state 
power in the wildlife sector. As noted in the previous chapter, Botswana implemented 
decentralized approaches to wildlife management in the form of CBNRM in 1989 under the 
leadership of President Masire. CBNRM devolves authority and power over natural resources 
to local communities. It allows communities the autonomy to make decisions regarding the use 
of natural resources such as wildlife in their locality. However, in the last decade wildlife 
governance has been dominated by top-down approaches where decision making has been 
taken by the state. Poteete and Ribot (2011) calls this ‘repertoires of domination’ which is 
defined as “sets of routine claims making actions available to actors as they seek to gain, 
expand or defend positions of dominance vis-à-vis particular types of actors” (p. 440). The 
recentralization of power was evident under the leadership of Ian Khama through government 
decisions to allocate resource royalties in the national green fund and presidential decrees to 
suspend hunting and establish the tourism land bank.  
5.5.1 National green fund  
Under Ian Khama’s presidency, the government of Botswana established a consolidated green 
fund commonly known as the National Environment Fund (NEF) in 2010. The fund was set up 
to finance community-based conservation projects related to environmental protection, 
sustainable use of natural resources, climate change mitigation and adaptation, waste 
management and pollution control country wide (Interview 66, MENT official, 22 July 2018). 
It is meant to ensure access to enough resources to maintain and enhance environmental-related 
activities, especially where they concern civil society involvement (MFDP, 2013). The green 
fund is not unique to Botswana. Countries such as South Africa have established similar 
funding initiatives which aims to transform the country’s economy towards a green economy 
by investing in innovative projects that will help realise a low-carbon, resource-efficient and 
climate resilient future (Molewa, 2017). The fund also assists South Africa in achieving its 
international commitment, particularly the sustainable development goals (SDGs).  
Botswana’s NEF evolved from parliamentary debates on CBNRM policy in 2007. Botswana 
legislators mostly from the BDP criticized the government of Botswana for limiting wildlife 
beneficiation to local communities participating in CBNRM initiatives. Benefits from wildlife 






4, diamonds have been critical for Botswana’s post-colonial development as the nation’s 
mineral reserves were used to drive economic growth and development for the country rather 
than benefit communities in which the diamond deposits were found (Poteete, 2009; Hoon, 
2014). During the CBNRM policy debate, one of the BDP Members of Parliament, Hon. 
Botsalo Ntuane argued that: 
 
any legislation that promotes separate ownership of natural resources only serve to sow 
the seeds of national discord. Any semblance of separate ownership and preferential 
treatment, no matter how well meant, is injurious and engenders a sense of injustice. 
Agitators who resent having to share resources on equal terms with everyone will be 
provided with enough reason to preach the gospel of resource chauvinism (cited in 
Hoon, 2014, p. 61).  
 
Through this debate, the BDP members of parliament sought to reinforce their political agenda 
of national beneficiation from natural resources that has contributed to the development of the 
country hence calling for the centralisation of CBNRM rents. CBNRM contradicted the 
fundamental national building ideals of Botswana where all-natural resources regardless of 
where they are located should benefit all citizens rather than a section of citizens where 
resources are found (Interview 78, Ian Khama, 4th March 2019). This means that the BDP 
politicians wanted CBNRM benefits to be treated the same as diamonds without considering 
the challenges that local communities experience in managing wildlife. For instance, local 
communities are involved in day to day conflict with wildlife, as one of the respondents noted 
“wildlife kills us, it destroys our crops” as opposed to diamonds that do not pose any threat to 
human life. However, the debates called for the recentralization of wildlife rents from CBOs 
through the CBNRM Policy of 2007. This policy became more pronounced under the 
administration of Ian Khama. The CBNRM policy became more of rent-seeking with the state 
taking a larger share of revenue (65 percent) generated by local community-based organisation 
(CBOs) and 35 percent retained by the CBOs. The 65 percent share is then distributed 
nationally for conservation projects through the NEF. It should be taken into account that the 
criteria for the ratio is unknown. Since its establishment the NEF has provided support to a 







5.5.2 Suspension of trophy hunting  
The year 2014 marked a significant shift from sustainable utilisation to a preservationist 
approach in wildlife conservation practice in Botswana. During his state of the nation address 
in November 2013, President Ian Khama announced an indefinite suspension on hunting in all 
controlled hunting areas save for private land with effect from 1st January 2014 (BNARS, 
2013). Many argue that the hunting ban was a presidential directive with no consultation with 
the affected stakeholders (LaRocco, 2016; Mbaiwa, 2018; Interview 51, Senior Wildlife 
Official,11th July 2018). The reasons for the hunting ban are many (Interview 78, Ian Khama, 
4th March 2019). Firstly, hunting did not generate as much money compared to photographic 
tourism as hunting is seasonal whereas photographic tourism runs throughout the year. Lindsey 
(2010) argues that hunting generates 15% of tourism revenues from only 1% of tourist arrivals, 
making it one of the lowest forms of tourism in Botswana. Additionally, safari hunting 
contributed 0.13% to Botswana’s GDP. In terms of job creation, hunting employs less people 
in comparison to photographic safaris.  
Secondly, it was implemented to deal with poor hunting controls and ethics by hunters. Khama 
is of the view that hunters abused the system of quotas by exceeding the animal quota’s given 
to them. They hunted more animals than what they were allocated thus threatening wildlife 
populations. In addition, hunters who had concessions in proximity to protected areas tended 
to lure wildlife into their concessions with provision of water and food in order to attract 
animals with high trophy qualities. Countries such as Kenya banned hunting in 1977 due to 
poor hunting controls and ethics on the part of the hunting industry that contributed to wildlife 
decline (Outoma, 2004; Lindsey et al., 2006). Overhunting and corruption were alleged in 
Kenya’s hunting industry (Booth, 2005).  Lastly, the hunting ban was meant to prevent 
confrontation between hunters and the BDF anti-poaching units. Ian Khama (Interview 78, 4th 
March 2019) noted that: 
There was a situation whereby if you had to do anti-poaching as we were and you had 
hunters shooting all over the place the people on the ground did not know whether the 
shots they are hearing on the ground are coming from poachers or legal hunters. So, 
you had a situation whereby and it happened when I was in the BDF where hunters 
were confronted because people thought that they were poachers so to avoid an ugly 







The official justification given by the government was that there was an observed decline in 
wildlife populations of some species. Elephant Without Borders (EWB) argued that the wildlife 
population in Botswana has been decimated by hunting, poaching, human encroachment, 
habitat fragmentation, drought and veld fires (Chase, 2011). Chase argued that 11 species 
declined by an average of 61% since 1996. This included ostrich numbers (declined by 95%), 
wildebeest (by 90%), tsessebe (by 84%), warthogs and kudus (by 81%), and giraffes (by 66%). 
A ministerial press release statement indicated that the decision came into effect due to the 
“realization that the shooting of wild game purely for sport and trophies is no longer seen to be 
compatible with either our national commitment to conserve and preserve local fauna or long-
term growth of the local tourism industry” (MEWT, 2013). In keeping with international trend, 
the government argued that the ban will facilitate the sustainable growth of the tourism sector, 
as hunting zones are converted into photographic areas (MEWT, 2013). With the resultant 
move to photographic tourism, Botswana was to attract ethical tourists to complement the high 
cost low volume tourism model. The ban on hunting received wide applause within the 
international conservation community. Animal rights and welfare groups were of the view that 
hunting ban would save wildlife species as they consider hunting to be immoral and that it 
pushed species further towards extinction (Lindsey et al., 2006).   
 
Despite many international accolades, the decision was highly contested by hunting safari 
operators, academics and local communities. For hunting safari operators, hunting is a 
conservation tool that facilitates the maintenance of biodiversity as well as a human-wildlife 
conflict mitigation measure (Lindsey et al., 2006; Interview 18, Trophy hunting safari operator, 
11th May 2018). In addition, hunting was practiced in marginal low-density areas where 
photography was not viable (Interview 18, Trophy hunting safari operator, 11th May 2018).  
Academics questioned the credibility of the EWB survey, citing deficiencies in the 
methodology. Botswana had not carried out a wildlife census since 2005. For local 
communities, trophy hunting was a crucial component of CBNRM that generated a substantial 
amount of money. Therefore, the hunting ban shaped the relations between the state and its 
citizens in that it altered the pro-community CBNRM approach and led to loss of income and 
jobs for local communities as I shall show in Chapter Six (LaRocco, 2016; Mbaiwa, 2018; 
Blackie, 2019). Local communities that relied on hunting for income were encouraged to 







Critics saw the ban as politically motivated arguing that it sought to safeguard the interests of 
Ian Khama in the non-consumptive tourism business to which he is highly connected 
(LaRocco, 2016; Interview 18, Trophy hunting safari operator, 11th May 2018). Local media 
reports (Sunday Standard, 2017) claim that Ian Khama made the decision to suspend hunting 
at the instigation of Wilderness Safaris and National Geographic filmmaker, Dereck Joubert, 
with whom he shares same photographic tourism business interests. Khama is a shareholder in 
wilderness safari and is also a close acquaintance of Dereck Joubert. President Ian Khama 
awarded both Wilderness Safaris and Joubert the Presidential Order of Meritorious Service in 
2015 for their role in wildlife conservation in Botswana. He also maintained tight control over 
MENT by appointing his younger brother as the Minister.  A trophy hunting safari operator 
(Interview 18, 11th May 2018) commented that they had privileged access to political power 
hence they were able to influence him. The photographic tourism industry is controlled by a 
small, white and foreign elite, but alliances are growing between this group and the traditional 
Tswana elite (i.e. the bureaucratic, business and political elite) (see Swatuk, 2005). 
 
5.5.3 Tourism Land Bank 
 
The move towards non-consumptive tourism marked the beginning of the controversial 
Tourism Land Bank. In January 2014, the Ministry of Lands and Housing (MLH) issued a 
savingram directing the reservation of forty-four (44) tourism sites to MENT. The savingram 
(MLH 1/11/11 (23) stated that: 
Acting in accordance with the provisions of the Tribal Land Act, Section 11 Sub 
Section 2, His Excellency the President has directed some tourism sites be transferred 
to the central government with immediate effect (MLH, 2014). 
 
Historically the concept of the land bank was initially developed to rehabilitate abandoned land 
that no private party would take on or perhaps because of unpaid taxes or contamination. In 
Botswana, the most aesthetically appealing and productive areas of tourism land countrywide 
are reserved for foreign direct investors. The tourism concessions were transferred from Land 
Boards16 to the parent Ministry of Lands and Housing. The reserved tourism concessions were 
 
16 Land Boards are elected bodies that are responsible for administration and equitable allocation of 






then given to the Ministry of Environment, with BTO becoming the champion of the land bank, 
an unpopular move deemed by some as a violation of Botswana’s land administration 
(Interviews 26, Regional wildlife officer, 23rd May 2018; 21, TLB official, 18th May 2018; see 
Blackie, 2019). Ian Khama argues that the land bank was meant to speed up or facilitate the 
development of the tourism sector through the maintenance of an adequate and constant supply 
of land for tourism activities (Interview 78, Ian Khama, 4th March 2019).  
 
Prior to the implementation of the Land Bank, tourism concessions were put out to tender by 
the land boards. Interested stakeholders would submit proposals and management plans to land 
boards and a rigorous process of evaluation conducted by an independent panel of experts who 
did not know the identity of the tender. Recommendations were then made to the relevant land 
board which made the final decision on allocation (more discussion on this in Chapter Six). 
The allocation was based on merits of the proposals. Where a concession belonged to local 
communities, the local community trust would become part of the evaluation process. As I will 
show in Chapter Six, the local community trust would sub-lease the concession to a potential 
investor who in return will pay a fee for utilizing the concession.  
 
With the advent of the Land Bank, BTO retained the decision-making power in the 
administration of tourism land concessions to foreign investors and tourism multi-national 
companies. As discussed in Chapter Four, this agency was created for marketing Botswana’s 
tourism to the international community and to facilitate enterprise development of ecotourism 
in Botswana. The presidential Tourism Land Bank meant that they had an additional role in 
allocating tourism concessions countrywide which were previously allocated by the Tribal 
Land Boards. Some local community concessions such as those owned by Mababe and 
Sankoyo were respectively withdrawn from these communities without consultation with the 
communities (Interview 44, Sankuyo Chief, 4th July 2018). The rights of communities to 
negotiate with an investor of their choice were taken away; forcing them to accept whichever 
investor the BTO chose for them (Interview 22, Executive member Sankuyo Trust, 21st May 








The land boards do not understand how the tourism business works. BTO has the 
knowledge on the tourism industry so they can monitor and police the operators 
something that land boards lack (Interview 78, 4th March 2019). 
 
Ian Khama is of the view that land boards gave tourism operators short term leases which 
caused a lot of insecurity in the tourism industry as operators did not know whether their lease 
would be renewed when it expires. According to the Tawana Land Board (TLB) official 
(Interview 21, 18th May 2018) regulations allow for tourism concessions to be leased to 
operators for 15 years. Private safari operators in the photographic industry claim that the 15-
year period is short as the logistics and administration to set up a tourism enterprise in the wild 
is expensive. Furthermore, it is claimed that the reinvestment of profits in wildlife concessions 
is constrained by the 15-year leases (Interview 78, Ian Khama, 4th March 2019). A decision 
was taken for BTO to award tourism operators longer leases of up to 30 – 50-year leases.  
 
One respondent noted that in certain instances the Minister of Environment often renewed 
leases of multi-national tourism companies without any challenges. Tshekedi Khama as 
Minister of Environment and young brother to Ian Khama micro-managed the BTO (Interview 
23, Tourism consultant, 20th May 2018). BTO reported directly to Tshekedi Khama, thus he 
was able to influence the day to day operations of the organization. As the minister, he was 
responsible for appointing the board of directors and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). It is 
understood that BTO operated without board of directors since April 2015. The board of 
directors is the only governing body of BTO and should be responsible for all the decisions 
and can only engage the minister for guidelines (BTO Act, 2009). As it stands, it is extremely 
difficult for indigenous Batswana to get into luxury safari tourism. A standard lease agreement 
contains a right of refusal clause which gives the incumbent tenant the right to match the price 
of a third-party vying to replace him/her in a concession area. If the tenant’s lease is not 
renewed and must vacate the site, s/he has to be fully compensated for infrastructural 
developments that in most cases would have been carried out over an extremely long period of 
time at a prohibitive cost. Therefore, extending the lease period would mean that the tenants 
spend more money making it even more difficult for citizens to replace them.  
 
The Tourism Land Bank has the potential to favor or open possibilities for land accumulation 






a desire by MENT to allocate lucrative tourism land to British billionaire Richard Branson 
(Serite, 2018). Earlier that month, Branson had made a courtesy visit to President Ian Khama, 
after which an instruction was issued to the Tawana Land Board (TLB) officials directing them 
to allocate Branson some portion of land in Moremi Game Reserve (Interview, 22, TLB 
official, 18th May 2018). The TLB official said: 
 
we did not do as we were instructed by the Minister of Environment and the Minister 
of Lands and Housing because we had to follow the due procedure as per the Tribal 
Land Act. You should note that Moremi Game Reserve is tribal land hence we needed 
to consult first with the BaTawana chieftaincy. Again, we did not understand why they 
wanted the deal to be done before the 1st April 2018.  
 
It is claimed that Tshekedi Khama (Minister of Environment) and Prince Maele (Minister of 
Lands and Housing) travelled to Maun from Gaborone to try to convince the TLB officials to 
allocate a prime concession to Branson before President Ian Khama vacated the office in 1st 
April 2018 (Interview 22, TLB official, 18th May 2018). Upon their return to Gaborone, four 
land board officials were dismissed from work by Maele on the 29th March 2018 for declining 
to allocate land to Branson. The allocation of sites to multinationals and billionaires will further 
contribute to high revenue leakages (Mbaiwa, 2005). As it stands, the tourism industry is 
mainly in the hands of foreigners who take over 70% of earnings (Mbaiwa and Hambira, 2020). 
The recentralization of tourism concessions can be attributed in part to the government of 
Botswana’s intention to consolidate the high cost low volume tourism model in which the 
country is marketed and branded as offering a unique wilderness product that appeals to the 
international community. To achieve this, there was a need to establish such an instrument that 
would attract foreign direct investment into tourism concessions in the Okavango Delta 
because private companies often have the financial and technical skills that could  complement 
the high cost low volume model that Botswana promotes. In other words, they have the means 
to implement technological innovation that minimizes environmental impacts while at the same 








This chapter focused on the transformation of the state in Botswana under the presidency of 
Ian Khama, a crucial moment in the consolidation of Botswana as a green state. The chapter 
has demonstrated the ways in which Khama defined state authority over wildlife thereby 
deepening the greening of the state. The chapter affirms that resource governance is embedded 
within the politics of the state. This means that resource governance is often a mirror image of 
the state. The militaristic outlook of the president Ian Khama aided militarisation of the state, 
wildlife conservation and recentralization of state power in wildlife governance.  
Green militarization, an attempt to enforce the green agenda constituted a very important 
element in the greening of Botswana. The intensification of green militarization came at a time 
when the world was facing an international crisis in environmental crime as a result of 
increased commercial wildlife poaching that threatened the survival of mega charismatic 
species. Commercial poaching also threatens the security and economy of the country.  With 
Botswana highly dependent on tourism for its economy, it was not surprising that the Botswana 
government under the leadership of former military head Ian Khama intensified its efforts to 
protect the country’s environmental assets.   
The Botswana state has revealed authoritarian leanings in wildlife conservation through 
government decisions to allocate resource royalties in NEF; the presidential decision to 
suspend hunting and establish tourism land bank. These decisions are illustrative of Ian 
Khama’s centralized and personalized decision making in resource management (Hoon, 2014). 
This is characterised by lack of engagement with local stakeholders and the reluctance to 
devolve power because it would mean leaving highly lucrative industry in the hands of the 
local people. These decisions and the attendant shifting of authority have not only reduced local 
autonomy over wildlife but have also opened new avenues for tourism private sector 
dominance in the wildlife sector. The next step is to show through a case study of Khwai how 
relationships between the state and its citizens are shaped through the medium of tourism 







State-citizen relations in the wildlife sector 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The transformation of the state of Botswana has brought various changes in wildlife 
governance and forged new relations between the state and its citizens at the local level, where 
control and access to natural resources is fiercely contested. This chapter demonstrates how the 
process of greening is entrenched in tourism concessions in the Okavango Delta and how this 
in turn shapes state-citizen relations. Tourism concessions are units of economic production 
and control leased out by the government of Botswana to local communities and the private 
sector for profit making either for consumptive or non-consumptive use. Concessions in the 
Okavango Delta conform to a business model that promotes profit making and the protection 
of the environment simultaneously. In this regard, a tourism concession is an important model 
that the state has put in place to practice and enforce the green agenda that ensures capital 
accumulation. This process is dependent on the protection of environmental assets from 
exploitation by locals. For instance, concessions place restrictions on land use: they forbid the 
creation of new settlement, cultivation, and keeping of domestic animals. This way, they are 
instrumental for the greening of the state at the local level. The greening process in the 
Okavango Delta unfolds in two main ways, namely, i) the participation of local communities 
through the CBNRM programme and ii) the involvement of the private safari tourism 
operators.  
The CBNRM initiative considers local communities as important agents in implementing the 
green agenda in far-flung remote areas. Local communities facilitate the greening process by 
embracing the programme as important for the sustainable use and management of resources 
and generating socio-economic benefits such as eco-based revenue, jobs, and infrastructure. 
Local communities are targeted for implementing the green agenda through CBNRM because 
they are often considered as a site of least resistance for at least two reasons. First, there is no 
mobilised civil society in far-flung areas that can fight for the rights of local communities if 
government undermines them. Second, CBNRM brings rewards to local communities to entice 
them to agree to practice the green agenda with the promise that they will generate profits if 
they sustainably manage the resources. Thus, CBNRM is part of the nation-wide business 
model that promotes profits and environment protection. The private sector is there to reinforce 






the latest technological innovation that minimises environmental impacts on a fragile 
ecosystem such as the Okavango Delta.   
 
The emergence of the green state is not without contradictions. Craig (2018, p. 1) noted that 
the state is a paradoxical force for and against ecological crisis in that it pursues domestic and 
global environmental policies while it also seeks to “reestablish profitable models of capital 
accumulation and economic growth”. The central government often wants to develop local 
communities who are located in fragile environments such as the Okavango Delta. The 
development paradigm has the potential to harm the resources that are important for greening 
the state. In Botswana, these contradictions played out through the marginalization of local 
people in the ecotourism enterprise, which has created tension between the state and local 
communities in the Okavango Delta. The tension is caused by state resistance to decentralise 
control of financial rewards in wildlife management from the state to its citizens as well as the 
recentralization of control in allocation of tourism concessions in the Delta. This has limited 
the autonomy of local communities in decision making and opened new avenues for private 
sector accumulation. This is typical of the consequences of state-driven greening processes in 
the Global South, where they are not able to deliver environmental justice. It is important to 
note that developed countries do not have to deal with such contradictions hence they are able 
to prioritize environmental justice. 
This chapter consists of three substantive sections. In the first part of this chapter, I demonstrate 
the ways through which the process of greening has unfolded at the local level within the 
context of CBRNM and private sector involvement in concessions in the Okavango Delta. The 
second part of the chapter explores how community concessions through CBNRM mediate the 
relations between the state and its citizens using the case study of Khwai village in the 
Okavango Delta. I do so by exploring the shifting of authority in allocating user and 
management rights in NG19, a tourism concession area awarded to Khwai Development Trust 
(KDT) by the Tawana Land Board (TLB) in 2002.  
6.2 The greening process in tourism concessions in the Okavango Delta 
In this section I focus on how greening of the local level is achieved in tourism concessions in 
the Okavango Delta. To facilitate the protection of environmental assets and green growth, the 






private sector involvement. The government of Botswana has divided concessions into various 
forms of wildlife utilization – multipurpose, consumptive or non-consumptive use (Interview 
60, Senior DWNP Official, 20th July 2018). These concessions are leased out to either local 
communities under the CBNRM programme or private tourism safari operators by the relevant 
land authority. Where a concession is situated on communal land, the respective regional tribal 
land board becomes the appropriate land authority and usage rights are provided for by the 
Tribal Land Act of 1968 (amended in 1993). Tribal land in Botswana is communally owned 
hence it is held in trust for communities by a regional tribal land board. For instance, communal 
land in the Okavango Delta is held in trust by the Tawana Land Board (TLB). As such TLB is 
responsible for granting resource use leases to the various stakeholders in the Delta. 
Concessions on state land, are granted by the central government through the Department of 
Lands. For identification purposes, concession areas are given codes depending on where they 
are situated in the country. For instance, in the Okavango Delta concessions are given NGs 
(Ngamiland) as their code; those in Chobe region is CHs, Kgalagadi is KD (see Figure 6.1).  








Figure 6.1: Map showing concessions in Botswana (Source: Okavango Research Institute, 
2019) 
6.2.1 Greening the Okavango Delta through the CBNRM programme 
CBNRM in Botswana was implemented as part of the global move from fortress conservation 
that had alienated local communities from natural resource use and beneficiation. Here, 
CBNRM involves devolution of power and authority to manage wildlife from central 
government to local communities in the Okavango Delta. The model predicts that if 
communities are given management responsibility over their local natural resources and obtain 
socio-economic benefits, they will be encouraged to use these resources sustainably so that 
both conservation and rural development goals can be achieved simultaneously. This means 
that local communities are critical agents in facilitating the greening process at the local level 
with the promise that they will derive socio-economic rewards such as income, jobs and 
infrastructure that will enable them to uplift their livelihoods. In Botswana CBNRM was 
externally implemented by donor agencies in 1989 (cf. Chapter Four). There are other similar 






Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, 
conservancies in Namibia and wildlife management areas (WMAs) in Tanzania.  
For communities to implement the green agenda and enjoy the financial rewards that comes 
with CBNRM they must have a community trust. A community trust is a legal institution that 
represents and safeguards the interests of their community in sustainable wildlife use and 
management. The setting up of a community trust is facilitated by the technical committee 
comprising of representatives from the land board, DWNP and the district council. The 
community trust is legally governed by the constitution and must show proof of fair 
representation and accountability (Cassidy, 2000; Rozemeijer, 2009). A board of trustees is 
elected to represent the community and carry out day to day CBNRM activities on behalf of 
the community. The general membership of the trust consists of all members of the village/s 
that wish to be part of the CBNRM programme. Some examples of community trusts in the 
Okavango Delta include but are not limited to Khwai Development Trust (KDT), Sankuyo 
Tshwaragano Management Trust (STMT), Mababe Zokotshana Development Trust (MZDT) 
and Okavango Kopano Mokoro Community Trust (OKMCT) which represents several 
villages.  
Once a community trust is formed, the community is granted a 15-year resource lease over a 
concession in their respective communal land by the Tawana Land Board (TLB). For instance, 
Khwai Development Trust (KDT) has been granted a resource lease for concession area NG18 
and NG19. The resource lease specifies the rights and responsibilities of the lease holder. The 
resource lease does not confer ownership over the land but rather it gives exclusive rights to 
use a concession area for commercial purposes to earn profit and protect the environment 
(Rozemeijer, 2009). In addition, the community trust must prepare and implement a 
management and land use plan for the area, which must be acceptable to government.  
Once the resource lease has been granted by TLB, the community can be awarded a wildlife 
quota for hunting purposes by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) based 
on the annual animal census data. Although local communities used to comment on the draft 
quota, they do not have control over the final wildlife quota. It is for this reason that Arntzen 
et al. (2003) argue that in 2002 communities stopped commenting, as their comments were 
rarely incorporated. Legally, the community decides how to use the quota. The trust may 






members in exchange for cash. The lack of local capacity to run the high-end hunting safaris 
have forced local communities to tender out the quota to private hunting operators to maximize 
its income from wildlife.  
For photographic tourism concessions, community trusts sub-lease or enter into a joint venture 
partnership with the private photographic safari operators. The Joint venture partnerships (JVP) 
guidelines (1999) prepared by the DWNP recommends a 1-1-3-5-5-year contract model. That 
is, the first and second sub-lease should last for a year, the third for 3 years and fourth and fifth 
each five year (Interview 49, CBNRM coordinator, 11th July 2018; see Blackie, 2019). The 
justification for this contract model is to try and protect community trusts from being trapped 
with an undesirable partner or in an undesirable contract (Gujadhur, 2001; Interview 24, 
Regional wildlife coordinator, 22nd May 2018). JVPs encourages partnerships that exhibit the 
correct mix of financial strength, requisite experience and strong empowerment credentials. 
Through such partnerships, it is hoped that local communities will gain necessary managerial 
skills that will allow them to run their own community tourism business efficiently. However, 
it has been noted that the JVP system is weak and that there is no significant transfer of 
entrepreneurship and managerial skills between safari hunting companies and communities 
(Mbaiwa, 2015). Instead of being at the forefront of the tourism business in their areas, the 
trust has been turned into a landlord with no evidence of them becoming owners (Mbaiwa, 
2015). 
The profits derived by local communities from lease agreements has allowed communities to 
invest in tourism infrastructure (see Figure 6.2) and provide direct community benefits. Profits 
have been used to cover funerals and provide funding for scholarships, old age/destitute, small 
scale business, sports, construction houses for the needy and household dividends. However, 
there is compelling evidence that CBOs have been plagued by financial mismanagement and 
abuse of power by the board of trustees (Arntzen, 2003; Thakadu, 2005; Mogende and 
Kolawole, 2016). For example, in the year 2001 a total of P99,461 and P18,984 could not be 
accounted by Mababe Zokotshana development Trust and Sankuyo Tshwaraganyo 
Management Trust respectively (Mulale, 2005; Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2010). In the Khwai 
Development Trust (KDT), close to a million pula went missing from the trust account as I 
shall show in the next section. Often these funds tend to be appropriated by the board of 






becoming a ‘foreign import’ project (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2010; Mogende and Kolawole, 
2016), which has not considered the local contexts and systems in place. The board of trustees 
usually consist of uneducated young people who do not have the necessary skills in business 
and financial management (see Twyman, 2001, 2020). The lack of financial expertise means 
finances are misused or inefficiently allocated. 
 
Figure 6.2: Wooden Bridge in a community concession (Source: Author, 2018) 
The question to be asked is how do local communities protect environmental assets in their 
concessions in the Okavango Delta? The protection of environmental assets, namely wildlife 
and other natural resources such as thatching grass and veldt products have been practiced 
through the implementation of Management Oriented Monitoring System (MOMS) (Interview 
31, Community Escort Guide, 29th May 2018). This a community-based tool that allows 
information on biodiversity to be collected in a user-friendly, simple and practical manner. It 
involves the collection of data using an event book and various types of registration cards for 
recording observations of wildlife. These event books are used by community escort guides 
(CEGs) who record wildlife sightings, rare and endangered species, mortalities, meat 







CEGs are members of the community who have been employed by community trusts to enforce 
conservation rules and practices in their respective community concessions. They are trained 
by DWNP and often conduct routine patrols, anti-poaching and wildlife resource monitoring 
in their concessions. In hunting concessions CEGs escort hunting safari operators to ensure 
good hunting controls and ethics from hunters. That means that they ensure that hunters abide 
by the hunting quota, whereas in photographic concessions, they ensure that photographic 
activities do not harm the pristine nature of the Okavango Delta either through waste-disposal, 
off-road driving or any other environmental harmful activities (Interview 31, CEG, 29th May 
2018). CEGs are empowered to act in the event that rules are not followed. In case of illegal 
hunting, they can arrest the culprit and hand the person to the Botswana Police Service (BPS). 
They have also put signage in their concessions to alert people of what is allowed and not 
allowed (see Figure 6.3). If a community member fails to observe conservation rules set by the 
community such a member maybe suspended from deriving benefits from the CBNRM 
program in their village until such a time an assessment has been made by the trust that the 
person has redeemed him/herself (Interview 29, Headman, 27th May, 2018). Such measures 
encourage members of the community to use resources sustainably. Interviews with regional 
DWNP officials reveal that unsustainable practices such as illegal offtake of species have 
lowered in areas where CBNRM is taking place. Recorded incidents of illegal hunting declined 
from a high of 23 in 1998 to 5 in 2006 (Mbaiwa et al., 2011). The case of CBNRM demonstrates 
that by recognizing local rights to land, the CBNRM program enables communities to police 
their own resources and enforce the green agenda within their concession area because they 







Figure 6.3: Signage of no poaching in a community concession (Source: Author, 2018) 
  
6.2.2 Private sector concessionaires and their green practices 
In this section I pay attention to how the private sector participates in the process of greening 
through photographic concessions in the Okavango Delta. Photographic tourism concessions 
for the private sector in the Okavango Delta are administered by the Tawana Land Board (TLB) 
via a tender system. TLB advertises tenders for concessions in which various companies submit 
their bids. The tenders are open to all companies that have an interest in managing the 
respective concession. The bids are evaluated and ranked across a range of criteria including 
environmental conservation, financial performance, corporate social responsibility by a tender 
evaluation committee made up of an independent panel of experts (Interview 22, TLB official, 
21st May 2018). The system is designed to attract the most competent operators, and to ensure 
that the local communities, and the country, derive maximum benefit from the use of its 
resources for tourism. This panel makes recommendations to the TLB which makes the final 
decisions on who wins the tender. The Botswana Tourism Organisation (BTO) is charged with 
the responsibility to attract investments in photographic tourism although their role has been 
modified to allocate concessions to the private sector under the administration of Ian Khama 







Private sector operators pay concession rental, resource royalty fees, sales tax on 
accommodation receipts, income tax and per-bed night levy to the central government.  
Companies leasing the concessions must adhere to strict guidelines designating the use of the 
leased concession. For example, a concession may be allocated 20 beds and 45 kilometres of 
game drive roads. This is meant to complement and consolidate the high cost low volume 
photographic tourism strategy by the government of Botswana. Concession operators pay high 
annual fees for each vehicle, aircraft and boats used within the area. Private safari operators 
must empower and employ locals thus reinforcing the policy of involving and benefiting the 
communities living in and around concessions. They also undertake cooperate social 
responsibility (CSR). Concessions are evaluated during their concession term about fulfillment 
of these conditions and overall management practices. Infringement of any of these 
requirements carries penalties such as non-renewal of the lease.  
 
Private safari photographic operators that operate luxury tourism in the Okavango Delta 
include Ker and Downey, Desert and Delta, &Beyond, Great Plains, Aberkrombie and Kent 
and Okavango Wilderness Safaris (OWS) just to name a few. The private sector has been 
influential in pioneering the use of semi-permanent structures which in principle could be 
removed at the end of the concession period (i.e. no above ground cement is used) (Interview 
23, BTO official, 21st May 2018).  A set of greening practices are identifiable in photographic 
luxury tourism concessions leased to the private safari operators, which is closest to the 
ecological modernization (EM) ideal of a green state. EM calls for the implementation of the 
latest eco-friendly technological innovation that minimizes environmental impacts while 
promoting economic growth. The implementation of such technology requires financial and 
technical capacity, which the private sector is endowed with. The private safari tourism 
operators in Botswana have implemented energy efficient technology that minimizes 
environmental impacts thereby complementing the HCLV tourism model in Botswana. For the 
purpose of fleshing out some of the identifiable green practices in private safari concessions I 
draw on examples from Okavango Wilderness Safaris (OWS), a subsidiary of Wilderness 
Safaris Holdings. OWS is one of the biggest ecotourism companies in Botswana, operating 
approximately twenty-two (22) luxurious lodges. Wilderness Safaris Holdings operates 
lodges/hotels in other African countries including Namibia, South Africa, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Wilderness Safaris prides itself as an ecotourism company 








OWS operations are guided by its 4Cs- commerce, community, culture and conservation. In 
relation to the protection of the environment, OWS aims to reduce energy consumption and 
fuel use in all their concessions in the Okavango Delta (Interview 13, OWS official, 11th May 
2018). The company has since shifted away from the use of fossil fuels to solar energy in all 
their lodges and camps. In the past, Wilderness Safaris has been using diesel fueled generators 
for energy supply which is not environmentally friendly particularly in the fragile ecosystem 
of the Okavango Delta (Mbaiwa et al., 2018). In 2012 the company decided to use solar energy 
for the provision of electricity and hot water via solar panels and inverters (see Figure 4; 
Interview 13, OWS official, 11th May 2018). A representative from OWS noted that: 
 
The un-spoilt wilderness in which we operate is fragile so our footprint has to be light 
and gentle to minimize any negative impacts that our operations might have on the 
environment (Interview 15, OWS official, 14th May 2018). 
 
The move away from fossil energy, means that the risk of fuel spillages is avoided in the fragile 
Okavango Delta.  Wilderness Holdings (2015) notes that between 2012 and 2015, it managed 
to reduce carbon emissions by 16% from 0.097 to 0.081 tons of CO2 e per bed night. 
Furthermore, wastewater (sewage and grey water) is treated in an above ground sewage plane 
ensuring that the water is clean before being allowed to enter the environment. In order to 
reduce overuse of bottled water, reverse osmosis filtration is done on site to provide guests 







Figure 6.4: Solar power system in OWS concession (Source: Wilderness Safaris, 2018) 
 
6.3 SHIFTING ARRANGEMENTS IN ALLOCATION OF CONCESSION AREAS  
With increased added financial value in photographic concessions in the Okavango Delta, the 
state is reluctant to give local communities full ownership of tourism concessions. Instead the 
Botswana state through the recent presidential policy changes, that is the tourism land bank, 
aims to reclaim lucrative tourism concessions from local communities. That means that the 
control of photographic concessions is being reconsolidated under state control with 
concessions being granted by the central state. The move to recentralize the allocation of 
concessions away from the tribal land boards to the central state has significantly altered the 
relations between the state and local communities in the Okavango Delta. The changes 
happening at the local level are mainly informed by or responsive to the national policy 
changes. In this section I focus on the shifting arrangements of allocation and control of 
concession areas in the Okavango Delta. The authority to grant photographic tourism sites 
underwent a significant transformation in 2014 under the presidency of Lt. General Ian Khama. 
As discussed in Chapter Five approximately 44 tourism sites countrywide were transferred 
from the authority of the land boards to the central government in the Ministry of Environment 
through the presidential tourism land bank. Whilst the hunting ban was in effect, all hunting 






(2020) estimate that a total of 22 hunting concessions in the Okavango Delta were duly 
converted into photographic concessions.  
Previously, concessions in the Delta were under the administrative authority of the Tawana 
Land board (TLB) but the process changed with the introduction of the tourism land bank as 
discussed in Chapter Five. The administrative authority for photographic concessions now lies 
with the Botswana Tourism Organization (BTO) in the Ministry of Environment, an 
unprecedented move deemed by others as a violation of Botswana’s land administration 
(Interviews 21, TLB official, 21st May 2018, Khwai councilor, 27th June 2018; 24 DWNP 
regional official, 23rd May 2018). This move by the state as discussed in Chapter Five was to 
enhance foreign direct investment in wildlife-based photographic tourism, a sector that is 
already dominated by foreign companies (Mbaiwa, 2005; Mbaiwa and Hambira, 2020). These 
companies typically have connections to international markets and start-up capital to reinforce 
the green agenda that local communities do not possess. This translates into ‘foreignization of 
green spaces’ in concessions surrounding local community settlements. The replacement of the 
land board as an authority to administer concessions has caused friction between the state and 
local communities as I shall show in the case study of Khwai village.  
This process of recentralization created tension and intensified hostile relations between the 
state and local communities and has caused friction between private safari operators and local 
communities in the Okavango Delta. Some community concessions in the Okavango Delta 
have been placed in the Land Bank (Mbaiwa and Hambira, 2020). For instance, NG19 for the 
Khwai community which includes a luxury photographic site has been included in the land 
bank as I shall show in the next section. The land bank gives BTO the power to sign leases 
with private operators in community concessions without the involvement of the relevant 
community trust. With such an arrangement, resource royalties generated from leasing 
community concessions is directly channeled to the central government through BTO rather 
than the community.  Next, I show how the involvement of the state in CBNRM operations has 









6.4 Evolving state-citizen relations in WMA NG19, Khwai village 
I present the case of Khwai to demonstrate how the relationships between the state and its 
citizens are shaped through the medium of concessions in the Okavango Delta. Khwai 
settlement is situated in concession area NG19 on the northern part of the Moremi Game 
Reserve and along the Khwai River (see Figure 6.5). Due to the availability of permanent water 
in the riverbed, Khwai has been an exceptionally rich area for wildlife. The Khwai community 
mainly comprises of the Bugakghwe or RiverBushmen people, a Basarwa (San) group, one of 
the most marginalized ethnic groups in Botswana (Taylor, 2000; Good, 2008; Marobela, 2010). 
There is a long history of evictions of the Basarwa from their ancestral lands to pave way for 
the protection and conservation of wildlife. As a result of these evictions the government has 
curtailed their wildlife-based livelihoods (i.e. hunting and gathering) which mainly defines 
their ethnicity. This has resulted in tense and untrusting relations between the government of 
Botswana and the Basarwa community. The eviction of marginalized groups is not only unique 
to Botswana but has also been taking place in other African states. For example, Maasai 
pastoralists were relocated from the Serengeti National Park, Mkomazi Game Reserve and 
Ngorongoro Conservation areas in Tanzania (Brockington, 2005), Wameru agro-pastoralists 
were evicted from Arusha National Park (Neumann, 1998).  
The Basarwa of Khwai are no exception to evictions. They were relocated from the Moremi 
Game Reserve in 1964 (Bolaane, 2004; Mbaiwa, 2005). Taylor (2000) narrates how people’s 
houses were burnt down to make sure that they do not return to the park. An elderly informant 
of Khwai who was there when the relocation happened explained that: 
 
We were evicted from our land by the government. There was a perception that Basarwa 
are utilizing wildlife unsustainably, so we were evicted to pave way for protection of 
wildlife. I do not understand why people kept on saying that we were depleting wildlife 
but look now wildlife numbers have drastically increased particularly elephants and 
buffaloes. These animals now continue to threaten our lives and livelihoods. As we 
speak today, the government and white operators are benefiting more from our deeds. 
We have always used wildlife in a more sustainable manner, conservation runs in our 







Khwai village was established to accommodate the resettled families of Basarwa from Moremi 
Game Reserve. In the process of their relocation, Basarwa lost access to natural resources 
within the game reserve. One informant noted that they could enter the park via transit only or 
as game guides (Interview, Khwai resident, 30th May 2018). Taylor (2006) laments that the 
government tried several times to relocate Basarwa from Khwai without much success. Since 
their area is situated in a flourishing WMA, the government “regarded their presence in an area 
with high wildlife densities on a tourist route as antithetical to wildlife conservation and tourist 
development” (Taylor, 2006, p. 56). I recall in 2013 when I first visited the Khwai community 
as a research assistant, rumours circulated around the village that the government of the day 
was planning another relocation. The relocation from the reserve created tension between the 
state and the Khwai community.   
 
The relationship between the Khwai community and the Botswana state is further shaped by 
the presence of private safari photographic operators situated in and around Khwai village. At 
the time of their relocation to Khwai, NG19 concession area consisted of three prime 
photographic tourism sites – Tsaro lodge, Khwai River lodge and Machaba lodge – which were 
leased to private safaris by the land board. Tsaro lodge was eventually given to the Khwai 
community in 2002 as I shall show in the next section. The presence of safari operators has 
caused bitterness. It is argued that residents have not come to terms with the game reserve, the 









Figure 6.5: Map showing Khawi village in the Okavango Delta 
The state-citizen relationship is multidimensional in nature. They border on the political, 
economic, social and civil spheres. What shapes or defines state-citizen relations in the context 
of CBNRM is the devolution of power, rights and responsibilities in the management of 
wildlife resources from the central state to the local communities. This process of devolution 
of power over resources demands a democratic and accountable government, an engaged and 
informed citizenry. Therefore, by state-citizen relations I mean moments when the state 
transfers power and rights over resources to local communities to pursue the green agenda and 
is dismantled as the result of the behavior of the state. When the state gives local communities 
power and rights over resources it gives the state legitimacy and a democratic outlook. This 
creates trust between the state and its citizens as they are able to collaborate together to pursue 
the green agenda with the promise that local communities will derive profits from the 
collaboration. When the state takes away that power and rights over the resources through 
financial costing and recentralization of control over concessions it tears apart the relations 






When CBNRM was introduced in the early 1990s, the Khwai community became the first to 
be approached to participate in the initiative by the national resource management project 
(NRMP). The low human population of Khwai in relation to wildlife, flourishing wildlife 
populations and the location of Khwai on existing tourist routes made Khwai appealing for 
CBNRM (Taylor, 2000, 2006). With these factors, the area was believed to have the highest 
tourism economic potential (Taylor, 2000; Interviews 50, DWNP official, 11th July 2018; 
Historian, 24th April 2018). Therefore, the Khwai community was requested to establish a 
community trust and enter into a JVP with a commercial safari operator, John Calis Hunting 
safaris who could develop the areas tourism potential and pay royalties to the community 
(Bolaane, 2004; Taylor, 2006; Interview 50, DWNP official, 11th July 2018). Despite a 
promising proposal by the implementers of CBNRM, the residents did not agree with the idea. 
The residents saw the proposal as part of a strategy by government to compromise their access 
to land. They did not want to relinquish control of their land to an outsider (Interviews 50, 
DWNP official, 11th July 2018; Khwai headman, 30th May 2018). Therefore, the question of 
access to traditional land and its resources characterized the Basarwa’s response to the 
government's CBNRM initiative (Bolaane, 2004).  
 
CBNRM presented an opportunity for the Khwai community to claim land rights (Interview 4, 
Historian, 24th April 2018). With the assistance of the University of Botswana lecturer Dr 
Emang Gaborone, the community established a land committee, Khwai Interim Management 
Committee (KIMC) in 1994 (Taylor, 2000; 2006).  With much success, they requested the 
Minister of Local Government and Lands to transfer all NG19 tourism photographic 
concession sites to the Khwai community (Interview 22, KDT assistant manager, 21st May 
2018; Tawana and Chobe Land Board Management Plan, 1996). As alluded to earlier, NG19 
consisted of three luxurious photographic tourism sites namely Tsaro lodge, Khwai River lodge 
and Machaba Lodge which were in the hands of the white safari operators. The Khwai 
community wanted to gain management rights over the lodges in NG19. The Minister of Local 
Government and Lands agreed in principle to a phased takeover of the management of the 
photographic tourism sites in NG19 (Tawana and Chobe Land Boards Management Plan, 
1996). The lodge sites were to be transferred over to the Khwai community when their 
respective leases expired. Tsaro lodge had a lease valid until 2001; Khwai River lodge 2021 
and Machaba lodge was operating without a formal lease (Interview 22, KDT assistant 







For the Khwai community to get management rights over tourism sites in NG19, they were 
requested to form a community trust. However, the formation of the community trust was 
delayed. The community proposed an exclusive Basarwa community, discriminating against 
other ethnic groups. This meant that other ethnic groups residing in the village could not 
participate nor benefit from the trust (Interview, 50 DWNP official, 11th July 2018). This was 
in reaction to the progressive dispossession they had experienced and a historical process of 
alienation from political and economic processes by the dominant Tswana groups (Bolaane, 
2004; Interview 4, Historian, 24th April 2018). One elderly informant noted that as Basarwa 
the government of Botswana had never treated them as people (Interview, 30th May 2018). 
They also saw this as a means of protecting their village from becoming dominated by outsiders 
(Interview 43, elderly Khwai resident, 30th May 2018). However, their proposal to limit the 
trust to Basarwa only was ethnically divisive and was denied by the land board and wildlife 
department hence the delay in registering the trust (Interview 49, CBNRM coordinator, 11th 
July 2018). As highlighted in Chapter Four the Botswana state under the presidency of Sir 
Seretse Khama adopted a non-ethnic discriminatory stance. All citizens are Batswana and have 
the right to apply for land everywhere they wish to. The land board and DWNP advised the 
community to make the trust inclusive to which they agreed resulting in the formation of the 
Khwai Development Trust (KDT) in 2000. 
Following the formation of KDT in 2000, the wildlife department granted KDT their first 
annual wildlife quota. Instead of sub-leasing their resource use rights to a joint partner, KDT 
decided to have full control over their wildlife quota. They conducted an animal-by-animal 
auction for safari hunters. Boggs (2004) argues that safari hunters were not satisfied with the 
KDT auction system hence they lowered their bids after the first year. In 2002, KDT decided 
to auction the entire quota to a single company (Boggs, 2004). It is estimated that KDT 
generated over P3,000,000 from their commercial wildlife base joint ventures (Taylor, 2000; 
Mulale, 2005; Mbaiwa, 2005). In addition, jobs were created for residents between 2000 and 
2002. However, due to lack of capacity to manage funds, huge sums of money were 
unaccounted for, mismanagement became pervasive and over P1,000,000 remained 
unaccounted for in 2003 (Mulale, 2005; Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). I remember in 2013 
whilst a research assistant when I attended the KDT annual general meeting, the internal 






who claimed unnecessary board meeting sitting and travel allowances. This caused mistrust 
between the board of trustees and the general membership of KDT. For this reason, DWNP 
suspended the allocation of the wildlife quota to KDT in 2003. DWNP required KDT to 
account for mismanagement of funds before a quota could be issued. KDT reported the matter 
of mismanagement of funds to the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) for 
investigation (Mulale, 2005).  
Prior to the 2004 national elections, things took a different turn. In July 2004, just a month 
before elections, the Minister of Environment and the new Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 
parliamentary candidate for Chobe held a political rally in Khwai (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 
2004, 2010). At the rally, the BDP parliamentary candidate produced a quota and returned it to 
the community of Khwai. The candidate member of parliament (MP) won the parliamentary 
seat. Khwai has been under the opposition party. Tactics were used by politicians to manipulate 
wildlife resources for political gain; the BDP politicians used the wildlife quota to dispense 
patronage to a local clientele (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2010). The politicians used their 
political power to bring back the quota despite KDTs failure to meet technical bureaucratic 
requirements of DWNP.  
 
The mismanagement of funds was also taking place in other community-based organisations. 
The reason for the mismanagement of revenue is not far-fetched. CBNRM was a foreign 
project that did not consider the conditions of local communities in remote areas. Since 
CBNRM is based on accumulation of capital to improve the livelihoods of local communities, 
locals did not have financial and technical skills to manage their operations thus leading to the 
misuse of funds. The mismanagement of funds became an opportunity for the government of 
Botswana to reassert control over wildlife, a resource that they never intended to give away to 
locals in the first place. In 2001, the Ministry of Local Government issued a Savingram 
directing all revenue to be transferred from community trusts to district councils (Rihoy and 
Maguranyanga, 2007, 2010). This rent-seeking behaviour by the state was opposed with much 
success by the National CBNRM forum steering committee. The committee argued that the 
government had no legal right to instruct legally registered community trusts to transfer their 








However, in 2007 through the CBNRM policy, the government of Botswana eventually 
managed to recentralise control over wildlife revenue. The government of Botswana infused a 
65/35 percent clause, meaning that 35 percent of revenue would be retained by the community 
trusts whereas 65 percent would be directed to the central government. As noted in the 
preceding chapter, the 65 percent was placed in the National Environmental Fund (NEF) to be 
distributed nationally for conservation related projects. It should be noted that local 
communities were not consulted before this decision was taken by government. Contrary to 
the objectives of CBNRM that aims to devolve power to local communities, the 
implementation of the 65/35 percent clause undermines the relationship between the state and 
its citizens. In the eyes of the locals, the state of Botswana is not democratic and accountable 
when it comes to management of resources of high value such as wildlife, resulting in distrust 
between the state and local communities. Rent-seeking behaviour of states in community-based 
conservation is also taking place in Eastern Africa in countries such as Tanzania. There are 
similar trends of recentralising control over natural resources cancelling out attempts to support 
rural livelihoods through devolution of rights to resources (Nelson, 2010; Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson, 2012; Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Bluwstein et al., 2016).  
In 2002, management rights over Tsaro Lodge were eventually transferred to KDT as promised 
by the Ministry of Local Government and Lands (Tawana and Chobe Land Boards 
Management Plan, 1996). Tawana Land Board (TLB) authorized a 15-year lease to KDT 
effective 10th January 2002 to 11th January 2017 (Head Lease Agreement between KDT and 
TLB, 2002). Tsaro lodge is a luxury photographic tourism site covering an area of 5ha. The 
Lodge is a 16-bed facility with 8 chalets (see Figure 6.7). It is located in the south west corner 
of WMA NG19 on a plot abutting the northern boundary of the Moremi Game Reserve. Before 
being given to Khwai in 2002, the lodge was operated by Chobe Holdings (Pty) Ltd. For the 
first part of this section, I draw on work from Poteete and Ribot (2011) on description of events 
between TLB and Chobe Holdings relating to arguments for the extension of the lease for Tsaro 
lodge by the company. The authors have extensively perused the letters from the land board 







Figure 6.6: Tsaro Lodge (Source: Author, 2018) 
 
Before initiating the process to transfer management rights of Tsaro lodge to KDT, the land 
board gave Chobe Holdings a notice advising the company that their lease would not be 
renewed when it expires. Despite the notification, the company challenged the decision 
(Poteete and Ribot, 2011). The company presented their case to national politicians, the TLB 
and KDT with the aim of getting an extension of the lease from the land board as well as 
compensation for fixed improvements from KDT (Poteete and Ribot, 2011).  
 
Chobe Holdings engaged then member of parliament who was also part of the cabinet, Jacob 
Nkate. In their letter to Nkate, the company presented various reasons as to why their lease 
should be extended. Firstly, the company noted that the 15-year leases for tourism in 
community managed areas are much shorter than the 50-99-year leases for other commercial 
sectors. Secondly, the company argued that benevolent landlord would give rights of first 
refusal to the current leaseholder even in the absence of a legal requirement to do so. Thirdly, 
they noted that it had invested substantially in refurbishing the lodge. Fourthly, the company 
claimed that TLB had provided inadequate notice of the termination of the lease (Poteete and 
Ribot, 2011, p. 442). The company also dismissed KDT as lacking both capacity and authority 
to make decisions. It nonetheless launched negotiations with the community to get partial 
compensation for fixed improvements (Poteete and Ribot, 2011, p. 442). However, KDT did 
not support the proposal.   
 
With these arguments, Chobe Holdings requested the central government to nullify the land 
board decision to transfer management rights over to KDT. However, their request was 
unsuccessful with the government upholding the land board decision. Despite the ruling by 






company then argued successfully for a delay in vacating the premises to avoid disruptions for 
the tourists (Poteete and Ribot, 2011). Poteete and Ribot (2011) claim that the company 
vandalized the property when they left the lodge as an act of sabotage.  
 
In January 2002, KDT managed to secure management rights over Tsaro lodge. Before they 
could operate the lodge, KDT was required by the TLB to produce a management plan for the 
lodge. Six months down the line, the lodge was still not operational. In June 2002, Ian Khama 
then vice president of Botswana visited Khwai and sought to intervene to get Tsaro lodge 
operating. Poteete and Ribot (2011, p. 443) argue that Ian Khama “entered the scene as a 
defender of national interest in keeping tourist facilities operational”. As discussed in Chapter 
Five, Ian Khama has business interests in the tourism industry in Botswana, with shares in 
some of the biggest tourism companies such as Wilderness safaris. Ian Khama was of the view 
that KDT should get into a strategic partnership more of a joint venture with Chobe Holdings 
to manage the lodge and speed its reopening. In addition, he wanted Chobe Holdings to be 
given right of first refusal before launching an open bidding process for management of the 
lodge (Poteete and Ribot, 2011, p. 443).   
 
By 2006, the lodge was still not operating despite the vice presidents attempt to intervene in 
re-opening of the lodge. Since the lodge was vandalized by Chobe Holdings when they vacated 
the premises, KDT requested funding from the Global Environment Facility’s (GEF) Small 
grant program to refurbish the lodge and get it operating. As one ex-member of the board of 
trustees explains: 
 
We renovated the lodge at a cost P2.5 million with the assistance of UNDP GEF, small 
grants program. However, the government refused to give us a tourism licence to 
operate the lodge though they had advised us to re-build the lodge (Interview, 29th May 
2018). 
 
The failure to get the lodge operational is attributed in part to the use of bricks and mortar in 
the construction of the lodge which was initially approved by the Department of Tourism and 
Department of Environmental Affairs (Interview 22, KDT assistant manager, 21st May 2018; 
see Figure 6.8). As part of green branding the new regulations for the Okavango Delta Ramsar 






ecological or physical impacts. Therefore, concessionaires are only allowed to construct semi-
permanent structures without mortar and brick. It is within this context, that the government 
advised KDT to put the lodge up for a tender so that the company that wins the tender will bear 
the costs for demolishing it and building a new lodge with semi-permanent structures (Tsaro 
Lodge tender guidelines, 2014). It should be noted that such structures require massive 




Figure 6.7: Tsaro lodge Chalets built with brick and mortar (Source: Author, 2018) 
 
In 2013, KDT approached BTO with the aim of getting assistance from the tourism parastatal 
in identifying a prospective investor. KDT wanted an investor whom they could trust and enter 
into a joint-venture partnership to operate the lodge. The ex-board member noted that: 
 
The Khwai community unanimously resolved that their preferred option for operating 
Tsaro lodge would be to lease it out to an investor. This came also after then President 
Ian Khama visited Khwai and was very concerned that the lodge was not operating 







According to KDT informants, BTO was to shortlist and recommend three companies 
(Interview 22, KDT assistant manager, 21st May 2018). That means, the role of BTO was to 
facilitate the tendering process for Tsaro lodge on behalf of the trust. With this arrangement in 
place, the successful bidder was to enter into a lease agreement with KDT. With a few years 
remaining on the KDT lease over Tsaro lodge, BTO advised KDT to obtain a new lease from 
TLB (CEO (503/03/2013)17. As such KDT wrote a letter to the TLB secretary requesting the 
lease extension for Tsaro lodge. The letter reads as follows: 
 
The request for lease extension is based on the fact that we are in the process of sub-
leasing the lodge and we have been advised that it would be next to impossible to find 
an interested bidder with the few years remaining on the lease.18  
 
In response to the letter, the land board resolved that the lease be terminated with immediate 
effect and the trust be issued with a new tourism lease (TLB/B/11/28 II (80))19. However, 
events took a different turn in 2014 with the implementation of the controversial presidential 
tourism land bank. The tender (tender No.  109/110314/NG19 (2)) for Tsaro Lodge was 
awarded to Kgori Safaris (Pty) Ltd, a company jointly owned by the BDP politician Jacob 
Nkate. Instead of recommending Kgori Safaris directly to KDT, BTO recommended the 
company to the permanent secretary (PS) of Ministry of Environment. The company had 
attained the highest overall score of 75.64% in the tender evaluation. The trust was represented 
by the trust accountant who was part of the evaluation committee and the Khwai Kgosi as the 
observer elected by the community to witness the proceedings. Then PS Neil Fitt awarded 
Kgori Safaris subject to the company providing proof of consent to source funds, a revised 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) plan and details on staff welfare in particular staff 
ablutions (EWTC 6/33/9/1/ 1 (48))20. The existing mortar and brick structures built by KDT 
were to be decommissioned within 5 years from the time of operation and replaced by semi-
permanent structures. This reflects that the government puts its faith in the private sector to 
reinforce the green agenda since they have the financial power to implement greener 
conservation practices as compared to local communities.  
 
17 Copy of BTO letter dated 04th March 2013. 
18 Copy of KDT letter dated 05 March 2013. 
19 Copy of TLB secretary letter dated 28th March 2013. 









Figure 6.8: Signage of Kgori Safaris at the entrance of Tsaro Lodge 
Kgori Safaris signed a new lease for Tsaro lodge with BTO and not KDT even though KDT 
had a lease running until January 2017. That meant that there were two leases running 
concurrently. TLB backed out on their earlier promise to get KDT a new lease, forcing KDT 
to approach the High court for redress. By the time I completed my fieldwork in Khwai village 
in July 2018 the matter was still at the High court. One executive member noted: 
 
We were told that Tsaro Lodge is now part of the Land Bank hence our lease will not 
be renewed. We were very shocked because that was not part of the plan when we 
approached BTO. We do not know anything about this Land Bank. We heard that the 
operator will only negotiate with the central government and not us (Interview, 29th 
May 2018).  
 
The Attorney General (AG) representing the land board argued that after KDT notified the 
TLB of their intention to renew the lease, there was a directive by former president Ian Khama 






land bank in 2014 (Botswana Gazette, 2015). The AG argued that KDT became an active 
participant in the sub-leasing of NG19. They consented to land being leased to someone else. 
What worries the community of Khwai is that Kgori Safaris will enter into the lease agreement 
with the government through BTO. That means, Kgori Safaris will directly pay royalties to the 
central government and not KDT. With this arrangement, they do not have a say on how things 
should be conducted on their concession site. To members of the KDT, Tsaro had been hijacked 
by BTO.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of concessions in greening the state in Botswana. 
Concessions place high value in profit making and in the protection of the environment. We 
see the greening of the state in the Okavango Delta which is the case study presented in this 
chapter in two forms namely the implementation of the CBNRM programme and the 
involvement of the private sector. Through the devolution of power and rights over wildlife 
resources, local communities are important agents in rolling out the green agenda on communal 
land. The devolution of power and rights over wildlife resources by the state to local 
communities in concessions has created unhealthy relations between the state and its citizens. 
The case of Khwai village reveals that the concession is not stable. The state is reluctant to give 
away power and rights over Tsaro lodge to KDT, but this does not come straight but rather 
through powerful government instrument, the presidential tourism land bank. The presence of 
BTO and absence of the Tawana Land Board in control of concessions has caused friction 
between the state and the local community of Khwai. The process of the land bank has 
deepened the processes of alienation from land and resources that surrounds Khwai, fuelling a 
source of bitterness in the community. Even if the state is reluctant to give away power and 
rights over the resource, communities continue to press for the green agenda on their own 
because they have tasted the profits that comes with managing this high value resource. The 
case of Khwai hints that the greening process is accompanied by environmental injustice. That 
is to say that the top down control of concessions by the Botswana state is not a democratic 
and accountable process. In pushing for a green economy and the greening of the state, the 
government of Botswana is determined to override CBNRM principles by involving the private 
sector in community concessions without due processes being followed. This is because the 






to adopt greener conservation practices that feeds into and complement the high cost low 




































Is Botswana a green state? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This study set out to understand the greening of Botswana as a state and how this process 
unfolded over a long period of time. I deploy the concept of the green state to pay attention to 
the complex processes that enabled the greening of Botswana as a state through the lens of a 
changing wildlife conservation policy and practices. I do so by investigating the role of political 
leaders, that is the presidency, in influencing and shaping the greening of the state between 
1966 to 2018, a period that covers the administration of Seretse Khama, Ketumile Masire, 
Festus Mogae and Ian Khama and how this in turn defines or shapes state-citizen relations in 
the country. The process of greening in Botswana has been achieved through the wildlife 
economy. Since independence, environmental protection has transformed environmental 
governance and significantly contributed to state-building in Botswana.   
In this concluding chapter, I revisit the concept of the green state and draw out key insights on 
the greening of the state using the specific case of Botswana’s wildlife sector. The case of 
Botswana challenges the normative assumptions that informs the debates on the green state 
which have excluded African states from the analyses of the green state. I begin the chapter by 
demonstrating the importance of analyzing the greening of the state in terms of processes rather 
than emphasizing ecological outcomes as put forward by theorists of the green state. I argue 
that the greening of the state hinges on processes by the which the state interacts with non-
governmental organisations, civil society, the private sector and international agencies and 
regimes to enact environmental reforms aimed at environmental sustainability. Such 
interaction maybe initiated by the state or by non-state actors who are determined to pursue an 
environmental agenda or to implement environmental strategies through organs of state 
institutions. Four key insights are drawn from the greening process of Botswana to summarize 
the main findings of the study. Firstly, transnational networks are critical in facilitating 
environmental reforms that consequently leads to the greening of the state. Secondly, the 
greening of the state entails political processes that shape environmental reforms. Here political 
leaders are critical agents in the greening of the state. Thirdly, the greening process necessitates 
the internal restructuring of the state by establishing relevant institutional structures necessary 
to drive the green agenda. Fourthly, the greening process in Botswana resulted in negative 






7.2 Greening of the state 
To facilitate the analysis the green state of Botswana the study applied the theory of the green 
state to the African context to investigate the ways through which the green state is produced. 
The theory of the green state considers the state as an agency in fostering environmental 
sustainability and as a critical instrument for solving environmental problems. The concept of 
the green state offers us an opportunity to reflect on how the state engages with environmental 
issues at the national and subnational levels to achieve an ecologically sustainable society. A 
green state is a state that strives to achieve environmentally sound behavior by aiming for 
political, economic and institutional change based on ecological rationality (Dryzek et al., 
2003). Green state theorists tend to over-emphasize the greening of the state in relation to the 
environmental outcomes that are measured in economically developed democracies in the 
Global North.  
The focus on environmental outcomes by green state theorists has turned a blind eye to 
environmental governance and politics in the Global South. In Africa, this omission ignores 
that countries on the continent are involved in protecting the environment and have also 
embarked on various environmental reforms. Theorists of the green state are of the view that 
developing nations do not have attributes that would qualify them to be analysed through the 
theory of the green state (Sonnenfeld and Mol, 2002; Eckersely and Barry, 2005; Mol, 2016). 
The lack of attention to  the developing world is derived from the strongly held view that states 
in the Global South have weak, failing or failed state capacity whereas the green state in the 
Global North is post-materialist and therefore able to pursue environmental justice. Against 
this backdrop, countries in Africa like Botswana would not qualify to be a green state according 
to green theorists. As such the normative view that informs much discussions on the green state 
limits the space for exploring many and varied actions carried out by the state like Botswana 
and many others in the Global South.  
 
The focus on the ecological outcomes misses out on understanding a crucial aspect in the 
analysis of the green state, namely the processes that produce the green state.  Therefore, I look 
‘beyond the usual suspects’ for the analysis of the green state by paying attention to these 
processes in the African context using Botswana as an example. These processes are important 
for understanding state efforts towards addressing environmental challenges. It allows us to 






time. Furthermore, it helps us to understand the main drivers of and the motives for 
environmental reforms in a country. In the domain of conservation, African states have 
embarked on processes of state greening through various strategies such as green militarization, 
transfontier conservation areas (TFCAs) and community-based conservation (CBC). These 
strategies invoke green discourses within the politics of the state. In addition, the discourses 
underpin international and multi-lateral agreements to which many African states are 
signatories.  
 
Environmental discourses and practices in Africa suggest some element of greening taking 
place on the continent. As we noted in Chapter Two and Four wildlife conservation programs 
have been driven by the interaction of state and non-state actors and global environmental 
regimes; suggesting that the green state in Africa is not an autonomous bureaucratic institution. 
Wildlife conservation has enabled the state to deepen and extend state power particularly in 
rural Africa, where wildlife resources are located and where state authority has been marginal. 
Considering this perspective, the greening of the state is not only confined to economically 
developed countries. The challenge to green theorists is to find various ways and different 
contexts in which many countries in the Global South are playing their role – however limited 
this might be – in trying to solve environmental problems.  
 
7.3 Key insights on the greening of the state from Botswana’s wildlife sector 
Key insights that can be drawn from the greening of Botswana as a state through the lens of 
wildlife conservation policy and practice include: the convergence of the interests of external 
and domestic actors towards facilitating environmental reforms, the political processes that 
shape environmental reforms, and the link between environmental (in)justice and the green 
state.  
7.3.1 Convergence of state and non-state actors in greening the state  
Green state theorists have paid less attention to the importance of the interaction between the 
state and external forces in the production of green states. The case of Botswana demonstrates 
that the environmental policies the country pursued were not an initiative of government alone, 
they are instead a product of the interaction between state authorities in Botswana and external 






international interest groups that interacted with the state between 1966 and 2018. Although 
the state formalizes and administers environmental policy through its agencies, such policy is 
conceived and shaped through vertical and horizontal networks (Death, 2016a; Johnston, 2017, 
2019), where either the state or non-state actors initiate the interaction to pursue an 
environmental agenda.  
The case of Botswana demonstrates that the country would not have embarked on the greening 
process without the involvement of non-state actors. Non-state actors have significantly 
influenced and shaped conservation agendas and outcomes that impact on the state whereas the 
state has provided an enabling policy environment. It is critical to note that the greening process 
cannot be complete or effective without an enabling policy environment. The changing wildlife 
conservation policy and practices in Botswana served as a medium for the interaction between 
domestic and international actors and interventions. In the case of Botswana, environmental 
agendas of and actions by non-state actors coincided with the state’s desire to experiment with 
and to develop a high cost-low volume (HCLV) tourism model that safeguard the country’s 
environmental assets, namely wildlife and wilderness areas. This model aims at minimizing 
environmental impacts while at the same time promoting economic (green) growth by 
attracting few high paying tourists to Botswana’s wilderness destinations such as the Okavango 
Delta. In other words, these are spaces for those who can pay (very handsomely) for the 
experience.  
  
Non-state actors have influenced the conservation agenda in Botswana in many ways. First, 
they helped in setting and rolling out conservation ideas as well as financing environmental 
programmes and providing technical backstopping. For instance, the suggestion for Botswana 
to adopt the HCLV was initiated by non-state actors at the symposium held by the Botswana 
Society (cf. Chapter Four). This green conservation ethos was consolidated by the 
implementation of the Tourism Policy of 1990. In turn, the policy enhanced the regulatory 
power of the state to protect the pristine and fragile environment in areas such as the Okavango 
Delta. It is worth noting that this policy has largely been driven by the private tourism sector 
because they have the adequate financial resources to implement environmental-friendly 
technological innovation in concession areas, which are instrumental for greening the state (cf. 
Chapter Six). The discourse and practices of international organizations and global 






management (CBNRM), which is anchored on the concept of sustainable development. 
CBNRM emanated from the promotion of decentralized approaches worldwide and was 
facilitated mainly by external donors such as USAID (cf. Chapter Four). This approach 
considered local communities to be critical agents in implementing the green agenda at the 
local level on communal land. The influence of transnational forces can also be gleaned from 
the creation of the TFCAs. The TFCA initiative in Southern Africa has largely been driven by 
the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) and contributed significantly to the emergence of a 
transnational African green state where states cooperate together towards a common goal of 
managing transboundary natural resources such as wildlife. Botswana is currently part of the 
Kgalagadi Transfontier Park (KTP), the KAZA and the Greater Mapunbungwe TFCA. The 
idea of TFCA has thus been mainstreamed into the Wildlife Conservation Policy since 2013. 
For instance, the policy aims to “facilitate the development of TFCAs and other transboundary 
management initiatives to promote regional integration in conservation and economic benefits” 
(p. 14).  
 
Second, non-state actors have provided the much-needed data on the status of biodiversity that 
required the active participation of the state. For instance, the Elephant Without Borders 
(EWB), a USA linked NGO based in Botswana conducted a wildlife census in 2011 on the 
status of wildlife populations in the country in conjunction with DWNP, in which they 
observed a decline in wildlife populations of some species (cf. Chapter Five). Based on the 
EWB report, the former president of Botswana Ian Khama took the decision to suspend hunting 
in January 2014. The hunting ban served to promote and further reinforce the commercial 
interests of the photographic industry which is highly politically connected.  
 
Third, international environmental organisations have directed environmental policy through 
lobbying, putting pressure on the state to adopt particular environmental plans or strategies. 
For example, the protection of the Okavango Delta and Botswana’s tourism interest are 
associated with pressure from Green Peace International and local actors, who saw the move 
to stop the constructions of dams in the Delta – which were intended to supply water to 
surrounding areas in the 1980s (cf. Chapter Four) – as a threat to biodiversity and as an 
economic asset. Green Peace International and IUCN lobbied the government of Botswana to 
list the Delta as a wetland of international importance in 1996 as well as for its inscription as a 







Fourth, the role of the private sector is not fully acknowledged in the scholarship on the green 
state yet it plays an important role in driving the green agenda. The case of Botswana 
demonstrates that the private sector in tourism has significantly influenced and directed the 
development of luxurious tourism that is dependent on green branding in the Okavango Delta 
(cf. Chapter Six). The private safari tourism operators have substantially invested in green 
ideas, green technologies (e.g. solar energy, mobile safari electric car) and programmes that 
contribute to environmental solutions while at the same time generating wealth. This is because 
the private sector has the financial capacity to implement technological innovation that tackles 
environmental problems. The types of technological innovations implemented by the private 
sector is identical to the ecological modernization type of a state. The implementation of green 
technologies and programmes has since improved the quality standards of tourism destination 
in Botswana as well as how such areas are marketed and promoted but also contributed 
significantly to the GDP of the country (Spenceley and Snyman, 2017). Furthermore, the 
private sector has enhanced the conservation of rhinos, an endangered species in the Okavango 
Delta. In collaboration with the state and neighboring states, the private sector has enabled the 
relocation of the rhinos from South Africa to the Okavango Delta between 2015 and 2017. The 
influence of non-state actors in Botswana’s environmental conservation policies accounts for 
the variation in the depth of the greening process.  
 
7.3.2 Political leadership in the greening of the state 
Analyses of the green state have yet to fully appreciate the role of leadership (green managers) 
in shaping environmental reforms. This calls for the need to look beyond the technical 
operation of national agencies, to reflect on the role played by political leaders in promoting 
green discourses and practices. This is important as the greening of the state entails political 
processes that shape environmental reforms. State leaders are crucial in that they can facilitate 
or resist environmental reforms and changes in institutional structures. State leaders authorize 
policies that in turn impact on the state as well as the international profile of the state. It is 
widely acknowledged among scholars in international relations, political science and 
economics that political leadership matters most at times of crisis or when international 
conditions are fluid or when the economy of the country is in turbulence (Keller and Yang, 
2008; Dyson and Briggs, 2017; Mintz and Tal-Shir, 2019). Whenever there is a crisis, citizens 






shape policies and behavior of states either through the mandate of ruling political parties or 
by their own initiatives. Ascendancy to state power by a new president or prime minister raises 
the prospect of changes in policy decisions and the state’s approach to environmental questions 
in part due to differences in personality traits. In addition, political leaders also command 
public attention, which in turn shapes state-citizen relations.  
I contend that political leadership is a critical driver in greening the state. They are part and 
parcel of the process in that they can strengthen, interrupt, constrain or slow the process of 
greening. They also articulate the green agenda and have the authority to pursue such an agenda 
through the organs and structures of the state. The case of Botswana shows that the four 
presidents, Seretse Khama, Ketumile Masire, Festus Mogae and Ian Khama have been 
instrumental in shaping wildlife policy that guided the development of the luxurious high-end 
tourism between 1966 and 2018. Their ideological orientation provided a fertile ground for the 
greening of Botswana.  
 
The presidency of Ian Khama was a crucial moment in the greening process of the state: he 
strengthened wildlife policy, realigned the wildlife economy with political power, and profiled 
the green image of the state in international platforms. This profile is evidenced by the green-
related awards he received from environmentally minded organisations and institutions. His 
presidential decision to temporarily suspend hunting in early 2014 (cf. Chapter Five) was 
widely applauded by the international conservationists and animal rights groups. However, the 
decision was not well received by those in the hunting industry and local communities, who 
have been benefiting from hunting. Writing on his blog about the Kasane conference on illegal 
wildlife trade, which was attended by 32 countries in 2015, the EU and international NGOs, 
the British High commissioner to Botswana, Nick Pyle commented that: 
 
The involvement of His Excellency President Khama demonstrated the real African 
leadership on this issue that the UK was looking for when we launched the illegal 
wildlife trade initiative in London in February 2014 (2015). 
 
This statement by the British High Commissioner to Botswana demonstrates that the greening 
process does not work in isolation from the international community. Rather it is shaped by the 






hunting ban in place, Botswana became a global leader in conservation and the number one 
tourism destination in Southern Africa because of its unique product that appealed to tourists 
from the Global North. As the policy gets more strengthened on environmental issues, the 
greening of the state becomes more visible as a process.  
 
Not only did former President Khama ban hunting, he also reinforced the protection of wildlife 
through militarization. At the height of increased commercial poaching in the Southern African 
region and illegal wildlife trade across the world, Ian Khama strengthened the military by 
bringing more security agencies into wildlife conservation. His administration also armed the 
DWNP anti-poaching unit with military weapons. At the same time, the government sanctioned 
the unofficial use of the shoot-to kill policy to deter poachers. Khama’s military background 
enabled him to promote green militarization in Botswana. With Botswana dependent on a few 
sectors of the economy such as high-end tourism and considering the risk poaching poses to 
the national economy and security, it is not surprising that the Botswana government under the 
presidency of Ian Khama protected wildlife seemingly at all cost (Ramutsindela and Büscher, 
2019). It is under this condition that Botswana earned a global reputation as Africa’s wildlife 
safe haven that saw many rhinos relocated to the country for safe keeping in 2015.  Ian Khama’s 
international conservation awards attest to his leadership in strengthening wildlife protection 
and steering environmental conservation (cf. Chapter Five). It is for this reason that this thesis 
argues that the greening process was enhanced under the presidency of Ian Khama.  
 
The new government under the presidency of Mokgweetsi Masisi also attests to the importance 
of political leadership in shaping green agendas. While international conservation actors and 
photographic tourism operators in Botswana were happy with the increased pace of the 
greening process of the state through wildlife under Ian Khama, at the end of his rule there are 
emerging signs of slowing down some of the elements of the greening process under the 
administration of the new President Mokgweetsi Masisi. Shortly after ascending to power in 
April 2018, Masisi unraveled his predecessor’s policies. For example, he disarmed the DWNP 
anti-poaching unit with certain military grade arms. Masisi stated that the move was in line 
with existing legislation which does not allow the department to use such military grade arms 
(Masisi, 2018). President Masisi further slowed down the process of greening by lifting the 
hunting ban in August 2019. The official reason for lifting the moratorium on hunting was 






the northern part of the country apparently due to the high wildlife populations in the area (GoB 
Facebook page, 2018). The government of Botswana explained that the country had 
experienced a thriving elephant population estimated at 130,000 against a 54,000 carrying 
capacity. This large population of elephants had created an ecological imbalance in their natural 
habitats and caused damage to local communities and placed a strain on natural resources such 
as water and vegetation (GoB, Facebook page, 2018).   
 
The reversal of the hunting ban was not well received by the international community. The 
international community claimed that Botswana was regressing; calling the lifting of the ban 
unethical while others referred to it as ‘Blood law’ (Joubert, 2019). International 
conservationists were of the view that such a move by Botswana will harm the country’s 
international reputation of conservation that will in turn affect the economy of the country. 
Many chalked it up to a populist ploy to win votes ahead of the national elections in October 
2019. A similar situation regarding the role of political leadership in greening the state can be 
gleaned from the United States of America (USA) where President Donald Trump reversed 
some of the policies put in place by his predecessor Barack Obama. It is under Donald Trump’s 
administration that the US pulled out of the climate change Paris Agreement. In simple terms, 
political leaders matter in the greening process of the state.  
 
7.3.3 State restructuring for greening Botswana 
The greening of the state is not complete without the necessary specialized administrative 
institutions. Green institutions enable effective green governance necessary for managing the 
environment and for restructuring human-environment relations (Johnston, 2019). They consist 
of environmental ministries and agencies “populated with a cadre of public officials with 
explicit responsibility for environmental protection’’ (Duit et al., 2016, p. 16). These 
institutions coordinate and administer green laws and policies within the territory of the state 
and become involved in managing transboundary environmental issues with other states. They 
are also able to facilitate the ratification of various environment-related treaties and collaborate 
with various institutions such as research organisations in providing green knowledge and 
expertise necessary for making informed decisions on environmental matters.  
The case of Botswana demonstrates that internal restructuring of the state was crucial for 






in fragmentation and weak approaches for tackling environmental issues. In 2002, institutions 
of the state were restructured to align their functions with the wildlife economy. With the 
assistance of IUCN, the Botswana government established a strong and dedicated 
environmental ministry in 2002, which housed several departments. This ministry is tasked 
with the responsibility of overseeing environmental and natural resource management and 
guiding the development of the wildlife economy. A number of departments including 
Department of National Parks (DWNP) and of environmental affairs (DEA) were placed under 
this ministry. To promote and guide the development of the luxurious ecotourism model that 
simultaneously promotes profit making and protection of the environment, the Botswana 
government established a parastatal, Botswana Tourism Organisation (BTO). This 
organization plays a crucial role in developing and implementing ecotourism guidelines that 
aspire to international ecotourism standards that promotes green branding. These guidelines 
monitor and steers the business activities of the private sector as well as local community trusts 
in the Okavango Delta. The Ministry of Environment is one of the biggest ministries in 
Botswana due to its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is anchored on 
the protection of environmental assets, namely wildlife. Reflecting the increased central role 
of wildlife conservation in the country’s national development planning, the budget for the 
ministry of environment has grown over the years from just P226,675,530 in 2002/03 financial 
budget to just P756,120,180 in 2018 with the DWNP being awarded the lion share of the 
ministry budget over the years (MENT, 2018). 
 
7.3.4 State-citizen relations in the greening process of Botswana 
Poverty, under-development and environmental injustice pose a serious threat to achieving 
environmental sustainability.  According to theorists of the green state, such a state prioritizes 
environmental justice and tackling poverty (Eckersely, 2004). However, environmental 
governance in Africa has to confront the sharp contradictions between socio-economic 
development and delivering the green agenda as determined by environmental organisations in 
the Global North. More often environmental protection takes priority over the livelihoods of 
ordinary citizens. For instance, environmental governance often limits access to natural 
resources by local communities that are dependent on them for their survival – which reflects 
trends in the colonial era of environmental injustice (Garland, 2008). Environmental injustice 






and political elite’s winners. As such, the greening process in Africa is characterized by 
negative state-citizen relations. However, these relations do not serve as a barrier to the 
emergence of a green state (Chandrashekeran et al., 2017). As Death (2016a) argues, this 
should have a central place within empirical accounts of the ways in which states in Africa 
have sought to govern natural resources within their territory.  
The case of Botswana demonstrates that the process of greening the state through the wildlife 
sector has brought about changes in wildlife governance and in the relationships between the 
state and local communities at a local level, where struggles over concessions and wildlife 
resources are contested. The study considered the relationship between the state and its citizens 
within the context of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). As such 
CBNRM is an important vehicle through which local communities can participate in 
facilitating the greening process in the Okavango Delta. What defines the relationship between 
the state and local communities in the greening process at the local level is the devolution of 
authority and management responsibilities over concessions from the central government to 
local communities usually by granting local communities resource rights. The premise is that 
local communities will be able to effectively manage their concessions sustainably and 
participate in the green agenda because they are able to reap socio-economic benefits such as 
income, infrastructure, employment and the like.  
 
The case study of the Khwai community in the Okavango Delta has demonstrated that the 
relationship between the state and its citizens in the context of CBNRM is fluid and tense (c.f. 
Chapter Six). This situation manifests itself in two important ways. Firstly, the central 
government partially granted local communities resource user and management rights over 
concessions in order to harness their cooperation in the implementation of CBNRM in the mid-
1990s. Local institutions such as land boards, district councils were brought in to facilitate the 
granting of user and management rights over concessions in collaboration with DWNP and 
local communities. In the eyes of local communities CBNRM was an opportunity to reclaim 
authority over land that they had previously lost due to evictions from Moremi Game Reserve. 
Through CBNRM, local communities with the support of local government agencies were able 
to make decisions on how they manage their concessions, whom they can enter into partnership 
with to develop their product, and how they distribute profits generated from the use of 






reinvest their profits to improve their livelihoods as well as the provision of infrastructure. 
They have also been able to protect the environmental assets which are important for providing 
income in their concession.  
 
Secondly, state-citizen relations were significantly altered between 2008 and 2018 as a result 
of the rent-seeking behaviour of the state and recentralization of decision-making power from 
local institutions such as land boards to central government. This recentralization of decision-
making power came with the introduction of the presidential Tourism Land Bank under the 
presidency of Ian Khama, which created friction between the state and its citizens in the 
Okavango Delta. Through the tourism land bank, several aspects of decision making on 
CBNRM, particularly granting of tourism concessions leases, was moved from the land 
boards/local communities to the BTO. That meant that, the allocation of prime photographic 
tourism concessions in the Okavango Delta were recentralized, controlled and restricted by the 
state resulting in hostile relations between the state and citizens in Khwai as their concession 
was placed under the Tourism Land Bank. Through this process the land bank deepens the 
processes of alienating land and resources from local communities. This has created tension 
between citizens and the state. The recentralization of decision making in management rights 
over photographic concessions was in part due to reinforcing the HCLV tourism model in 
which marketing and branding Botswana as a prime wilderness destination took precedence 
under the presidency of Ian Khama. As one of the government officials commented: 
 
CBNRM is dead in Botswana. Decisions are made by the highest office in the country, 
particularly that wildlife is high stake resource and they have interest in the tourism 
industry. This resource has always been centralized since independence and the state 
has never wanted to give ordinary citizens a stake in the tourism industry particularly 
in lucrative sites in the Delta (Interview 70, DWNP, 27th January 2019). 
 
In its pursuit of green growth, the government of Botswana acts on behalf of private capital but 
undermines the aspirations and interests of local communities (Molomo, 2008). However, local 
communities have been able to contest government decisions because they have tasted the 
fruits that come with managing wildlife even though the state never intended to give over rights 
to local communities in the first place. Therefore, the greening process at the local level is 






authoritarian control of people, land and environment are very much part of the greening 
process in Africa.  
 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has traced the evolution of wildlife conservation policy in Botswana between 1966 
to 2018, a period that covers the presidency of the founding father of the nation to his son Ian 
Khama to understand the complex processes that enable the production of the green state. This 
thesis makes two main contributions to the green state debates. First, it demonstrates that the 
process of greening unfolds over time within the context of a developing country and that this 
process opens avenues for expanding analyses of the green state beyond countries in the Global 
North. The case of Botswana showcases the importance of analyzing the green state in terms 
of processes that facilitates or limits state efforts in tackling environmental issues. The thesis 
highlights that the focus by green state theorists on ecological outcomes which tends to be 
measured well in economically developed democracies have overlooked many and varied 
green actions carried out by states in developing countries. The focus on processes that enable 
green state formation challenges conceptions of the green state and offers a platform for 
including more developing countries in the analysis of the green state. Secondly, the thesis 
demonstrates the importance of political leadership i.e. heads of states, in shaping green 
discourses and practices. Political leaders are drivers of the greening process: they can 
strengthen or slow down the greening process.  
The analysis of Botswana’s wildlife sector shows that the country is in the process of greening. 
The greening process of Botswana has been enabled by the interaction of state authorities and 
international agencies and actors who financed environmental-related programmes and 
facilitated the development of green institutions. The greening process manifests in two main 
ways. First, the four presidents were instrumental in shaping the wildlife policy that guided the 
development of the high cost low volume tourism industry that became a contributor to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country, and their ideological orientation enabled this to 
happen. However, the presidency of Ian Khama stands out as the peak of the greening of 
Botswana because it realigned the wildlife economy with political power. Second, the 
institutions of the state were restructured so that they would align state activities with the green 






region to enrich the debates on the green states. This would allow us to draw on similarities 
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1. What does good governance mean to you? 
2. What makes good governance over natural resources? 
3. How should natural resources be governed?  
4. Who should govern natural resources and why? 
 
B. Leadership and natural resource governance 
 
1. How would you describe the leadership of Sir Seretse Khama; Ketumile Masire; 
Festus Mogae and Ian Khama? Probe: why do you say that? What did they do? 
2. Did the governance of natural resources differ under each of these leaders? If yes, 
what were the changes? If no, why were there no changes?  
3. How has each leader influenced Botswana’s wildlife policy? Probe: How did they 
pursue wildlife policy.  
4. Is there any difference or similarity in the way they pursued wildlife policies?  
5. What do you think was the state vision for wildlife at independence?  
 
C. Institutional arrangements 
1. How were natural resources governed before independence?  
2. How did state leaders of Botswana rearrange traditional and colonial institutions in 
natural resource governance after independence?  
3. How did this play out in the governance of wildlife?  
4. What is the role of tribal authorities in wildlife governance in modern Botswana? 
5. How does the state involve tribal authorities in wildlife governance? 
 
D. Public-private relations in wildlife governance 
1. What is the role of the private sector in wildlife in Botswana?  
2. How does the state involve with the private sector in wildlife governance? 
3. When did private companies start operating in the Okavango Delta? Probe: How 






4. How do private companies acquire land in the Okavango Delta? 
5. What is the role of the state in facilitating the acquisition of prime spots by private 
companies in the Delta?  
6. When did we start to see the influx of private tour operators in the Okavango Delta. 
Probe: Why do you think that happened?  
7. To what extent has the private sector influenced wildlife policies in modern 
Botswana?  
8. Why has the state decided to pursue public-private partnership in wildlife based 
tourism?  
9. What effect has public-private partnership or privatization had on local 
communities in the delta?  
10. What frameworks regulate private sector operations in wildlife governance in the 
public interest?  
11. What role do government institutions play in the public-private partnership? And 
what is their relationship with the private sector? 
 
E. State-society relations 
1. What is the role of local community in management of wildlife?  
2. How does the state involve with local community in wildlife governance?  
3. What support does the state give to local communities in governance of wildlife? 
4. To what extent has power and authority of management of wildlife devolved to 
local communities? And what impact has this had on popular control? 
5.  Is there tension between local communities and the state in CBNRM? If so, why? 
6. Why do you think the state favors centralization over decentralization of natural 
resources?  
7. How do state decisions on wildlife impact on local communities? 








APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW TEMPLATE: LOCAL COMMUNITIES – KHWAI
A. Good governance
1. What does good governance mean to you?
2. What makes good governance over natural resources?
3. Who should govern natural resources and why?
B. Leadership and natural resource governance
1. How would you describe Sir Seretse Khama; Ketumile Masire; Festus Mogae and Ian
Khama?
2. How has each leader influenced Botswana wildlife policy?
3. Did the governance of wildlife differ under each of these leaders? If yes, what has
changed? If no, why were there no changes?
C. State-society relations
1. How would you describe the relationship of the above leaders of Botswana with
your local community in wildlife governance?
2. Has there been any change with regard to how state leaders relate with local
communities in wildlife areas?
3. How has state decisions on wildlife affected your local community?
4. Who decides on partnerships between local communities and private sector
operators?
5. Why do you think the state favors centralization over decentralization of natural
resources?
6. What are the challenges that your community face in wildlife governance?
